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ABSTRACT
The Role o f Discrete Emotions in Advertising Context Effects
Stacy Davis
Joseph N. Cappella
The purpose o f this study was to assess how emotions elicited by television programs
influence the way in which subsequently viewed persuasive messages are cognitively
processed. Research on the influence o f discrete emotions on information processing has
shown that happiness elicits greater peripheral processing, while sadness leads people to
engage in greater central processing. It was hypothesized that messages which were
placed in a happy program context would be more likely to be processed peripherally,
while those that were embedded in a sad program context would be processed centrally.
It was also hypothesized that the emotion o f the messages themselves would interact with
the emotion o f the programs, such that a happy message would be more persuasive when
placed in a happy program, while a sad message would be rated as more persuasive when
placed in a sad program. Two theories were proposed to explain the mechanism through
which these effects might work. An experiment was conducted using 148 college
undergraduates at the University o f Pennsylvania. Participants were assigned to one o f
four experimental conditions, and were shown either a happy or sad program clip,
followed by either a happy or sad anti-drug public service announcements. As was
predicted, PSAs which were embedded in a happy program were more likely to be
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processed peripherally, while those that were embedded in a sad program were more likely
to be processed centrally. Little evidence was found to suggest that the emotion from the
PSAs interacted with the emotion o f the programs. However, some evidence was found
to suggest that the content o f the PSAs interacted with the emotion o f the programs. The
results suggest that advertisers should consider the emotion that is elicited by the
television programming contexts in which their messages appear in order to fully
understand the way in which viewers are processing them.
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INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that emotions play a significant role in the way we process
persuasive messages. Advertisers and politicians frequently use emotional appeals to
manipulate an audience’s attitude towards a product or issue by associating an attitude
object with a particular state o f emotional o r affective arousal (Breckier, 1993). Research
also shows that one’s affective state at the time o f processing a persuasive message can
influence one’s ability or motivation to process the message. While a considerable amount
o f research has acknowledged the role o f emotion in attitude formation and attitude
change, the process by which emotion mediates persuasion is not fully understood at this
point.
In general, studies which have attempted to address the role o f affect in the
persuasion process have focused on generalized mood states, paying little attention to
differences in the way specific discrete emotions influence the processing o f persuasive
messages. In the past decade, a number o f studies have evaluated how global positive or
negative mood states influence cognitions, and cognitive processing, but few studies have
considered how particular emotions interact with cognitive processes to determine the
outcome o f persuasive messages.
One area in which the role o f emotion in persuasion has significant practical
importance is in the cognitive processing o f advertising and public service announcements.
Because emotion is so commonly manipulated in these persuasive messages, the impact of
emotional response to these messages can not be ignored. In addition, a number of studies
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have evaluated how the affect elicited by the media environment (particularly television
programming) surrounding an advertisement can influence how consumers respond to an
advertising message. Again, research in this area has generally focused on the effects o f
generalized affective states, as opposed to discrete emotions. The purpose o f this
dissertation is to further examine the role that emotion plays in the processing o f
persuasive messages, by evaluating the role o f discrete emotions in television
programming context effects. The following questions will be asked: 1) what effects do
the emotions elicited by television programs have on cognitive processes? 2) can the
effects o f discrete emotions such as happiness and sadness which have been shown to
exert differential effects on cognitive processes explain differences in programming
context effects? 3) what is the process through which discrete emotions elicited by
television programming influence the processing o f persuasive messages? 4) how does
program-induced emotion interact with the emotion evoked by persuasive messages and
how does this interaction influence the effectiveness o f persuasive media messages?
In order to lay the framework for the hypotheses o f this study, research from
several areas will be outlined. First, an overview o f dual-process modes of persuasion will
be discussed, followed by a discussion o f research on the role o f affect and mood in the
persuasion process, including the limited research that exists on the influence o f discrete
emotions on information processing. Discussion will then turn to research on advertising
context effects and the role that message-irrelevant affect has been show to play in the
processing o f adverting messages. Finally an attempt will be made to integrate these
different areas o f research to show how discrete emotions may influence the way we
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process persuasive messages, with implications for the way emotions elicited by television
programs can influence the way we process television advertisements and public service
announcements. Based on the theories o f emotion, persuasion and context effects studies,
two theories will be put forth and tested to assess the process through which discrete
emotions may influence the way we process persuasive messages on television.
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BACKGROUND
Persuasion and Attitude Structure
While there is no one definition o f persuasion that all scholars accept, a general
definition o f persuasion is an attempt by a person to use communication to induce a
change in another person’s mental or emotional state. Although a change in one’s mental
state can be manifested in a change in one’s beliefs, perceptions or behavior, in the context
o f persuasion it most often refers to a change in attitude (Perloff 1993). While scholars
have struggled over the past century to develop a clear, comprehensive definition o f the
term attitude, most theorists would probably agree with the basic conceptualization o f
attitude as a learned (rather than innate), evaluation o f an object, person or idea that is
enduring and which guides or influences one’s behavior.
The structure o f attitudes has been the subject o f debate among persuasion
theorists. Under the classic model o f attitude structure, attitudes consist o f cognitive,
affective and behavioral components (Rosenberg & Ho viand, 1960). The cognitive
component is thought to represent thoughts, beliefs and judgments about an attitude
object, the affective component represents the feelings or emotion aroused by the attitude
object, and the behavioral component represents the actions taken in response to the
object (Breckler & Berman, 1991). Critics o f this model argue that it assumes that
attitudes must be linked to behavior, despite the fact that there is evidence that attitudes
may not predict behavior at all (for instance Zanna & Rempel, 1988). Because o f this
criticism, some researchers prefer to view attitudes as a global evaluation consisting o f
both cognitive and affective components (Cacioppo, Petty, & Geen, 1989; Pratkanis,
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1989). The extent to which attitudes are based on affective or cognitive components is
thought to vary (Millar & Millar, 1990), with attitudes including a mixture o f both
affective and cognitive components (Breckler, 1993). Although some scholars argue that
either the cognitive component (e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), or affective component
(e.g. Zajonc, 1980) is o f central importance to attitude structure, current models allow for
the possibility that either cognitive or emotional information (or a combination o f both)
can influence attitudes.

The Role of Affect in Models of Persuasion
Most modem persuasion research relies on the cognitive response approach which
assumes that the receiver o f persuasive messages plays an active role in the
communication process. Central to this approach is the notion that the thoughts and ideas
that a person generates while processing a persuasive message mediates the impact that
the message has on attitudes (Perloflf, 1993).
Contemporary persuasion research has been dominated by two cognitive
processing models: the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986),
and the Heuristic Model o f Persuasion (Chaiken, 1987), both o f which are based on the
belief that it is important to understand how one cognitively processes a message in order
to understand the impact that a message will have on that individual. While the two
models propose similar processes, the ELM will be discussed in greater detail here
because it has generated more attention and research.
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Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) Elaboration Likelihood model developed from
criticism o f other cognitive response theories which did not account for the fact that
contextual factors lead to substantial variability in the extent to which people are willing
and/or able to engage in message-relevant thing. The model takes into consideration the
fact that there are some situations in which people may actively process messages, and
engage in complex information processing, while in other situations they may process
messages more superficially. The assumption underlying the ELM is that there are two
distinct routes which can lead to attitude change. Central route processing occurs when an
individual is motivated and able to scrutinize a persuasive message. This type o f
processing is characterized by extensive cognitive elaboration in which an individual gives
careful and thoughtful consideration to the arguments presented, and may generate
counter arguments in response to the position advocated by the communicator. Peripheral
route processing occurs when the message recipient lacks either motivation or ability to
engage in extensive cognitive elaboration o f a persuasive message, in which case the
individual may rely on simple cues or heuristic devices, which may be external to the
message itself^ in order to make attitudinal judgments. An individual’s motivation to
process a message is thought to be influenced by a variety o f factors including whether the
issue is personally relevant (involvement), and whether an individual has a high need for
cognition. One’s ability to process a message is thought to be affected by such things as
distraction, prior knowledge, and message comprehensibility.
Another strength of the ELM is that it offers an explanation for why some attitudes
tend to endure over time, while others are more short-lived. According to the model,
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attitude change based on central route processing is more stable, persistent over time, and
more predictive o f behavior, whereas attitude change based on peripheral cues is less
enduring. The assumption is that when people engage in central route processing, they
access thoughts and rehearse mental arguments which are then stored in memory and
incorporated into an individual’s schema for that issue, making it less open to
counterpersuasion. In contrast, when people engage in peripheral route processing, they
are more apt to attend to the message’s external cues, so there is little cognitive
elaboration o f the message itself which reduces the likelihood that one’s schema for the
issue will be affected. As a result, attitudes shaped by peripheral processing are less likely
to hold up when they are challenged, or when the peripheral cues become less salient.
The Heuristic-Systematic Model o f Persuasion (HSM) proposes a similar dual
process conceptualization o f persuasion, suggesting that there are two types o f message
processing - systematic and heuristic (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken, Liberman & Eagly, 1989).
Systematic processing involves scrutinizing a messages and relating it to already held
knowledge, while heuristic processing takes place when a person uses simple decision
rules, such as “experts can be trusted” when judging a persuasive message without
engaging in extensive processing o f message content. Unlike the ELM, the HSM
contends that systematic and heuristic processing may co-occur, and may have both
independent as well as interactive effects on judgment (Chaiken, et. al., 1989; Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993). In addition, heuristic processing under the HSM differs somewhat from
the ELM’s peripheral route processing in that heuristic processing is thought to be
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completely cognitive, whereas peripheral route persuasion may occur as a result o f either
cognitive or affective factors which are external to the message.
Originally, the influence o f affect was not considered in discussion o f the ELM and
the HSM. Recently, however, studies have begun to address the role o f affect in the
persuasion process within the context o f the ELM. According to proponents o f the ELM,
affect is thought to influence attitude change in several ways, depending on the whether
elaboration likelihood is low, moderate or high. In situations where the likelihood o f
elaboration is low, affect is thought to act as a peripheral cue. When elaboration
likelihood is moderate, affect is thought to influence the nature and extent o f information
processing that takes place, and when elaboration likelihood is high, affect is thought to
act as a persuasive argument. (Petty, Cacioppo & Kasmer, 1988; Petty, Cacioppo,
Sedikides, & Strathman, 1988; Cacioppo & Petty, 1989; Petty, Gleicher & Baker, 1991).
These findings will be discussed further in following sections.
While greater attention is now being paid to the role o f affect in persuasion
models, most o f the studies which address the role o f affect in the ELM focus on the
effects o f general positive or negative mood states without considering the effects that
specific emotions may have on information processing and attitude change. Many
persuasion studies have failed to adequately acknowledge the distinction between moods
and emotion, often only discussing affect in terms o f positive or negative valence or “bad”
vs. “good” moods. However, it is important to distinguish between moods and emotion
when discussing the role o f affect in the persuasion process, because these affective states
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have unique properties which may exert differential effects in how we process persuasive
messages.
Before discussing the limited research which exists on the effects o f emotion on
persuasion, research focusing on the role o f mood in the persuasion process will be
discussed in order to better understand how affective states can influence information
processing, especially in the context o f the ELM.

Mood and Persuasion
The majority o f research conducted on mood and persuasion considers the role o f
mood in the context o f the cognitive response models discussed above. Mood is thought
to influence persuasion processes in a number o f ways (Schwartz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991).
First, one’s mood can act as a peripheral cue. Individuals may simplify their judgments by
asking themselves “How do I feel about it?”, using their affective state as a way to
evaluate the issue or object they are considering. If the individual is in a good mood
he/she should evaluate the object more positively than if he/she is in a bad mood. Second,
moods may influence the associations generated during message exposure by increasing
the accessibility o f mood congruent information in memory (the mood-congruency
hypothesis) (Bower, 1981). According to this view, affect primes concepts in memory
that are associated with the affective state. Thus, individuals in a good mood may generate
more positive associations then individuals who are in a bad mood, making them more
susceptible to persuasion. Third, affective states may influence the criteria individuals use
to evaluate the quality o f a message (the change-in-criteria hypothesis), so that individuals
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in a bad mood will use harsher criteria to judge an object or issue. While the above three
hypotheses predict that individuals in a good mood will be more likely to be persuaded
than those in a bad mood, two additional hypotheses suggest that individuals’ affective
state may influence the degree to which they elaborate the content o f persuasive messages
either by influencing motivation to elaborate message content, or by influencing ability to
elaborate on a message (i.e., by decreasing an individual’s information-processing
capacity). In their review o f evidence supporting each o f these hypothesis, Schwartz,
Bless, & Bohner (1991) concluded that there is most support for the notion that mood
influences the extent o f argument processing. Limited evidence was found to support the
change-in-criteria hypothesis, mood-congruent recall hypothesis, and mood as peripheral
cue hypothesis (Note that Forgas (1995) argues that there is ample evidence for both the
mood-congruent recall hypothesis and peripheral cue hypothesis. This will be discussed in
future sections).

Mood and information processing
Moods are expected to influence information processing style by impacting either
one’s motivation to process a persuasive message, or by influencing one’s information
processing capacity. A number o f studies indicate that subjects who are in a positive
mood are less motivated to elaborate on persuasive messages than those who are in a
negative mood. According to this hypothesis, individuals who are in a good mood are
more likely to engage in simplified, heuristic processing, while those in a bad mood are
more likely to engage in effortful, detailed, analytic processing (see Schwarz, Bless, &
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in a positive mood are less motivated to elaborate on persuasive messages than those
who are in a negative mood. According to this hypothesis, individuals who are in a
good mood are more likely to engage in simplified, heuristic processing, while those
in a bad mood are more likely to engage in effortful, detailed, analytic processing (see
Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991; Schwarz, 1990 for a review). Compared to
subjects in a bad mood, happy subjects have consistently been shown to rely more on
source cues and less on extensive evaluation o f message quality in persuasion settings
(Worth & Mackie, 1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989; Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack,
1990; Mackie & Worth, 1991; Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994), to show greater
reliance on stereotypes in assessing allegations o f guilt (Bodenhausen, 1993;
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994), and to use more heuristic approaches to
problem solving (Schwarz & Bless, 1991). Schwarz et al. (1991) explain the effects o f
mood on processing motivation in terms o f emotion theory, by citing Frijda’s (1988)
assumption that “emotions exist for the sake o f signaling states o f the world that have
to be responded to, or that no longer need response and action” (p. 354). Thus, they
argue that negative affect may signal to an individual that there is something in their
immediate situation that is problematic. This response will trigger an in-depth
processing style which will allow them to assess their situation carefully and
determine an appropriate response. In addition, a negative mood state may motivate
individuals to avoid erroneous decisions, again encouraging detailed, analytical
processing so as to prevent further complication o f an already problematic situation
(see Schwarz, 1990).
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In contrast, positive moods may signal to individuals that their environment is
safe, which will make them more likely to take risks, and more likely to engage in
superficial information processing strategies. Moreover, because positive moods do
not evoke or constrain one to a particular analytic cognitive procedure to cope with a
situation, individuals in a good mood may be less motivated to engage in analytic,
effortful cognition, and may exhibit greater creativity in their cognitive processes.
Isen (1984, 1993) offered a different explanation for the influence o f mood
states on processing strategies. She suggested that individuals in a positive mood
avoid engaging in effortful processing strategies because it would hinder their ability
to maintain their positive affective state. Unlike Schwarz et al., she adds that this
finding is dependent on the nature of the persuasive message. Individuals who are in a
good m ood will engage in systematic message processing if the message is positive,
because the message will allow them to maintain their positive affective state. They
will, however, avoid scrutinizing negative messages which could disrupt their positive
mood.
These findings suggest that the success o f persuasive messages is dependent
on the interaction between mood and the quality o f the arguments presented in the
message. Thus, individuals should be more persuaded by a message containing strong
arguments when they are in a bad mood, rather than a good mood. Conversely, they
should be more persuaded by messages which present weak arguments when they are
in a positive mood than when they are in a negative mood (e.g. Bless, Bohner,
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Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Bohner, Crow, Erb, & Schwarz, 1992; Innes & Ahrens,
1991).
The effects o f mood on message processing have also been explained in terms
o f the impact that positive and negative moods may have on information processing
capacity. This hypothesis suggests that mood related thoughts may decrease one’s
cognitive capacity, thus interfering with one’s ability to elaborate a message.
However, results from studies designed to test this hypothesis have rendered
inconsistent findings, so it is unclear whether negative or positive moods are more
likely to interfere with message processing capacity.
On the one hand, positive moods are thought to increase the accessibility o f
positive material (Bower, 1981), which is thought to be more extensive and
interrelated in memory than negative material. Because our memory consists o f a
highly complex network o f positive concepts, positive moods may trigger a great
number o f positive thoughts which are irrelevant to the persuasive message, thus
reducing the capacity that is available to process the message’s arguments (Isen,
Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). On the other hand, negative events which result
in bad moods may cause individuals to search for explanations, which could interfere
with their ability to perform well on other tasks (Abele, 1985; Bohner, Bless,
Schwarz, & Strack, 1988; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
As with the motivational hypothesis, the cognitive capacity hypothesis
suggests that there will be interaction between affective state and message quality.
When cognitive capacity is reduced by one’s affective state, one will be more
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persuaded by weak arguments, and less persuaded by strong arguments than those
whose capacity is not affected. However, it still remains unclear whether positive or
negative moods are more likely to reduce cognitive capacity.
While there is conflicting evidence as to whether mood effects can be
attributed to differences in motivation, or whether they are due to capacity
constraints, in general, studies tend to support the hypothesis that motivation is the
mediating factor in the effects o f mood on information processing. For instance,
Bless et. al (1990) found that when subjects in a good mood were explicitly instructed
to evaluate the quality o f a message, they were influenced by strong, but not weak
arguments. However, without this instruction, they were equally influenced by strong
and weak arguments. In contrast, subjects who were put in a bad mood were only
influenced by strong arguments, regardless o f whether they were instructed to assess
the quality o f the message arguments. This suggests that the effects o f mood states on
information processing are mediated by motivational variables, rather than diminished
cognitive capacity. If positive moods restricted individuals’ processing capacity,
merely instructing them to attend to the quality o f a message would not allow them to
overcome capacity deficits. Similarly, Innes & Ahrens (1991), found that when
individuals are given instructions which increase their motivation to process a
message carefully, the impact o f affective states may be overridden. Like Bless et al.
(1990), they concluded that the impact o f mood states appears to be mediated by
motivational factors.
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Negative moods and information processing
Many mood studies do not attempt to distinguish moods beyond the degree
to which they are positively or negatively valenced. Often mood induction involves
eliciting “good” or “bad” moods, without distinguishing the nature o f the feelings
surrounding the mood (i.e. sadness vs. anger). The assumption in these studies is that
negative moods, regardless o f whether they are characterized primarily by sadness,
anger, anxiety, disgust or some other negative emotion, have the same effects on
information processing. Moods are often induced by having subjects provide a vivid
report o f a pleasant or unpleasant event (for instance, Bless, et al., 1990). Subjects are
then asked to respond to the question “How do you feel right now, at this very
moment?”, (l=very bad and 9=very good). While this method has resulted in reliable
manipulation checks, clearly this procedure does not allow for the range o f mood
states that individuals may feel in response to the life event they described. In
addition, may studies operationalize “bad” in terms o f sadness, without considering
that sad moods may have different impact on information processing than other
negative moods. To date, only one study has attempted to look explicitly at the
differential effects that specific negative mood states (sadness and anger) may have on
information processing and persuasion (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994).
Although there are few studies which acknowledge the usefulness o f differentiating
mood states, the few studies which do attempt to do this will be discussed in hopes o f
shedding light on how discrete emotions may influence message processing and
persuasion.
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Results from a number o f mood studies suggest that sad moods elicit
systematic or analytic information processing (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack,
1990; Schwarz, 1990; Bohner, Crow, Erb, & Schwarz, 1992; Bohner, Chaiken, &
Hunyadi, 1994). Bless et al. (1990) found that subjects who were in a sad mood
(which was induced by asking subjects to provide a detailed written report o f a sad
life-event) were more likely to be persuaded by strong arguments, than subjects who
were in a happy mood. Subjects (university students) were asked to rate the
persuasiveness o f a tape recorded argument announcing an increase in tuition.
Subjects in a bad mood were more likely to support the tuition increase if they were
exposed to strong rather than weak arguments. Subjects in a good mood were
equally affected by both strong and weak arguments. The lack o f a main effect
finding (i.e. those in a bad mood were not more likely to feel negatively towards the
tuition increase) suggests that sad moods do not directly influence one’s evaluation o f
an issue, nor do they seem to trigger more negative associations. Rather sad moods
seem to influence the type o f processing that takes place, so that there is an
interaction between sad moods and message type. Subjects in a sad mood are more
likely to elaborate the content o f a message than subjects in a good mood, and are
therefore more likely to be persuaded by strong rather than weak arguments. This was
evidenced by the greater proportion o f favorable thoughts, and lower proportion o f
unfavorable thoughts that subjects in a sad mood generated in response to the strong
arguments than in response to the weak arguments. (The cognitive response did not
vary depending on argument quality for subjects in a good mood).
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Bodenhausen, Sheppard and Kramer (1994) attempted to assess the impact
that different types o f negative affective experiences could have on cognition and
social judgments. Based on differences in physiological responses that are elicited by
anger and sadness, the authors predicted that people in sad and angry moods would
processing information differently. They hypothesized that individuals who are in a
sad mood would be more likely to process information systematically, while those in
an angry mood would be more likely to engage in superficial processing, using
heuristics to make judgments. They cited Schwarz’s (1990) explanation that because
sadness is associated with problematic life situations, people in a sad mood are more
likely to engage in thoughtful cognitive processes as a way to search for effective
solutions to their problems. An additional explanation is that sad people may prefer to
be cognitively involved in extensive information-processing as a way to distract
themselves from thoughts related to their unhappy circumstances.
Although there are no studies which focus specifically on the effects o f anger
on information processing strategies the authors argued that intuitively, angry people
would probably be prone to impulsive, less deliberate decision making. Because anger
is likely to be induced by an immediate threat or insult, it seems logical that the most
appropriate adaptive response would be for people in an angry mood to react quickly
and spontaneously, without extensive thinking about possible alternative solutions. In
addition, the authors argued that, like fear, anger seems to reduced one’s ability to
engage in detailed information processing, because it limits one’s cognitive capacity.
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Thus the authors hypothesized that those in an angry mood would be more likely to
engage in heuristic processing strategies.
Students were asked to recall a life-event which had made them either feel
very angry or very sad (in the neutral condition they were asked to recall the mundane
details of the previous day). They were then asked to participate in a seemingly
unrelated experiment in which they were to act as a member o f a peer judicial board,
and to render judgment on cases o f alleged misconduct (cheating and assault). In half
the cases, students were given cues which would facilitate stereotypic judgments (i.e.
the fictitious student had a Hispanic name, or was described as a well known athlete
on campus). The authors found that subjects were more likely to rate the stereotyped
student as guilty when they were angry (no evidence was found that sad or neutral
subjects were more likely to perceive the stereotyped student as guilty). They also
found that angry subjects were more likely to rely on source expertise when rating
their agreement with a persuasive message, indicating greater use o f peripheral
processing strategies. They were more likely to agree with a persuasive message
(advocating raising the legal driving age, or banning meat from the school cafeteria)
when the source was highly credible or trustworthy, than if the source was low on
expertise or trustworthiness. There was no significant difference between the low and
high expertise conditions for sad or neutral subjects. However, it is worth noting that
neutral subjects showed a similar pattern of results (although the relationship was not
significant). No significant differences were found between angry and sad subjects in
the amount o f thought listing that occurred. As Nabi (1997) argues, this lack o f a
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finding is not inconsequential, in that it may indicate that a false conclusion was made
by the authors. She argues that perhaps angry students are just as likely as sad
subjects (if not more likely) to engage in careful, systematic processing, in fact, using
information gathered both from careful assessment o f the arguments, as well as from
peripheral cues as was proposed by the HSM (e.g. Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi,
1994). At the same time, the authors did acknowledge that the preponderance o f
comments in all conditions were negative, indicating that the students’ prior attitudes
were probably fairly strong, and that the arguments presented were generally not
convincing (especially for the topic o f banning meat from the student cafeteria which
is a fairly radical proposition). Nonetheless, there is clearly a need for further evidence
to support the authors’ conclusions that anger provokes the use o f heuristic
processing. In addition, because the authors only focused on the adaptive function o f
emotions (and not the action tendency o f anger, as will be discussed in the next
section), it is possible that anger may indeed lead to more systematic processing.
While the study by Bodenhausen et al. (1994b) attempted to go beyond
thinking about the influence o f affective states in terms o f global moods, they did not
distinguish moods from emotions. In fact, very few studies have considered the
importance o f looking specifically at the effects o f discrete negative emotions on
information processing and persuasion. Before discussing the few studies which do
focus on the effects o f specific emotions, it is first important to distinguish emotion
from mood states, and to discuss why emotions are thought to influence cognitive
processes and behavior in a manner that is unlike that found with mood effects.
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EMOTION
Defining Emotion
According to Frijda (1993) emotions are usually less enduring, more intense,
and less diffuse than moods. The most interesting distinction between moods and
emotions, according to Frijda, is the quality o f “diffiiseness” or “globality”. Emotions
are thought to be directed towards an object, and are “about” something, whereas
moods lack an orientation towards something; they are not focused on a particular
person or thing. In addition, emotions are thought to motivate distinct behaviors to
cope with the event or object that elicited the emotional response. Emotions are
therefore thought to arise from appraisals o f specific actual or perceived events
(Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Smith & Lazarus, 1990).
Although there are numerous theories o f emotion, functional theories offer the
most relevant insight into the relationship between emotion and cognitive processes,
and have typically been used to explain the role o f emotion in information processing,
social judgment, and persuasion (Baron, Inman, Kao, & Logan, 1992; Baron, Logan,
& Lilly, 1994; Bodenhausen, et al., 1994; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Nabi,
1997).

Functional Theories of Emotion
Functional theories o f emotion focus on how emotions prepare us for
particular types o f interactions with the environment, by activating and allocating the
mental and physical resources that are appropriate for the situation (Dillard & Wilson,
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1993). These theories are based on the evolutionary perspective proposed by Darwin
(1872/1965) who argued that the behaviors that are triggered by emotional responses
are adaptive functions that have developed through evolution. The four basic
premises on which functional theories are based are: 1) that emotions have an
inherent adaptive function which is based on distinct motivational properties (such as
protection, destruction, or reproduction) (Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1977; Plutchik,
1980; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991); 2) emotions have adaptive significance because
they are triggered by events that are relevant to the individual (e.g. the presence o f a
friend, enemy, competitor, etc.) (Plutchik, 1980; Lazarus, 1991); 3) once elicited,
emotions have unique goals or motivations which are represented by a state o f action
readiness, or tendency to act in a particular way (Frijda, 1986; Ortony, et al., 1988;
Lazarus, 1991). This component of emotion is thought to be central to functional
theories because each emotion is characterized by a different action tendency, and the
subjective experience o f emotion is thought to be defined by awareness o f this
tendency. Because emotions activate states o f readiness, they are thought to
influence perception, cognition and action, by directing people’s attention away from
other concerns and goals, and eliciting information processing strategies that will
allow one to accomplish the goals established by the action tendency (Frijda, 1986).
Finally, emotions are assumed to be an essential organizer and motivator o f behavior
(Izard, 1977). Table 1 provides a review o f functions and action tendencies o f six
emotions (Dillard, Plotnick, Godbold, Freimuth, & Edgar, 1996; Frijda, 1986;
Plutchik, 1980). Several theories have developed from the perspective held by early
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discrete emotional theorists (e.g. Tomkins, Plutchik, and Izard). Among the most
noteworthy are Cognitive Appraisal Theory and Lazarus’ Cognitive-MotivationalRelational Theory.
Table 1. Functions and action tendencies of six emotions
Emotion
Surprise
Puzzlement
Happiness
Fear
Anger
Sadness

Environmental trieeer
Novelty
Anomaly
Goal achievement
Danger
Obstacle
Loss

Function
Orient
Understanding
Conserve resources
Protect
Remove obstacle
Adjustment to loss

Action Tendency
Focus
Analyze
Continue towards goal
Withdraw from stimulus
Attack
Withdraw into self/search
for plan

Cognitive Appraisal Theory
According to appraisal theorists, people constantly and automatically appraise
or evaluate their environment. These appraisals result in an action tendency which is
felt as an emotion and may eventually lead to overt action (Arnold, 1960). Positive
emotions are thought to be produced by a particular kind o f appraised benefit, while
negative emotions are thought to be induced by a particular kind o f appraised harm.
The emotional response that results from the appraisals is thought to prepare and
mobilize the individual to cope with the particular appraised benefit or harm in an
adaptive way; i.e. by maximizing the appraised benefit, or by avoiding or alleviating
the appraised harm. Individuals are thought to evaluate situations on a number of
dimensions, and appraisal theorists offer different suggestions as to the nature o f the
dimensions which contribute to the felt experiences o f particular emotions (e.g.
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1986; Lazarus,
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1991). However, common appraisal dimensions on which many theorists agree
included pleasantness, agency, and novelty.
Most cognitive appraisal theorists focus their research on understanding the
unique set o f appraisals that lead to specific emotions. However, some appraisal
theorists also consider the motivational goals associated with each emotion (e.g.
Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991;). Lazarus (1991) offers the most comprehensive theory
which combines the notion o f appraisal patterns with the concept o f action tendency
or motivational goals that comes from earlier theories o f discrete emotions.
Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory o f Emotion (Lazarus)
According to Smith and Lazarus (1993), whether a situation is appraised as
negative or positive depends somewhat on the individual’s goals and beliefs. Thus,
appraisal plays an important role in linking environmental circumstances, with
personal goals and beliefs. However, in order for appraisal to play this mediating
role, two types o f cognition must be involved: 1) basic awareness or knowledge o f
one’s circumstances, and 2) the appraisal or evaluation o f the “facts” surrounding the
situation with respect to their significance for personal harm or benefit. The authors
argue that appraisal is often erroneously conflated with knowledge or beliefs about
what is happening in one’s environment. However, only cognition related to one’s
evaluation o f the situation in terms o f one’s personal well being (i.e. appraisal)
directly results in emotion.
Lazarus identifies six appraisal components, divided into two levels. Primary
appraisals concern the extent to which a circumstance is relative to the person’s well
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being, and include motivational (personal) relevance, and motivational congruence
(whether the situation is consistent with the person’s goals or desires). Secondary
appraisals concern the person’s resources and options for coping with the situation,
and include accountability (who deserves credit or blame for the outcome o f the
situation), coping potential (ability to act directly on the situation to keep it in line
with one’s goals and ability to adjust psychologically if one must change one’s goals),
and expectation o f future resolution . Specific patterns o f appraisal based on the
primary and secondary components are thought to result in particular emotions which
prepare a person to cope with the circumstances in an adaptive manner.
In addition to these individual components o f appraisal, Smith and Lazarus
(1993) combined the components into summaries, or “gestalts o f relational meaning”
(p. 236), which they call “core relational themes”. These themes capture the defining
harm or benefit that underlies each emotion (see table 2). Appraisal components and
core relational themes provide alternative ways o f representing the same relationship
between one’s evaluation o f the environment, and the emotion that results. Study
results suggest that core relational themes and appraisal components are, in fact,
equally predictive o f emotions (Smith and Lazarus, 1993). Thus, core relational
themes can be thought o f as a short cut for discussing the primary motivation behind
each emotion, which may influence which cognitive and physical resources are called
upon to cope with the situation. However, whether one discusses appraisal in terms o f
individual components, or core relational themes, the theory behind Lazarus’ model is
that each emotion is an expression o f a particular relationship o f an individual with
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his/her environment which evokes a particular action tendency (i.e. motivation o f
particular mental or physical resources).

Table 2. Appraisal Components and Core Relational Themes o f 5 Emotions
(from Smith and Lazarus, 1993)
Emotion

Core Relational Theme

Important Appraisal
Components
Incongruency with goals
Other-accountability

Anger

Other-blame

Fear/Anxiety

Danger/Threat

Incongruency with goals
Low/uncertain coping potential

Guilt

Self-blame

Incongruency with goals
Self-accountability

Sadness

Irrevocable loss

Incongruency with goals
Low coping potential
Low future-expectancy

Happiness

Progress towards a goal

Congruency with goals
High future-expectancy

Based on the action tendencies that are thought to be elicited by each emotion
(in response to appraisal o f one’s circumstances), functional theorists propose that
emotions will influence individuals’ cognition and behavior. The following section
will outline the particular ways in which specific emotions are thought to activate
certain types o f physical or mental activity.
The assumption that discrete emotions serve distinct functions in organizing
cognition and human behavior is not shared by all emotion theorists. In fact, the
notion o f discrete emotions is often challenged by other perspectives which believe
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that all emotion feelings can be defined in terms o f broad dimensions such as
pleasantness and arousal (e.g. Watson & Tellegen, 1985). However, many theorists
contend that there is ample evidence which shows that reliable indices o f discrete
emotions can be obtained (e.g. Izard, 1972), and that conceptualizing emotions as
unique constructs is both valid and useful (Izard, 1993).
Among those who accept the notion o f discrete emotions (e.g. Arnold, 1960;
Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; Lazarus, 1991), there is little
agreement as to which emotions should be considered primary or basic. A number o f
studies have found evidence for the existence o f at least seven discrete emotions
(Izard, 1977; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), and most theorists include
happiness, anger, fear, sadness, disgust, and guilt/shame among the emotions which
have distinct adaptive functions. Because happiness, fear, and sadness are most
relevant to this study, they will be discussed here.
H appiness/Joy
Happiness is thought to function as a way to facilitate social interaction and
social bonds (Izard, 1993). The expression o f happiness is thought to signal readiness
for friendly interaction and to elicit contagion, and empathy which should contribute
to well-being in the environment. Happiness is also thought to have recuperative
powers, and reduce stress, which allows people to maintain their ability to cope in
strenuous situations. Appraisal theorists tend to believe that happiness arises from
situations in which individuals feel in control o f their circumstances, and have a
positive outlook for future success. In addition, the action tendency o f happiness is
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continued progress towards one’s goals, which suggests that happiness encourages
maintenance o f one’s current behavior. In this respect, the function o f happiness is
also to conserve resources so that one may continue to make reasonable progress in
reaching one’s goals.
Because happiness stems from contentment with one’s circumstances, and can
function as a “breather” from stressful circumstances, it seems likely that happiness
will impact cognitive functioning by reducing the amount o f effort that one is willing
to exert. Those experiencing happiness will probably not want to engage in
information processing which will disrupt their current positive state, or hinder their
progress in reaching their goals. Thus, it seems likely that happiness will result in
more superficial information processing.
Fear
The principal function o f fear is to motivate escape from dangerous situations
(Izard, 1993). Fear may arise from either physical or psychological threats (such as
threats to one’s self-concept, or one’s integrity). According to appraisal theorists,
fear arises from situations which are perceived as threatening to one’s self and which
are out o f one’s control (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1984; Frijda, 1986). Fear is
experienced as apprehension, and uneasiness, and its action tendency is to escape
from the threatening agent, or to alleviate the fear-eliciting condition, which often can
result in avoidance behavior (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). While fear is thought to
motivate avoidance behavior, this does not necessarily mean that fear will always lead
to flight. Sometimes fear will inhibit motor response, causing an individual to
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“freeze” in response to the threat. Cognitively and perceptually, fear also does not
necessarily lead to avoidance responses. In fact, according to Izard (1993), fear tends
to produce “tunnel vision” by focusing attention on the source o f the threat, and
restricting one’s ability to take in other information. Fear can therefore lead to intense
focus on the threatening agent or situation which will guide the individual to selfprotective behavior.
In terms o f information processing, it seems possible that fear may elicit either
careful scrutiny o f information, or minimal information processing. The action
tendency o f fear suggests that this emotion will cause people to avoid, or escape feareliciting stimuli, which would suggest that messages will be processed superficially.
Yet, because fear has also been described as motivating close attention to the
threatening source, it seems possible that fear will elicit systematic processing. Nabi
(1997) proposed that contextual factors present in the message would determine
whether fear would elicit extensive, or minimal processing. She argues that fear will
lead to careful information processing if the person believes that this will allow
him/her to learn how to avoid physical or psychological harm. However, fear will
probably induce superficial processing in situations where careful processing would
prolong the fear response, without providing information which would help the
individual cope with the fear. If the message and the source o f the threat are not
relevant to each other, it reduces the chances that the information provided would
help reduce one’s fear.
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Sadness
Because the primary eliciting conditions o f sadness is physical or
psychological loss or separation, and the action (or inaction) tendency is withdrawal
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991), it is not surprising that the unique function o f sadness
is to slow mental and physical activity (Izard, 1993). This slowing o f mental and
motor systems allows us to signal to ourselves and others that there is trouble,
strengthen social bonds by eliciting empathetic responses from others, and motivates
us to find a solution to alleviate the distress (Tomkins, 1963; Lazarus, 1991).
According to Izard (1993), the slowing o f cognitive processes induced by
sadness may allow one to engage in a more careful search for the source o f trouble,
and greater reflection on what caused the sadness. This deliberate scrutiny o f oneself
may enable an individual to find a way to avoid similar situations in the future, or to
be better prepared to cope with them if they arise. Formulating a plan for future
behavior is thought to help alleviate the sadness. Thus, in terms o f cognitive
processes, sadness functions to motivate problem-solving activity, by encouraging
individuals to focus inwardly and search for solutions to cope with one’s distress.
The implications o f this is that sadness will induce systematic, detailed
information processing. Although the action tendency o f sadness is withdrawal, it
seems that the purpose o f this withdrawal is to allow one to reflect on one’s
circumstances. Thus it seems likely that sadness will induce careful processing o f
information, especially if that information will aid in coping with the source o f one’s
distress or will aid in solving one’s problems.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

THE INFLUENCE O F DISCRETE EM OTIONS ON ATTITUDE CHANGE
Despite the recent increased interest in the role that affect plays in the
persuasion process, there is very little research which examines the influence o f
discrete emotions on attitude change. The majority o f studies which do consider the
role o f emotion in persuasion tend to focus on the influence o f fear, with very little
attention paid to other negative emotions such as anger or sadness. In addition, with
the exception o f fear appeal studies, those studies which do discuss discrete emotions
tend to focus on their influence on social perception or information processing,
without further considering how emotions may affect persuasion via those intervening
processes.
Fear
Because fear appeals are so often used in public health campaigns, it is
commonly assumed that fear will lead to greater message acceptance. The results o f
three meta-analyses indeed suggest that the experience o f fear is positively and
linearly associated with persuasion (Boster & Mongeau, 1984; Sutton, 1982).
Several theories o f how fear appeals work have been developed. Drive theory was the
first theory proposed (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). It suggested that fear is an
unpleasant state which people are motivated to reduce. In order to alleviate the
unpleasant feelings associated with fear, people change their attitudes in the direction
advocated by the message. Janis & Leventhal (1968) proposed that the relationship
between fear and attitude change is curvilinear, so that moderate levels o f fear elicit
attitude change, but that high levels o f fear arouse too much anxiety, resulting in a
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negative relationship between fear and attitude change. Neither o f these theories has
generated substantial support (Boster & Mongeau, 1984).
More recent approaches to fear and attitude change emphasize the impact o f
fear on cognitive functioning. Leventhal (1970) proposed a parallel response model in
which he argued that fear-arousing messages elicit two separate processes - fear
control and danger control. Fear control is thought to occur when an individual
attends to his/her fearful responses, while danger control occurs when an individual
turns their attention to the external danger present. Attitude change is thought to
occur when one engages in danger control, but is less likely to occur when one
engages in fear control because the person may engage in avoidance behavior which
inhibits persuasion.
Building on this model, Rogers (1975) proposed a protection motivation
theory, in which he argues that fear-eliciting messages will be effective to the extent
that they motivate people to protect themselves from danger. Whether a fear appeal is
successful will therefore depend on whether it motivates people to take the necessary
steps to deal with the danger presented. Fear appeals should therefore include
information related to the types o f consequences that may result if behavior is not
modified, probability o f the likelihood that the consequences may occur, and efficacy
of the coping response proposed in the message. This information should theoretically
persuade individuals by convincing them that there are negative consequences
associated with the behavior, high probability that the consequences will result if the
current behavior is not modified, and that the consequences can be avoided if he/she
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changes the problematic behavior. This theory also failed to receive substantial
support.
While this approach, and several others like it (e.g. Witte, 1992), attempted to
integrate the relationship between fear responses and cognition into persuasion
models, they still neglected to consider how fear may influence cognitive processing
(i.e. one’s ability or motivation to process messages). The impact o f fear on
information processing strategies has only recently begun to be incorporated into fear
appeal research as a way to fully understand the role o f fear in the persuasion process.
Jepson & Chaiken (1990) were the first to propose a model o f how fear can
influence information processing style, and subsequent persuasion. They argued that
chronic fear interferes with ability and/or motivation to think systematically about
persuasive messages. According to the theory, chronic fear will trigger defensive
avoidance in receivers, so that they will try to minimize their exposure to the
unpleasant information by spending as little time and effort as possible processing the
message. Thus message acceptance under chronic fear conditions is likely to result
from heuristic rather than systematic processing, as receivers will avoid extensive
message-relevant thinking.
The authors tested the hypothesis that chronic fear would lead to persuasion
via less careful processing, by giving respondents a message about the importance o f
regular cancer checkups. Respondents were given a thought listing task which was
designed to measure the number o f subtle, logical errors that respondents detected in
the message which could only be discovered through careful message processing.
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The authors found that chronic fear o f cancer decreased systematic
processing, in that it was negatively related to the number o f logical errors detected in
the message. They also found that chronic fear was positively related to persuasion,
which suggests that although chronic fear may reduce careful processing o f
persuasive messages, it will not necessarily reduce the persuasive impact o f the
message.
Although this study focused on chronic, rather than acute (situation or
message specific) fear, it opened up the possibility that fear may influence persuasion
via its effects on information processing style. Baron, Inman, Kao, and Logan (1992)
extended this line o f thinking by applying it to situations in which acute fear is
induced.
The authors tested the hypothesis that fear would lead to more superficial
processing o f persuasive messages by manipulating the fear level o f dental patients
who were about to receive a filling. In the high-fear condition, subjects listened to a
taped message which graphically described their upcoming procedure, while subjects
in the low-fear condition listened to neutral filler information about fluoridated water.
After listening to the taped message, they then heard a persuasive message concerning
a possible increase in the state sales tax which contained flawed arguments, but strong
peripheral cues (speaker style, audience reactions) and were asked to indicate their
attitude towards the tax as well as to rate the quality o f the message. Subjects in the
high-fear condition gave higher ratings o f the message quality than those in the lowfear condition, suggesting that they were influenced to a greater extent by the
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peripheral cues than those in the low-fear condition. This suggests that fear may in
fact increase the likelihood that one will engage in superficial processing o f persuasive
messages. No significant differences were found between conditions on measures o f
attitude change or memory for message statements. The lack o f an attitude change
finding is not surprising given the topic o f the persuasive message(tax increases),
which subjects would probably generally not support regardless o f the quality o f the
arguments.
These findings were expanded on by others who believed that message
processing would depend on the interaction between emotion and message factors.
Several studies evaluated the role that emotion would play in information processing
in situations where the message to be processed was directly relevant to the
individuals’ fear. For instance, Baron, Logan, Lilly, Inman, and Brennan (1994)
considered the relevance o f the persuasive message to respondents fear, arguing that
perhaps fear would increase message processing if it was believed that the message
would offer reassurance about how to cope with the source o f the fear.
As with the study discussed previously, subjects who were scheduled for
dental fillings were either exposed to a high-fear inducing message (one which
graphically described their upcoming procedure), or a low-fear message containing
innocuous, filler material. They were then exposed to a message which contained
either a high or low quality message about the positive effects o f fluoride in
preventing cavities (a topic that was directly relevant to the upcoming stressful event),
both o f which contained the same statistics and reference groups to try to control for
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the effects o f peripheral cues. They hypothesized that those in the high-fear condition
would be more likely to process the message carefully because o f their greater
involvement and concern with the topic (which is also relevant to Petty and
Cacioppo’s (1986) argument that high involvement will lead to more extensive
message processing).
Contrary to previous studies, the authors found that subjects in the high-fear
condition were more likely to engage in more elaborate message processing, gave
higher ratings to higher quality messages, and were more likely to show attitude
change than those in the low-fear condition. The authors conclude that this study
provides evidence that fear may increase information processing if the message offers
information which is relevant to the fear-inducing situation. While this study
acknowledges the interaction between fear inducing stimuli and the content of
subsequent persuasive messages, they did not test whether these effects would hold
up if the persuasive message included different types o f appeals. The authors do
acknowledge that because the message was primarily reassuring, there was less
opportunity for fear to elicit the defensive avoidance response found in other studies
(e.g. Jepson & Chaiken, 1990). Thus, it is unclear whether the same results would
have been found if the persuasive message had been a fear-based appeal itself. Had
the persuasive message also elicited fear, the increased level o f negative emotion may
have lead to the defensive avoidance response found in previous studies.
The results o f these studies seem to suggest that chronic fear and messageirrelevant fear will result in less careful message processing (Jepson & Chaiken, 1990;
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Baron et al., 1992). In cases where the persuasive message is relevant to the fear,
there is evidence that higher levels o f fear will lead to increased message processing,
but only if the message provides reassurance, or offers individuals information about
how to cope with their fear (Baron et al., 1994). These studies all tend to look at how
fear influences the processing o f messages which are affectively neutral themselves, or
where the fear is induced by the persuasive message itself. However it is still unclear
how message irrelevant fear will influence processing o f persuasive messages which
also elicit fear (or another emotion).
Happiness
Because there are fewer positive emotions than there are negative emotions
(happiness and pride are generally the two positive emotions that are considered core
emotions), studies which assess the influence o f positive affect on information
processing and persuasion, are for all intents and purposes, studies o f the effects o f
happiness. There is ample evidence which suggests that happiness results in greater
message acceptance, and that it induces heuristic, rather than systematic processing.
Because this literature was discussed in the previous section on mood effects, it will
not be reviewed here.
Sadness
The effects o f negative emotions other than fear (e.g. anger, sadness, disgust)
have, for the most part, been overlooked in persuasion research. As mentioned earlier,
sadness is generally induced in studies which test the effects o f global positive or
negative mood states. In order to induce negative affect, subjects are often asked to
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describe (in writing) an event in their life in which they were sad. However, authors
o f these studies rarely consider negative affective states as distinct entities, and do not
acknowledge that negative emotions such as anger or sadness may have different
implications for information processing (with the exception o f the study conducted by
Bodenhausen, et al., (1994).
One study which does consider the role o f emotions such as sadness and anger
in attitude change was conducted by Dillard, Plotnick, Godbold, Freimuth, and Edgar
(1996) who explored the possibility o f multiple affective responses to AIDS PSAs.
Based on Plutchik’s (1980) argument that emotions rarely are experienced in a pure
state, and early studies which showed that anger elicited by fear-appeals can mediate
the persuasive effects o f health messages (Dabbs & Leventhal, 1966; Leventhal &
Singer, 1966), the authors tested emotional reactions to fear-based PSAs and the
effects o f those emotions on perceived persuasiveness o f the messages.
Regression analysis found that fear, sadness and surprise were positively
related to judgments o f message persuasiveness, while puzzlement and anger were
negatively related to judgments (happiness was not significantly related to judged
persuasiveness). The implications o f this study are limited, however, because the
emotions were unintentionally elicited in the context o f fear appeals. It is unclear
whether the same pattern o f results would be found in situations where the emotions
were intentionally elicited.
The authors also assessed whether the differential effects o f emotions on
messages acceptance could be explained by differences in the nature o f the thoughts
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that were elicited by the emotions. In a second study, the authors tested whether the
valence o f cognitive responses would influence judgments o f message persuasiveness.
Subjects watched a PSA and then reported their cognitive responses, emotional
responses, and ratings o f the message. The valence o f cognitive responses was
computed by subtracting the number o f negative cognitions from the number o f
positive cognitions. Regression analysis found that the valence o f cognitive responses
was not a significant predictor o f message acceptance (judgments o f persuasiveness).
There were also no significant relationships between valence o f cognitive response
and any of the six emotions. Thus they concluded that the effects o f emotion on
persuasion did not appear to be mediated by cognitive response, and thus emotional
response probably served as a peripheral cue.
The results o f this study are important because they allow for the influence o f
multiple emotions in processing persuasive messages. The findings are also
significant in that they are supported by previous research and correspond with the
action tendencies associated with each emotion. For instance, fear was shown to be
positively related to message acceptance, which is supported by prior research
(Boster & Mongeau, 1984; Sutton, 1982), and corresponds to the action tendency o f
fear which is withdrawal from (or submission to) the stimulus. The positive
relationship o f sadness to message acceptance also seems consistent with the action
tendency o f sadness which is problem solving, or searching for ways to cope with
one’s loss (although there is no research to back this up). In contrast, the negative
relationship o f anger and message acceptance also seems to fit with the action
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tendency o f anger to attack, which seems likely to be manifested in disagreement with
the advocated position. The negative association between anger and persuasion has
been supported by the few fear appeal studies which also measured anger (Dabbs &
Leventhal, 1966; Leventhal & Singer, 1966).
Despite the merits o f this study, there are several factors that need to be
considered in evaluating the results presented. First, the authors concluded that the
effects o f emotions on message acceptance were not due to cognitive response, and
thus they argued that emotion acts as a peripheral cue in the processing o f persuasive
messages. None o f the emotions were significantly related to their measure of
“dominant cognitive response” (the number o f negative thoughts subtracted from the
number o f positive thoughts), and dominant response did not significantly predict
message acceptance. However the authors’ conceptualization o f cognitive response
seems somewhat flawed. The authors (drawing from mood research and television
context effects studies) argued that positive affective responses should lead to more
positive thoughts related to the message, which in turn should lead to greater message
acceptance. While this is a valid hypothesis, it does not seem to be a fair test o f
whether subjects are engaging in systematic processing. By only considering the
relative number o f positive and negative thoughts generated in response to the PSA,
the authors failed to assess whether particular emotions are more likely to elicit
extensive message elaboration, regardless o f the valence o f the thoughts produced.
For instance, if sadness truly does elicit more systematic processing, this may cause
subjects to weigh the pros and cons o f the message’s arguments, which could in fact
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encourage subjects to generate both positive and negative thoughts about the
message. This type o f systematic message elaboration would not be captured by the
measure used by the authors. In fact, the authors acknowledged that the average
number o f thoughts generated by all subjects was fairly high (4.30), suggesting that
subjects were engaging in fairly extensive cognitive activity. It is unclear why the
authors did not include the total number o f thoughts generated as a variable in their
regression models. In fact, the lack o f association between positive thoughts and
message acceptance suggests that the affect-as-information hypothesis (positive affect
associated with more positive attitudes towards the message), or affect as a heuristic
cue does not hold in this situation (in which case all negative emotions would be
negatively related to message acceptance).
In addition, the authors also failed to address the implications o f multiple
emotional responses being elicited by a single messages. It seems possible that the
interaction o f the emotions may have implications for message processing, such that,
perhaps the dominant emotion that is elicited (in this case, fear), may reduce the effect
o f other emotions. Perhaps in the presence o f fear, emotions that may normally elicit
systematic processing, will act as peripheral cues instead (this idea will be discussed in
later sections).
While this is the only study known which explicitly tests the role o f various
emotions in the persuasion studies, an additional study discusses the role o f sadness
and anger in other types o f social perception which sheds some additional light on the
way in which discrete negative emotions influence cognitive functioning.
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Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) noted that appraisal research has
generally focused on establishing the link between appraisals and the emotions they
elicit, yet little attention has been paid to the way elicited emotions influence the
appraisal o f subsequent events (see also Frijda, 1993). Because anger and sadness
result from different, distinct patterns o f appraisals, the authors sought to distinguish
whether they would have different effects on judgments or whether they would
produce the same general negative bias characteristic o f global negative moods.
Specifically, they sought to establish whether specific emotions would make particular
kinds o f appraisals salient in judging new events, leading individuals to interpret
situations in ways that would reflect their underlying appraisal dimensions. Because
one o f the most distinguishing dimensions o f negative emotions is agency, they
hypothesized that sadness and anger would elicit judgments that would differ on this
dimension. Sadness is thought to result from events which are perceived to be
beyond human control, while anger is thought to result when an individual perceives
another person to be the cause o f their misfortune. Thus, they predicted that when
interpreting ambiguous situations, angry subjects would emphasize the behavior o f
other people, while sad subjects would be more likely to emphasize situational
factors. In line with other appraisal dimensions, they also hypothesized that sad
subjects would be more likely to interpret events as hopeless, while angry subjects
would be more likely to perceive the actions o f others as unfair. Subjects were first
asked to imagine themselves in either an angry or sad situation which was provided in
written form to them (they were told this was a warm-up exercise). They then read
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about a situation in which a social mishap occurred that could be interpreted as being
caused either by other people or by situational factors. (The situation involved the
protagonist inviting a potential love interest to a party, having him/her show up with a
significant other, and a friend teasing the protagonist about the situation in front of
everyone).
In line with their hypothesis, the authors found that sad subjects were more
likely than angry subjects to attribute the mishap to situational factors, whereas angry
subjects were more likely than sad subjects to blame the mishap on other people. Sad
subjects also saw the situation as more hopeless than angry subjects, while angry
subjects rated the actions o f other people as less fair than did sad subjects. While the
target situation was designed to be ambiguous, an interesting question that arises
from this study is whether the emotion elicited by the situation influenced the effects
that were found. The authors did not find significant differences in emotional ratings
o f the situation across conditions. However, subjects’ primary emotional response to
the scenario was anger, followed by sadness. Whether these same set o f results
would be obtained if the target scenario was less emotionally evocative, or induced an
emotion other than anger, remains to be seen. One possibility is that the anger elicited
by the story increased the likelihood that appraisal factors would be activated and
utilized when subjects were assessing the events.
In fact there is some evidence which may suggest that the emotional content
o f the target stimulus will influence the extent to which appraisal factors are used in
judgments. In a separate study, the authors tested whether sadness and anger would
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influence subjects’ judgments o f the likelihood that future events would occur. The
same task was used to elicit either sadness or anger. Subjects were then asked to
estimate the likelihood of ten events by giving probability estimates between 0 and 1.
Four o f the events described were positive (e.g. getting a great job, correcting a
health problem), and six were negative (e.g. house bums down, friend dies in a plane
crash). Each event was described as being the result o f either human agency (e.g.
friend’s help, doctor’s insight, arson, pilot error) or situational factors (job market,
luck, brush fire, lightening). Two forms were created, and the causes were reversed
on each form. The authors found that sad subjects perceived situationally caused
events as more likely than angry subjects, while angry subjects perceived events
caused by human action as more likely than sad subjects. The interesting aspect o f this
finding is that this result was only found to be true o f negative events. No differences
were found between sad and angry subjects’ judgments o f positive events. This
suggests that perhaps the emotion elicited by imagining the negative events, increased
the likelihood that appraisal dimensions would shape subjects’ judgments. In a
broader sense, perhaps this indicates that the emotion o f the target stimuli influenced
the cognitive process used by the subjects. Whether the use o f appraisal factors
suggests systematic or heuristic processing is open to debate.
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AFFECTIVE STATES AND THE USE OF SCHEMAS
At this point it is really just a matter o f conjecture that the use o f appraisal
factors indicates a particular style o f information processing. However there is
evidence which suggests that the link between affective states and cognitive
processing can manifest itself in particular cognitive functions. For instance, affective
states have been shown to influence subjects reliance on cognitive schemas. To the
extent that the use o f schemas indicates heuristic processing, it seems that research in
this area is relevant to the discussion o f affect and information processing.
While there are no studies which consider the role that emotions play in
influencing the use o f schemas, there is some evidence that general physiological
arousal and global moods can increase dependence on schema-related information in
judgment formation.
In general, highly accessible schematic information is thought to be used more
readily to encode and process subsequently presented social stimuli. It has been
established that media content can prime social schemas, and that once primed, these
schemas are more likely to be used than other schemas to process and interpret
ensuing information (see, for instance Berkowitz, & Rogers, 1986). This is especially
likely to occur if the stimuli presented shares a phenotypic relationship with the
primed schema, or if the stimuli presented is ambiguous. Hansen and Krygowski
(1994) tested the effects o f arousal on the priming o f sex object schemas. Based on
evidence which suggests that arousal activates more extreme schemas, the authors
hypothesized that judgments about a subsequent message after priming by music
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videos would be more extreme in physiologically aroused individuals. Specifically,
they hypothesized that after priming a sexual schema using music videos, aroused
subjects would rate women in subsequently presented commercials as sexier than
subjects who were not aroused (arousal was induced by having subjects ride a
stationary bike).
The authors found that music videos featuring sexy scenes primed sexual
schemas which were carried over to interpretations o f subsequently presented
commercials so that commercials were rated as more sexy, more humorous, less
disgusting and less aggressive following a sexy music video. Interestingly, ratings o f
the commercial on humor, disgust, and aggression corresponded to ratings o f the
music video prime on these aspects, indicating that the commercials “took on aspects
o f the thematic content o f the music videos” (p. 37). In addition, arousal was found
to exaggerate the priming effects so that ratings o f the content o f the commercials
were significantly more extreme in the direction o f the priming videos. The
commercials thus seemed to take on the attributes that were primed by the schematic
content o f the videos, especially under conditions o f high arousal.
The authors speculate that arousal may make people more schematic by
reducing cognitive processing capacity, and forcing people to rely on simpler, less
involving cognitive processes, which require less effort and attention. By using
schemas, people are able to rely on accessible schema content when making
judgments about individuals’ actions or characteristics (in this case, the characters in
the commercials), without evaluating their actual attributes or behavior. While this
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study focused on arousal as opposed to actual affective states, it opens up the
possibility that differences in physiological states may influence the use o f schemabased information.
Bohner, Crow, Erb and Schwarz (1992) considered the same possibility, but
focused on the role o f moods in influencing individuals’ tendency to use schemas. The
authors argued that because positive moods increase heuristic processing, they also
elicit greater reliance on overleamed scripts (a type o f schema which involves
organized sets o f expectations about events) that are applicable to the situation
presented. The authors based their conjecture on the belief that affective states serve
informative functions. Because negative moods are thought to inform people that they
are facing a problematic situation, it would not be beneficial for them to rely on
overleamed scripts when making decisions about their circumstances. In contrast,
positive moods signal to people that their environment is safe, so the use o f scriptbased information allows people to be efficient in their decision making.
The authors used this theory to explain conflicting results o f two studies. In
one study subjects in a good mood were more likely to comply with a request for a
donation while sitting in a waiting room than those in a bad mood. However, a
second study showed that being in a good mood did not influence subjects’
willingness to allow someone to cut ahead of them in line while waiting for a
telephone. The authors argued that those in a positive mood were more likely than
those in a bad mood to rely on, and comply with a “money collection” script, in which
a person explains the purpose for the collection, and the target person donates a small
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amount, because the donation script did not interfere with their current behavior. In
contrast, a request to cut ahead in line interrupts the script one has for waiting in line
at a public telephone, so that complying with the request would interrupt the scripted
behavior that the subject was already engaging in. Thus, the increased reliance on
scripts that was induced by positive moods would lead to compliance in the money
donation situation, and noncompliance in the telephone line situation.
Based on the logic o f the previous two studies, it seems fair to hypothesize
that happiness (with its function o f conserving resources and encouraging efficient
processing) would elicit greater reliance on schema-based information. In contrast,
sadness would not be associated with increased reliance on schema-based information
in forming judgments.
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CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
One theme that has emerged in studies which assess how mood and emotion
influence persuasion is that contextual factors can determine the role that affect plays
in the persuasion process. Increasingly, studies are showing that affect rarely has a
direct effect on information processing, and that it is important to consider the
interaction between affective states and other factors related to the message itself
individual differences, and situational constraints when examining the role o f affect in
persuasion. There is now substantial evidence which shows that affective states can
influence persuasion in different ways, depending on the conditions in which the
message is received.
A number o f studies have considered the relationship between situational
factors and the mechanisms through which affect influences information processing
and persuasion. Wegener, Petty & Klein (1994), argue that mood influences
persuasion processes differently depending on the likelihood o f message elaboration
(see also Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994; Cacioppo & Petty, 1989; Richman and
Strathman, 1993). First, in situations where elaboration likelihood is low (e.g. where
individuals are unwilling or unable to engage in central processing), mood appears to
exert a direct effect on judgment, by serving as peripheral cue. This is because when
motivation or ability to process is low, recipients may misinterpret their mood as a
reaction to the message and use it to judge the message according to the “how do I
feel about it?” heuristic (Schwarz, 1990). Thus, individuals who experience positive
affect while processing a message should evaluate the message more favorably, while
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those experiencing negative emotion will be more likely to react unfavorably to the
message, regardless o f the strength o f the argument.
Secondly, in situations where elaboration likelihood is moderate (e.g. when
people are uncertain about whether they should think extensively about a persuasive
message), affect can influence the extent to which they engage in cognitive
elaboration and the nature o f their thoughts. They suggest that positive affective
states may impede careful message processing, while negative affect may facilitate it.
Bohner, Chaiken and Hunyadi (1994) found that happy subjects’ attitudes towards
persuasive messages were generally influenced by source-related thoughts (evidence
of heuristic processing) regardless o f whether the message was ambiguous or
unambiguous. In contrast, sad subjects’ attitudes were based on systematic processing
when the message was unambiguous, but were influenced by both systematic
processing as well as source-related thoughts when the message was ambiguous.
Thus sad subjects engaged in both heuristic as well as systematic processing under
conditions o f moderate elaboration which supports the HSM hypothesis that
systematic and heuristic processing can co-occur. It also suggests that people in sad
moods are more influenced by variations in message factors than those in happy
moods.
Finally, in situations where elaboration likelihood is high (e.g. when subjects
are high in “need for cognition” (i.e. they tend to engage in argument elaboration), or
the situation demands extensive message processing), mood influences the nature o f
the thoughts that come to mind in evaluating the content o f the message arguments.
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Thus, in high elaboration conditions, positive moods are assumed to facilitate the
recall o f positive material in memory (Bower, 1981), and facilitate positive
elaborations o f message content. For instance, Wegener et al. (1994) found that
among those high in need for cognition, negatively framed arguments (i.e. those
stating the negative consequence that would ensue if the advocated behavior were not
adopted), were more persuasive when subjects were in a negative mood than in a
positive mood. Conversely, positively framed arguments were more persuasive when
subjects were in a positive mood, than when they were in a negative mood. No
differences were found between mood conditions among those low in need for
cognition. The authors explained these findings by arguing that mood influenced
judgments o f the likelihood o f events occurring. Positive moods increased
perceptions that positive outcomes would occur (making positively framed outcomes
seem more probable), while negative (sad) moods increased perceptions that negative
outcomes would occur. Thus, the authors concluded that under high elaboration
conditions, moods can influence the valence o f the thoughts that are generated in
response to a persuasive message, which in turn influences likelihood judgments.
One comprehensive model that has been proposed to explain the interaction
between contextual factors and the role that affect plays in information processing and
social judgment is Forgas’(1995) Affect Infusion Model (AIM). This model is
especially relevant and important to understanding context effects, because it
stipulates the conditions and extent to which affect will influence (or infuse)
judgmental processes by entering into people’s deliberations and shaping the outcome
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o f those deliberations. The AIM was developed out o f growing evidence that the
nature of the message, individual differences, and situational factors can all exert
influence on the quality and degree to which mood affects judgments.
According to the model, there are four types o f processing strategies that
people may engage in: I) direct access, in which one uses pre-existing evaluations; 2)
motivated processing in which there are strong and specific motivations for a
particular judgment to be achieved (e.g. in mood management); 3) heuristic
processing in which people consider only some o f the available information, and use
whatever shortcuts or simplifications are available to them; and 4) substantive
processing in which there are complex or specific situational demands which require
people to “select, learn, and interpret novel information about a target and relate this
information to preexisting knowledge structures” (p. 47). The model stipulates that
different processing strategies imply different kinds o f mood effects on judgments.
Direct access and motivated processing are thought to be low affect infusion
strategies, meaning that mood may have no effect or lead to mood incongruence
when these types o f processes are used. Heuristic and substantive processing are
thought to be high affect infusion strategies, meaning affect has more o f a direct
impact on judgment. Factors which are thought to determine which processing
strategy is used include variables related to the target (familiarity, typicality,
complexity), judge (personal relevance, motivational goal, cognitive capacity,
affective state), and situation (need for accuracy, availability o f objective criteria,
social desirability).
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In general, direct access processing is thought to occur in conditions where
the target is familiar, and has highly prototypical features, where there is low personal
involvement with the decision, and there are no situational factors which encourage
detailed processing (e.g. selecting a favorite cereal at the grocery store). Mood will
not influence judgments during this type o f processing. Motivated processing is
thought to occur in situations where there are strong and specific motivations for a
particular judgmental outcome to occur. For example, dysphoria is thought to trigger
a motivated, directed search for information which will help alleviate that negative
mood state. Thus, under this kind o f processing, mood-incongruent information may
be attended to.
High affect infusion strategies (heuristic and substantive processing) are
thought to occur when there is neither a prior evaluation nor a strong motivational
goal to direct judgmental outcomes. Heuristic processing is thought to occur in
situations where people want to minimize their cognitive effort, and often occurs
when the target is simple, or very typical, the personal relevance o f the judgment is
low, the judge has limited cognitive capacity, and the situation does not demand
accuracy or careful consideration. In these types o f situations, affect is thought to
influence judgments directly by acting as information (i.e. people are more likely to
rely on the “how do I feel about it?” heuristic). For instance, under heuristic
processing conditions, subjects have been found to give more positive evaluations
when in happy moods, than when in sad moods (see studies cited in previous section).
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In contrast, substantive processing occurs when the target it complex, or
atypical, the judge has adequate cognitive capacity, and is motivated to be accurate
(because o f situational or personal demands). Under these conditions, the AIM
predicts that affect will influence judgments indirectly by serving as a prime facilitating the recall o f memories which are congruent with the mood so that
subsequent judgments will be influenced by mood-congruent data. Thus being in a
good mood should lead judges to pay closer attention to positive information, make
more positive interpretations o f ambiguous information, and have a better memory for
positive details. The study by Wegener et al. (1994) is an example o f a study which
supports this hypothesis: for those high in need for cognition, (who engaged in
substantive processing), people in negative moods were more persuaded by negatively
framed messages, while people in positive moods were more persuaded by positively
framed messages.
While this model was developed to account for mood effects in particular,
Forgas argues that the principles underlying the model apply to all kinds o f valenced
affective states, and suggests that further research be conducted to test the effects o f
specific emotions within the framework he puts forth. He speculates that because
emotions (unlike moods) often have specific causes, they are most likely to initiate
motivated processing (a low affect infusion strategy), because the action tendency
associated with emotions will encourage a targeted, selective search for (non-affect
related) information to service a goal. Thus, he argues that affect infusion due to
emotions is only likely to occur if the emotion fails to trigger motivated processing.
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Forgas cites the study by Keltner et al. (1993) in which judgments reflected the
underlying appraisal patterns o f specific emotions (i.e. angry subjects attributed events
to the actions o f others while sad subjects interpreted the events in terms o f
situational factors), as evidence that emotions will motivate targeted information
search, that will impede affect infusion.
Yet, in the same review article, Forgas concedes that very few studies have
evaluated whether emotion influences processing strategies in accordance with the
AIM. In fact, he argues that it is also possible that the results found by Keltner et al.
(1993) provide evidence that emotions elicit substantive processing in some
situations, because it seems likely that some degree o f substantive processing is
necessary in order for appraisal effects to occur. He also cites evidence from the
study o f Bodenhausen et al. (1994) which suggest that anger and sadness can elicit
different types o f processing strategies. He concludes that precious little is known
about the role o f emotion in this model but that it is possible that specific emotions
will influence judgments under varying processing conditions. Forgas also suggests
that the appraisal components o f emotion may be an important source through which
we can understand the role o f emotion in infusing judgments. He comments that
appraisal factors “suggest that affective experience is embedded in a rich network o f
cognitive appraisals about causation, agency, fairness, and the like, information that
may also infuse judgmental processes” (p. 61). He adds that a plausible (yet not yet
tested hypothesis) is that appraisal factors may influence judgments under conditions
requiring heuristic or substantive processing in the same way that affect is thought to
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bias judgments under these conditions. This is most likely to occur in situations
where the stimulus is complex, or unusual.
The interesting (and sometimes confusing) aspect o f this model, is that it
integrates research which shows that mood can play a dual role in judgments by
influencing both the type o f processing strategy that is used (e.g. heuristic vs.
substantive), i.e. how people think, as well as influencing the kind o f information they
subsequently consider, i.e. what people think. Thus affect can act as a contextual
variable which encourages a processing type, as well as shape the nature o f the
thoughts that are generated once that processing mode has been activated.
Though not discussed by Forgas, this raises some interesting questions in
terms o f how the emotion elicited by one stimulus may influence processing o f a
subsequent emotion- eliciting stimulus. For instance, what happens when a stimulus
which provokes happiness is followed by a stimulus which provokes sadness? One
area where this question has obvious relevance is in the effects o f television
programming contexts. How might the emotion elicited by television programming
influence how we process advertisements and public service announcements which
also trigger particular emotions? Before considering how the emotions elicited by
both programs and persuasive messages may interact, it is first necessary to review
research which considers how television programming contexts influence advertising
message acceptance.
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TELEV ISION PROGRAM M ING CON TEXT EFFECTS
The television programming context in which commercials are embedded is
found to exert a significant impact on viewers’ response to the advertising message.
A number o f studies have found that the surrounding program can influence viewers’
mood (Goldberg and Gom, 1987), involvement level (Soldow and Principe, 1981) or
liking o f the program (Murry, Lastovicka, and Singh, 1992) in such a way that it will
affect the recall o f the advertised product and the persuasiveness o f the ad.
Most studies o f programming effects describe these effects in terms o f
network models o f memory. According to these models (which have been briefly
described in previous sections), memory consists o f a network o f information
containing nodes which are linked by pathways. Activating one node can lead to the
activation o f other interconnected nodes along these pathways. Mood nodes are thus
thought to be linked to mood-consistent knowledge structures, so that moods may
trigger mood related memories and thoughts (Bower, 1981). When similarly toned
material is primed in memory, it allows the mood induced by one stimulus to be
transferred to the evaluation of another stimulus. For instance, if a program puts a
viewer in a happy mood, and then sees a commercial for a product such as cereal,
he/she will be more likely to access positive memories o f breakfast, because the
positive mood would increase the accessibility o f positive material in memory. In
contrast, the same commercial embedded in a sad program may elicit negative
breakfast memories. In addition, because mood-consistent knowledge structures are
thought to be activated when a mood is aroused, mood consistent information is
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thought to be processed more readily. Thus, moods are thought to lead to more
elaborate processing o f material that is valenced in the direction o f the mood, leading
to better memory for mood congruent information and greater elaboration biased in
the direction o f the mood.
Based on this perspective, Goldberg and Gom (1987) hypothesized that a
positive mood induced by a program may lead to the activation o f positive memories
or thoughts related to the images found in the commercial, which in turn would lead
to a positive response to the advertising message. In contrast, advertisements placed
in the context o f a sad program may trigger a negative affective response to the
commercial. They exposed subjects to ads embedded in either a happy or sad
television program and found that a commercial embedded in a happy program was
more likely to generate a positive affective response and was more likely to be rated
as effective by subjects than one embedded in a sad program.
Mathur and Chattopadhyay (1991) conducted a similar study in which they
hypothesized that the affective tone o f cognitive responses to a commercial would be
influenced by the program context, such that happy programs would lead to more
happy cognitive responses, and sad programs would lead to more sad (less happy)
cognitive responses They also hypothesized that happy programs would increase the
amount o f cognitive elaboration generated in response to a commercial, and that sad
programs would inhibit processing. Thus viewers seeing an ad embedded in a happy
program would recall more o f the advertisement and produce more cognitive
responses towards the ad compared to those viewing a sad program.
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Contrary to other studies which suggest that happy moods decrease the
amount o f cognitive effort one is willing to engage in (see previous sections), the
authors argued that because the knowledge structures o f happy moods are broader
and more integrated, information can be more easily encoded and elaborated on,
facilitating later recall (Isen, 1984). According to the authors, the network o f happy
associations in memory is so extensive, that the elicitation o f a happy mood will cue a
large amount o f material that is interrelated and interconnected, providing a broad and
extensive context into which new material may be easily encoded, making it more
readily retrievable later. They also argued that sad moods will inhibit the encoding o f
information, because sad moods cause us to become engrossed in the cause o f our sad
mood, which, would cause us to focus more attentional resources on the program,
and less on the commercial. This reasoning contradicts other studies which suggest
that the extensive network o f happy associations may in fact decrease cognitive
capacity, thus interfering with information processing (citation ). It also contradicts
evidence which suggests that happy moods decrease motivation to process
information, thus increasing reliance on heuristic processing. In addition, their
hypothesis about the influence o f sadness on information processing was not based on
prior research which shows that sad moods may influence cognitive processing.
Nonetheless, the authors found evidence to support their hypotheses: a greater
proportion o f happy cognitive responses towards the ad was generated when the ad
was embedded in the happy program than when it was embedded in the sad program
(computed as the number o f happy cognitive responses divided by the sum o f the
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happy and sad cognitive responses). In addition, they also found evidence o f greater
recall o f an ad when it was embedded in a happy program than when it was embedded
in a sad program, and a greater number of commercial-directed thoughts. The authors
suggested that perhaps the sad program was more interesting and attention grabbing
which prevented people from focusing on the ad, or those in a happy mood were able
to process the information from the advertisement more efficiently.
The interesting aspect o f this study is that the authors did not consider the
affective reactions that may be generated by the ads themselves. The authors tested
the effects o f programming context on two ads. One was an upbeat ad for
McDonald’s, and the other was a somber ad for a life insurance company. The
authors selected these ads because they were both “emotional appeals” (as opposed to
rational, information-based appeals) that were distinct from each other in terms o f
content and product type. These ads were selected in hopes o f being able to increase
the generalizability o f their results. However, the authors did not pre-test the ads, so
it is unclear if the ads themselves evoked particular emotional responses. Although the
McDonald’s ad was clearly an upbeat ad, it is unclear whether the insurance ad would
evoke an emotional response, and if so, what kind o f response that would be. For
their two main hypotheses, there were no significant program by advertisement
interactions, and the authors concluded that their findings were robust across the two
ads (although the interactions approached significance at p = . 10). However, on
closer analysis, the authors did find some significant program by advertisement
interactions. While there was no effect o f program context for the McDonald’s ad
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(both generated a similar number o f program related and commercial related
thoughts), there were some significant differences between program conditions for the
insurance ad in terms o f the number o f program related cognitive responses, the
number o f commercial related cognitive response, and message recall. Specifically,
those who saw the sad program generated more program related thoughts than those
who saw the happy program. Yet, there were more commercial related cognitive
responses and greater message recall in the happy condition than in the sad condition.
The authors suggested that the sad program may reduce the amount o f attention that
is paid to the ad, while the happy program increased processing efficiency.
However, given that the authors did not fully account for the type o f affective
response that was generated from the ads, it is difficult to conclude whether happy
programs will in fact, always lead to more positive evaluations o f all ads. The results
from this study only clearly support this hypothesis in cases where the embedded ad is
also positive (as is the McDonald’s ad). The authors concluded that there was
evidence that the happy program increased processing efficiency (as evidenced by
better recall), and also allowed for greater resource allocation (because their were no
differences in the total number o f cognitions related to the program). Because we are
unsure whether the insurance ad was negatively valenced, or affectively neutral, we
cannot be sure whether these same results would hold up in conditions where the ad
clearly generated a negative emotional response. The lack o f a control group also
makes it unclear how to interpret these results. In addition, without knowing the type
o f emotional response the ad may have evoked (anger? sadness? fear?), we cannot
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fully explain the results o f this study. However, the fact that differences were found
between conditions for the “somber” ad, suggests that it is important to consider both
the programming context as well as the affective nature (not to mention the content,
product, involvement level o f the product, etc.) o f the ads themselves.
Kamins, Marks and Skinner (1991) considered the possibility o f an interaction
between the mood induced by both the program and the advertisements. They argued
that the results o f Goldberg and Gom (1987) suggest that advertisements should
always be embedded in happy programs, because these programs will trigger positive
memories which will carry over to evaluations o f the ad. Conversely, negative
programs should be avoided because they will elicit negative associations. However,
citing research which shows negative moods can lead to more altruistic behavior,
they argued that people in a negative mood do not always react negatively to stimuli.
The authors offered three explanations for increased altruism under negative mood
states: 1) negative moods may result in a desire to reduce negative feelings by
engaging in mood elevating behavior such as helping others (mood management), 2)
negative moods related to the misfortunes o f others may encourage an empathic
response which will lead to helping behavior, 3) a negative mood will facilitate
prosocial behavior if the person feels personally responsible or if a norm which
encourages altruistic behavior becomes salient at the time. The authors argued that
because television approximates real-life situations, and people are able to project
themselves into many o f the situations depicted, the altruistic response that is
generated by negative (sad) moods may be manifested in positive evaluations o f
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programs or commercials. Thus, when viewers feel sad for others, they may react
positively to an ad which is consistent with their mood, and with which they can
empathize. Because the viewer cannot actually help the person depicted in the
commercial, empathy replaces actual helping behavior, and the viewer gets positive
feelings from having felt empathetic towards the character depicted. Thus, an ad
which is consistent with a sad mood may be evaluated positively because it elicits a
pro-social empathic response.
Using a 2x2 design they manipulated both the mood o f a talk show segment
and the mood o f a commercial embedded in the segment. Subjects viewed either a
happy o r sad talk show segment followed by a commercial which was designed to
elicit either happy or sad emotions. The commercials all dealt with the topic o f
healthcare - the happy ad dealt with the choice o f an HMO, while the sad ad
concerned an alcohol and drug treatment center. The authors found that subjects were
less likely to generate negative thoughts if they viewed a sad ad in the context o f a sad
program than if they viewed the sad ad in a happy program (no differences were
found between conditions for the happy ad). Ratings o f the effectiveness o f the ad,
and attitudes towards the ad were also significantly higher when the mood o f the
commercial matched the mood o f the program in which it was embedded (again only
for the sad ad, although the happy ad was rated directionally higher when in a happy
rather than sad program). These findings contradicted the results o f Golberg and
Gom (1987) which suggested that ads placed in positive programs were more likely
to perform better than those placed in sad programs. Results from this study also
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indicated that it was also necessary to consider the mood induced by the commercial
in order to assess the impact that program content will have on the effectiveness o f an
ad.
The authors proposed several hypotheses for these results. One was that
viewers may desire the program to continue, and therefore do not want commercials
to interrupt the flow o f the program or the affective state induced by the program.
When a happy commercial follows a sad program, the disruption may be more evident
though contrast, resulting in lower advertising evaluation. Thus programs and ads that
are affectively consistent may be rated higher than those which conflict with each
other. An alternative explanation is based on the mood management perspective and
suggests that the positive moods generated by happy programs may lead people to
prefer positive ads which will enable them to maintain their positive mood state. On
the other hand, people who are in a negative mood after watching a sad program will
prefer negatively valenced ads because they will provide a justification for their
feelings, and will allow them to continue to respond empathetically.
There is in fact some evidence that viewers prefer to maintain consistency in
their cognitive and affective state when processing programs and advertisements.
Feltham and Arnold (1994) conducted a study to assess whether the same consistency
theory could be supported using the cognitive components o f the programs and ads.
Early context effects researchers suggested that people have an inherent drive to be
consistent. Our inclination when viewing or reading something, therefore, is to form a
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gestalt or holistic pattern to what is being experienced (Kennedy, 1971) so that our
mental set does not change when we move from program to ad.
In order to test whether content consistency would lead to more positive ad
evaluations, the authors conducted a 2x2 experimental design in which they
manipulated the degree to which the programs and ads differed on cognitive (rational,
informative) content, in order to see whether consistency between the program and ad
on factual, neutrally-toned content would lead to greater ad effectiveness. They also
considered the role o f viewer involvement. Subjects were exposed to one o f the four
possible program/ad combinations. They first viewed four advertisements, one o f
which was the test ad. They then viewed the program segment, followed by the test
ad again. Subjects were then asked a series o f recall and recognition measures as well
as questions related to attitudes towards the ad, attitudes towards the brand and
purchase intent.
The authors found that consistency between program and ad on rational, non
affect laden content led to more positive evaluations of the ad and advertised brand
(although the ads were remembered less often). They also found a significant
interaction between involvement and consistency effects such that involvement was
only positively related to evaluations o f the ad and brand when the program and ad
were inconsistent. This suggests that consistency between the program and ad could
potentially diminish the negative impact o f low program involvement. In other words,
factual ads which are embedded in factual programs may offset the effects o f low
viewer involvement.
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A variation o f the explanation given for these results is that people prefer to
maintain consistency in the type of cognitive processing strategy they use. The highly
factual program segment that was used consisted o f a fictional program in which a
lawyer counsels two clients about their upcoming trial. The low factual program
consisted o f a night club scene in which a woman sings a song. If rational, factual
material encourages more systematic processing, and non-factual material elicits
heuristic processing, then perhaps the results o f this study suggest that people prefer
to maintain consistency in their cognitive processing style. If this is true, than perhaps
the results o f the study by Kamins et al. (1991) suggests that program-ad consistency
leads to better ad evaluations because it allows people to maintain the extent o f
cognitive elaboration in which they are engaged. If we rely on results from mood
studies which show that happy moods elicit heuristic processing, while sad moods
encourage systematic processing, perhaps the positive evaluations found when
program and ad are consistent in mood really reflects viewers’ desire to maintain their
cognitive processing strategy. Perhaps happy ads embedded in happy programs are
evaluated better because they allow viewers to continue to engage in heuristic
processing, while sad ads perform better in sad programs because they allow viewers
to continue to process information systematically.
Because the context studies have not focused on the extent to which the
programs and ads elicit superficial or extensive cognitive elaboration, it is unclear
whether this is a valid explanation. In addition, because the context studies have
traditionally focused only on sad and happy programs and ads, it is unclear whether
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similar results would be found if other emotions were tested. It would be especially
interesting to test the influence o f other negative emotions which have been found to
motivate heuristic processing (such as fear or anger). For instance, would a sad ad
embedded in a fear-evoking program be evaluated as positively as if it were embedded
in a sad program?
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Context effects and the AIM
Clearly more research needs to be conducted in order to fully explain how
emotions elicited by programs and ads will interact to influence how viewers evaluate
advertisements and PSAs. It seems that an important missing element from these
studies is an assessment o f the cognitive mechanisms through which these effects may
be occurring. One model which may provide some clues as to how the emotions
elicited by programs and ads may interact is the AIM.
Based on the assumptions o f the AIM, the processing demands o f the situation
will determine the way in which affect influences processing. Because happiness has
been found to elicit heuristic processing, we can assume that a happy program will
encourage heuristic processing. Thus the emotion from the ad would be used as
information that the viewer would use in forming his/her judgment about the ad
(because the AIM stipulates that under heuristic processing, affect will serve as
information, meaning that people will use affect as a way to judge how they feel about
a message). Thus, under the heuristic processing conditions created by a happy
program, a happy ad would be evaluated positively, while a sad ad would be
evaluated negatively (i.e. the happy program would encourage people to use the
affect generated by the ad to guide their evaluation o f the ad). In otherwords, the
emotion from the message context (the program) would influence the processing
strategy chosen fhow people think), while the emotion from the ad itself would
influence the kind o f information they subsequently consider (what they think).
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In the case o f a sad ad embedded in a happy program, the happy program will
encourage heuristic processing, so that the emotion from the ad will serve as a
heuristic cue, and the viewer will evaluate the program more negatively (as was
found). However, affect will influence evaluations o f the sad ad differently if the ad is
placed in a sad program. According to the AIM, in situations where systematic
processing is elicited, affect will influence attitudes indirectly by modifying the valence
o f thoughts that come to mind. If we assume that sad programs will encourage
systematic processing, then we can assume that more extensive processing o f a
subsequently viewed ad will take place, and greater and more extensive negative
material will be accessed from memory in response to a sad ad. Although Mathur et
al. (1991), assumed that accessing negative material from memory would lead to
more negative evaluations of message, there is evidence which suggests that this is
not the case under systematic processing conditions. Recall that Wegener et al. (1994)
found that although negative (sad) affective states prime negative thoughts in
memory, this may actually lead negatively framed messages to be rated as more
persuasive, because the negative associations may increase one’s judgments o f the
likelihood that negative events will occur. Given that sad ads probably frame material
in terms o f potential loses or negative consequences that may occur if a behavior is
not adopted (or a product is not purchased), it seems that the negative associations
generated from the program under systematic processing conditions may encourage
viewers to accept the message in the sad ad. In contrast, positively framed messages,
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like those that are found in a happy ad, are probably less likely to be rated as
persuasive by sad viewers during systematic processing conditions.

Summary of Context Effects and the AIM
The AIM stipulates that affect will influence judgments differently depending
on the demands inherent in the context in which the message is processed. I f we
incorporate what is known about the way that emotion influences processing choices
into this model, it seems that sadness will be likely to encourage substantive
(systematic) processing, while happiness will elicit heuristic processing. According to
the model, under heuristic processing conditions, affect will be used as information,
so that one will rely on the “how do I feel about it” heuristic when forming
judgments. Under systematic processing conditions, however, affect is thought to play
a more elaborate role, triggering or priming affect-congruent material in memory.
In terms o f television programming context effects this suggests that happy
programs will trigger heuristic processing, while sad programs will encourage
systematic processing. If happy programs motivate heuristic processing, viewers will
be more likely to use the emotion they felt from an ad as a heuristic cue when forming
judgments about the ad. Thus, a happy program will lead to positive evaluations o f a
happy ad, but negative evaluations o f a sad ad. In contrast, because sad programs
trigger systematic processing, the emotion elicited from the ad will influence
judgments indirectly via more elaborate cognitive processes such as affective priming.
A sad ad will evoke negative thoughts and memories, while a happy ad will elicit
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happy thoughts. Negatively framed material will thus be judged more positively when
processed in the context o f a sad program, because the primed negative associations
will make the possibility o f negative events occurring seem more likely, while
positively framed material will be judged less positively. This is an alternative
explanation for the results o f Kamins et al. (1991) who found sad ads perform better
in the context o f a sad program, while happy programs are evaluated better in the
context o f a happy program.
O f course, the relationship between the emotion in the ad and program could
also be reversed so that the emotion in the ads will determine the processing style that
is adopted, which in turn will determine how the emotion from the program influences
evaluations o f the ads. It is difficult to speculate which process is more likely,
especially given that most studies focus on the influence o f message irrelevant affect
on message processing. Thus, we can not be sure whether emotion elicited by the
message itself will be more likely to determine the processing style that is adopted
(how to think), or the valence o f the affect that infuses judgments (what to think).
Given that research on mood and judgment suggests that message irrelevant affect
that is generated prior to processing a message can influence whether that message is
processed systematically or heuristically, it seems appropriate to predict that the
emotion elicited by the proceeding program will influence the extent o f message
elaboration that one is likely to engage in when processing an advertisement or public
service announcement.
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Context Effects and PSAs
To date, context studies have focused on the effect o f program-elicited
emotions on the processing o f commercial advertisements. However, it is unclear
whether the same effects would hold in situations where the television message is
aimed at changing more complex behaviors such as drug use. Certainly consumers
may differ in their interest in o r involvement with consumer products, and certain
purchase decisions will be more involving than others (e.g. the decision to purchase a
particular brand o f toothpaste is much less involving than the decision to purchase a
particular type o f car). However, it is probably safe to argue that most consumer
purchasing decisions are not life-altering decisions. It is also safe to argue that
persuading someone to use a particular brand o f shampoo is much less challenging
than persuading someone not to use drugs. Obviously the decision to use drugs is
influenced by far greater, more complex factors than those that influence consumers’
decisions to buy a particular brand o f shampoo. In addition, people are less likely to
hold firmly entrenched beliefs about consumer products than they are about drug use.
At the same time, public service announcements aimed at preventing viewers
from engaging in risky or harmful behavior often use emotional appeals to persuade
viewers. Fear appeals are most commonly used, but guilt, sadness, and happiness
(self-esteem) are emotions that are also being tapped more frequently through public
service announcements aimed at changing health-related behaviors. While not tested,
it is probably safe to argue that, in general, emotion provoking PSAs are more
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emotionally evocative (at least in terms o f negative emotions) than the majority o f
commercial messages, given the nature o f the topics that they usually address.
Because PSAs are more likely to address complex behaviors, often use
emotion to influence viewers, and have not been tested in previous context effect
studies, they will be used as the basis for this study. At the time that this study was
being conducted, Partnership for a Drug Free America was running a campaign aimed
at discouraging pre-teen and teenage children from using drugs. The campaign was
wide-reaching in terms o f the age and racial groups it was trying to target and the
types of appeals being used. They tested numerous PSAs many o f which were
emotion based appeals designed to elicit fear, sadness, happiness, anger, disgust or
surprise. The PSAs used in this study were selected from those used in their
campaign.
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HYPOTHESES
Pretest Hypotheses
Because context effects research has focused on the moods that are elicited by
television programs, it is first necessary to determine whether programming can, in
fact elicit discrete emotional responses. Given that emotions are defined as being
more intense, short lived, and object directed, it seems fair to speculate that television
programming may in fact, elicit discrete emotions such as sadness, happiness, and
fear. In fact, research has shown that fictional films can elicit emotions (Gross &
Levenson, 1995), but that they rarely induce one and only one emotion (McHugo,
Smith, and Lanzetta, 1982). This is not surprising, because emotions are thought to
rarely be experienced in a pure state (Plutchik, 1980), and it would be unrealistic to
assume that complex stimuli like commercials, public service announcements or
television programs only induce one emotion. Given this, this study will apply the
definition o f “discrete” that has been used in other studies (Gross & Levenson, 1995;
Nabi, 1997), which is rating the target emotion significantly higher than other
emotions.
Hypothesis 1: Television programs and public service announcements can
elicit discrete emotions such that the target emotion is reported at significantly
higher levels than other emotions.

The majority o f context studies have focused on happiness and sadness
because they are thought to be the emotions that are most commonly elicited by
television programs and commercials. Because the purpose o f this study is to assess
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the cognitive mechanism through which context effects may occur, it makes sense to
focus on the emotions which have already been considered in other studies.
Functional theories o f emotion stress the motivational aspects associated with
the experience o f each emotion. According to these theories, the subjective
experience o f an emotion will focus one’s attention away from other concerns and
goals, and elicit information processing strategies that will allow one to accomplish
the goals established by the action tendency.
Happiness is thought to be activated by a desire to achieve a goal and the
function o f happiness is to conserve resources in order to successfully work towards
that goal. The action tendency o f happiness, therefore, is to maintain progress
towards one’s goals. Thus, happiness is thought to be associated with simplified,
heuristic information processing strategies which will allow one to conserve
resources.
Hypothesis 2: After viewing a happy program, viewers will be more likely to
engage in simplified information processing when processing a subsequent
persuasive message. Relative to viewers in the sad condition, they will
generate fewer thoughts related to the message (support arguments + counter
arguments), and will generate more argument-irrelevant thoughts in response
to the message. (Argument-irrelevant meaning comments on the execution
elements, the tone o f the message, the speaker, special effects, etc.)

Sadness is thought to be triggered by irrevocable loss, and the function o f
sadness is to adjust to that loss. Although the action tendency o f sadness is
withdrawal, sadness motivates people to search for a way to solve their problem or
cope with their loss, so the experience o f sadness actually signifies a contemplative
state.
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Hypothesis 3: After viewing a sad program, viewers will be more likely to
engage in detailed, elaborate information processing when processing a
subsequent persuasive message. Relative to viewers in the happy condition,
they will generate more thoughts related to the message, and will generate
more argument-specific thoughts in response to the message.
General Context Effects Hypotheses
Mood effects studies often assess how moods influence individuals’ tendency
to engage in heuristic versus systematic processing by measuring whether
respondent’s evaluations o f messages are based on argument quality (evidence o f
systematic processing), or external cues such as source expertise (evidence o f
heuristic processing). However, because this study will use actual PSAs, it is not
possible to manipulate the strength o f the arguments conveyed in the them. Thus,
evidence o f heuristic processing will be measured by viewers’ tendency to use
program-elicited schemas when processing an ensuing persuasive message. Studies
have shown that increased physiological arousal and positive moods lead to greater
reliance on cognitive schemas (Bohner, Crow, Erb and Schwarz, 1992; Hansen and
Krygowski, 1994). In addition, schemas related to television programming content
have been found to influence subsequent interpretations o f commercial messages.
Thus,
Hypothesis 4: Viewers o f happy programs will be more likely than viewers o f
sad programs to interpret a PSA in terms o f themes that are primed by the
program.
(*Note that program themes will be determined after the program segments are
selected. For instance if the program involves peer relations, it may encourage
thoughts related to peer pressure. A medical program may be more likely to prime
thoughts related to the health dangers o f drugs, a program involving a school context
may prime thoughts o f the negative effects o f drugs on school performance, etc.)
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In addition, cognitive appraisal theorists argue that emotions are elicited from
a specific pattern o f cognitions that represent one’s perceived relationship with one’s
environment. The experience o f different emotions is based on differences in
interpretation o f events on dimensions such as agency, control and future outlook.
Negative emotions are thought to be distinguished most clearly by the dimension of
agency, such that sadness is thought to result from situations in which one blames
one’s self while anger is thought to result from external sources. Keltner et al. (1993)
and Frijda (1993) have proposed that the reverse relationship between appraisal and
emotion may also exist such that elicitation o f emotions may make particular kinds of
appraisals salient in judging new events, leading individuals to interpret situations in
ways that would reflect their underlying appraisal dimensions. Forgas (1995) argues
that while it has not been established whether the influence o f appraisal features on
subsequent judgments may occur under heuristic or substantive processing conditions,
it seems more likely to occur under substantive processing conditions. In the case o f
persuasive messages such as PSAs where social problems (drug abuse, domestic
violence) are discussed, the messages often focus on themes related to individual
power to do something about the situation, self-efficacy in avoiding maladaptive
behavior, hope that the situation will improve, etc.. The degree to which these themes
resonate with viewers may perhaps be shaped by the emotion that is elicited prior to
viewing these messages:
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Hypothesis 5: Viewers o f happy programs will be more likely to judge
subsequently viewed persuasive messages (PSAs) in terms o f individual
control, and will be more likely to have a positive future outlook for the
situation than viewers o f sad programs.
Hypothesis 6: Viewers o f sad programs will be more likely to judge
subsequently viewed persuasive messages (PSAs) in terms o f impersonal
situational factors, and are more likely to view the situation as hopeless than
viewers o f happy programs.

In line with previous context effects research, similar patterns o f results are expected:
Hypothesis 7: Happy PSAs will be rated as more effective and more
persuasive when embedded in a happy program than when embedded in a sad
program.
Hypothesis 8: Sad PSAs will be rated as more effective and more persuasive
when embedded in a sad program than when embedded in a happy program.

Two possible models will be proposed to try to explain the cognitive
processes underlying context effects, one based on consistency effects (i.e. subjects
prefer to maintain the processing style in which they are engaged), and one based on
the AIM.

Consistency Theory Hypothesis
If the consistency theory is valid, then we would predict that consistency
between program and PSA in terms o f mood would allow viewers to maintain a
consistent processing style (systematic versus heuristic). Thus, it would not be
consistency o f the mood per se that viewers prefer, but consistency in the amount o f
cognitive elaboration in which they are willing to engage. If it can be shown that
happiness elicits simplistic processing, while sadness elicits more elaborate
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processing, then we should find that regardless o f the programming context, happy
PSAs should be processed more superficially, while sad PSAs should be processed
more elaborately.
Hypothesis 9: Regardless o f programming context, the total number of
thoughts, and number o f argument related thoughts that are generated in
response to a happy PSA will be significantly lower than those generated in
response to a sad PSA.
The assumption behind this theory is that the emotion elicited by the program
will not influence the way in which an emotional PSA is processed, but that the
emotion from the PSA itself will determine the extent o f cognitive elaboration that
takes place in response to the message. The greater persuasiveness o f PSAs
embedded in programs with which they are emotionally consistent will thus result
from viewers’ desire to maintain the level o f processing in which they are engaged.

AIM Theory Hypotheses
An alternative model through which to evaluate context effects is the AIM.
Following the assumptions o f this model, the interaction o f the emotion elicited from
the program and the PSA would determine how emotion would influence subjects’
ratings o f the PSAs. Unlike the predictions made under the consistency hypotheses,
this model predicts that the emotion elicited by the program would influence the type
of processing strategy used to process an ensuing PSA, and determine the extent to
which the emotion from the PSA would shape viewers’ judgments o f the PSA.
According to the model, under heuristic processing conditions, affect is
thought to be used as a heuristic cue. Under low message elaboration conditions,
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individuals tend to use their affective state to inform their attitude towards a message,
using the “how do I feel about it?” heuristic. Affect is therefore thought to influence
judgments directly. I f happiness elicits heuristic processing, then we would predict
that happy programs would reduce viewers’ motivation to process subsequent
messages, and the emotion elicited by the PSA itself would be more likely to act as a
heuristic cue. Thus a negatively valenced PSA would be rated negatively, and a
positively valenced PSA would be rated positively in the context o f a happy program.
O f course, this is the same prediction made by the consistency model.
However, if this model is more accurate, then we would predict that there would be
less cognitive elaboration o f both a sad PSA and a happy PSA in the context o f a
happy program (whereas the consistency model predicted more elaborate processing
o f the sad PSA). Conversely, sadness is thought to elicit more elaborate, systematic
processing, so affect should influence judgments indirectly, via the associations that
are generated during processing. This leads to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 10: The total number of thoughts, and number o f argument-related
thoughts will be higher for those viewing a happy PSA in the context o f a sad
program, than for those viewing a happy PSA in the context o f a happy
program. The total number o f thoughts, and number o f argument-related
thoughts will be higher for those viewing a sad PSA in the context o f a sad
program than for those viewing a sad PSA in the context o f a happy program.
In addition, the greater use o f heuristic processing triggered by the happy
program should lead to greater reliance on schema-based information transferred from
the program to the PSA. Thus we would expect:
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Hypothesis 11: Happy and sad PSAs embedded in a happy program will be
more likely to be interpreted in terms o f themes primed by the program than
PSAs embedded in sad programs (see hypothesis 4 for explanation o f possible
themes).
In addition, the heuristic processing elicited by a happy program should lead
to more positive and lenient evaluations o f happy PSAs, and more negative
evaluations o f sad PSAs.

Hypothesis 12: After viewing a happy program, ratings o f the quality and
effectiveness o f happy PSAs will be more positive than ratings o f sad PSAs,
although the number o f favorable and unfavorable cognitions generated in
response to the PSAs will not differ.

According to the AIM, under systematic processing conditions, affect is likely
to influence judgments via affective priming, in which similarly valenced cognitions
are more likely to be generated. If sad programs encourage more elaborate
processing, then we would expect a more extensive network o f affect-congruent
thoughts to be accessible in memory when viewers process subsequent persuasive
messages. Thus in addition to the hypotheses proposed above (that sad programs
would lead to greater message elaboration, and more argument-related thoughts in
response to a subsequent PSA), the following prediction is made:
Hypothesis 13: After viewing a sad program, subjects will be more likely to
elicit thoughts that are affectively consistent with the emotion elicited by the
program. Proportionately more sad than happy cognitions will be generated in
response to both happy and sad PSAs.
In addition, the amount o f associative priming that occurs should be
significantly greater following a sad program than a happy program.
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Hypothesis 14: The ratio o f sad to happy cognitions will be greater in
response to PSAs embedded in a sad program than the ratio o f happy to sad
cognitions generated in response to PSAs embedded in a happy program.
Combining the two components o f the AIM, we should predict that the
valence o f the cognitions generated (support arguments, affirmations relative to
counter arguments, disaffirmations) will differ depending on the processing demands
determined by the emotion elicited by the program. Following a happy program, the
emotion elicited by the PSA will influence judgments directly, so that sad PSAs will
generate more negative cognitions, while happy PSAs will generate more positive
ones. In contrast, following a sad program, more negative associations will be
generated, so that negatively framed PSAs will generate more positive cognitions than
positively framed ones. Thus:

Hypothesis 15a: Subjects viewing a happy PSA will exhibit fewer unfavorable
cognitions when the PSA is placed in a happy program than when it is placed
in a sad program.
Hypothesis 15b: Subjects viewing a sad PSA will generate more favorable
cognitions when the PSA is placed in a sad program than when it is placed in a
happy program.

Finally, although sadness may elicit greater negative associations, this does not
necessarily mean that ads following sad programs will necessarily be rated as less
persuasive (as was suggested by Mathur et al., 1991; Goldberg and Gom, 1987). As
was found by Wegener et al. (1994), under systematic processing conditions, the
priming o f negative material in memory may actually lead negatively framed messages
to be rated as more persuasive, because negative consequences may become more
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salient in memory, making the risks o f not adopting the advocated behavior appear
more serious. For instance, under systematic processing conditions, those in a happy
mood should judge the positive benefits o f not taking drugs as more likely than those
in a sad mood, while those in a sad mood should judge the negative outcomes o f
taking drugs as more likely than those in a happy mood. If sad PSAs in the context o f
sad programs are rated as more persuasive than those embedded in happy programs,
then it would be necessary to assess whether subjects were indeed prone to judge
negative consequences as more likely after viewing a sad PSA in the context o f a sad
program.
Hypothesis 16: Subjects viewing a sad PSA embedded in a sad program will
rate the negative consequence o f not adopting the advocated behavior as more
likely than those viewing a happy PSA embedded in a sad program.

Additional hypothesis
Clearly there a numerous additional ways in which these theories could be
tested using a range o f emotions. However, because the majority o f context studies
have focused on sadness and happiness, and because these emotions have clearly been
established as evoking different degrees o f cognitive processing, it seems important to
use these emotions in this study. Ideally it would be beneficial to test the effects o f an
additional emotion, particularly a negative emotion which is thought to elicit heuristic
processing, such as fear (and potentially anger). By incorporating a negative emotion
which is thought to encourage the same type o f cognitive processing as happiness (i.e.
heuristic processing), we would be able to advance what is known about discrete
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emotions and strengthen the argument that effects go beyond differences due to
positive/negative valence.
For instance, in testing the consistency hypothesis, I will try to establish that
happy programs and PSAs elicit heuristic processing, while sad programs and PSAs
elicit systematic processing, and that it is the consistency o f processing strategy that
leads happy PSAs to be evaluated as more persuasive in happy programs, and sad
PSAs to be evaluated as more persuasive in sad programs. However, if I were to find
evidence for this, it would still be difficult to ascertain whether it is consistency o f the
emotional response itself that is important, or if it is indeed consistency o f processing
strategy that viewers prefer. Ideally it would be useful to be able to test whether the
same effects would be found using a negative emotion which is also thought to elicit
heuristic processing (e.g. fear). This would allow us to assess whether it is the valence
o f the emotion that is crucial, or the processing strategy evoked by the emotion that
accounts for the effects found. If viewers prefer to maintain their processing strategy,
then it should follow that regardless o f the valence o f the emotion they are
experiencing, PSAs which elicit emotions which encourage simplistic processing
should be evaluated better in the context o f programs which also elicit emotions that
encourage the same amount o f cognitive effort. Because happiness and fear are both
thought to elicit simplistic processing, while sadness is thought to elicit more
systematic processing, the following prediction could be made:
Hypothesis: Happy PSAs which are embedded in a fear-evoking program will
be rated as more persuasive than sad PSAs which are embedded in a fearevoking program.
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I f results were found to support this hypothesis, it would contradict prior
context effects studies which argue that viewers prefer to maintain a positive or
negative mood state. If this were the case, then the reverse would be expected:
programs and PSAs which elicit similar negatively valenced moods (fear program-sad
PSA) should be rated higher than those which conflict with each other (fear programhappy PSA).
While this seems like a worthwhile study to carry out, in fact the effects o f
fear on cognitive processing are not clearly established at this point in time. Thus, it
would be extremely risky to extend this study to incorporate the additional conditions
needed to test this hypothesis. Nevertheless, it poses an interesting question for
future study which should be carried out if evidence is found to support the
consistency theory.
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Figure 1. Context Effects under the Consistency Model
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Figure 2. Context Effects under the AIM

Happy program
Heuristic processing
(affect-as-information: “How do I feel about it?)
Happy ad = positive evaluation
Sad ad = negative evaluation

Sad program
Systematic processing (how to think)
Triggers negative memories, thoughts due to associative priming
Happy ad: rated less persuasive (positively framed messages evaluated poorly)
Sad ad: rated more persuasive (negatively framed messages evaluated better)
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PRE-TEST 1: Selection o f television programming segments and PSAs
Because past research has not clearly established that television programs and
advertisements can elicit discrete emotions, part one o f the pretest in which the
programming and PSA stimulus were chosen was used to evaluate this.
M ethod
Subjects: Subjects were undergraduates at the University o f Pennsylvania. Fiftyeight students participated in the pre-test. Thirty-eight students were recruited from
two communications courses and were offered extra-credit to participate. Twenty
more students were recruited from another communications class and were paid $7.00
for their participation. Subjects ranged in age from 18-23. The mean age was 20.3.
Seventy-six percent o f the sample was female, and 62% o f the sample was Caucasian.

Procedure: Subjects were simply told that their evaluations o f public service
announcements and movie content were needed. They were randomly assigned to
one o f four conditions, and were first shown a series o f public service announcements
followed by three movie clips.

Pretest for Selection o f Public Service Announcements
Twelve PSAs were selected from the PDFA anti-drug campaign to be pre
tested (Four sad, four happy, and four neutral). These PSAs were chosen based on
whether they seemed at face-value to be attempting to evoke a particular emotional
response. The goal o f the pre-test was to find three PSAs: one which elicits
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happiness, one which elicits sadness, and one that is emotionally neutral. Because
PSAs can elicit more than one emotion, PSAs were defined as eliciting a discrete
emotion if the target emotion was rated significantly higher than other emotions.
Subjects were shown six PSAs (two happy, two neutral, and two sad) prior to seeing
three program segments. The PSAs were rotated in order to control for order effects.
After each PSA was shown, the tape was paused and they were asked to rate on a
seven point scale the extent to which each PSA made them feel happy, sad, angry,
afraid, surprised, guilty, or disgusted (l= not at all, 7=very much). In order to assure
that the PSAs did not differ on other dimensions, subjects were also asked to rate the
PSAs on other factors such as likeability (l=Dislike very much, 7=Like very much),
interest (l=Boring, 7=Interesting), irritating (l= n o t at all, 7=very much) and overall
evaluation (l=B ad, 7=Good). These are the same scales used to evaluate
advertisements in previous context effects studies (e.g. Goldberg and Gom, 1987;
Kamins et al., 1991). They were also asked to rate on a seven point scale (l= n o t at
all, 7=very much), the extent to which the PSAs were motivating, and exciting.
Lastly, subjects were asked to rate the PSAs in terms o f their persuasiveness.
They were asked to rate on a seven point scale the extent to which each one was
effective (l= n o t at all, 7=very much), convincing (l= not at all, 7=very much),
believable (l= not at all, 7=very much) and the strength o f the argument presented
(l=w eak argument, 7=strong argument).
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Pretest for selection o f program segments
The intent o f the programming pretest was to select segments which would
effectively elicit the relevant discrete emotions. The goal was to select one sad
segment, one happy segment, and one neutral segment from the same program in
order to control for the actors, content, story-line, style, acting, plot, etc. which could
interfere with the manipulation if the segments were chosen from different programs.
In addition, there is the possibility that the content o f the program and PSA may
interact in some unpredictable ways. Thus in selecting the program segments to pre
test it was necessary to try to select segments where the content was as unrelated to
the topic o f the PSAs as possible. For example, if a program segment was selected
which depicted family conflict, the conflict should not be related to the topic
discussed in the PSAs (e.g. drugs) and should probably not focus on any other social
issues (e.g. safe sex) which may include themes related to morality, risky behavior,
etc.
After viewing dozens o f news programs, talk shows, television dramas,
documentaries and movies, I decided to use movie clips as the programming segments
to be tested. I selected movies for a number o f reasons. First, in order to be able to
control for other factors which may be influencing subjects’ cognitive processing (e.g.
the plot, actors, style, etc.) I needed to find clips that were similar on as many other
dimensions as possible to ensure to the best o f my ability that any results I would find
could be explained by the difference in the emotion evoked by the clips. This
prevented me from using news stories, or talk shows where clearly the topic o f
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discussion would be different for clips evoking happiness or sadness. I also wanted to
find clips that would effectively elicit the relevant emotions, and that few subjects
would have seen before. I decided to use movie clips, because I felt that any dramatic
television programming would have a higher likelihood o f being seen by subjects,
whereas with movies, I had the opportunity to search for obscure or older movies. I
also felt that movies were probably more likely to contain both happy and sad scenes,
and scenes that would be more intensely emotional.
I selected three movies. Two were selected after asking people to
recommend movies that contained both sad and happy scenes, and screening those
movies. These movies were “My Life” (about a man dying o f cancer), and “Dad”
(about an elderly father who becomes ill). The third was selected from a study
conducted by Gross and Levenson (1995) who tested emotional response to 78 film
clips and who developed a list o f 16 clips from different movies which were found to
elicit discrete emotional responses. From their list I chose the movie that included the
scene that earned the highest sadness ratings in their study. This movie was “The
Champ”. After viewing each o f these movies, I selected three clips from each: one
which I expected to produce happiness, one sad clip, and one neutral clip.
In line with previous research (Goldberg and Gom, 1987; Kamins et al.,
1991), program segments were limited to 5-10 minutes. Subjects watched and
evaluated six PSAs before viewing three movie clips. The order o f the clips was
rotated to control for order effects, however, sad clips were always shown after
happy clips, because o f the concern that very sad clips would hinder subjects ability to
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evaluate happy segments which followed. In addition, subjects were only shown one
clip from each movie (i.e. if they saw the sad clip from a movie, they did not also see
the happy clip from the same movie). Neutral clips were not tested as part o f this
pre-test. Thus, the segments were presented in the following order:

Condition 1
Happy PSA 1
Neutral PSA 1
Sad PSA 1
Neutral PSA 2
Happy PSA 2
Sad PSA 2

C o n d itio n !
Sad PSA 2
Neutral PSA 2
Happy PSA 2
Sad PSA 1
Neutral PSA 1
Happy PSA 1

C on d ition !
Happy PSA 3
Neutral PSA 3
Sad PSA 3
Neutral PSA 4
Happy PSA 4
Sad PSA 4

Condition 4
Sad PSA 4
Neutral PSA 4
Happy PSA 4
Sad PSA 3
Neutral PSA 3
Happy PSA 3

Happy - My Life
Sad - Champ
Sad - Dad

Happy - Champ
Happy - Dad
Sad - My Life

Happy - Dad
Happy - My Life
Sad - Champ

Happy - Champ
Sad - My Life
Sad - Dad

After viewing each segment, subjects were asked to rate on a seven point
scale the extent to which each segment made them feel happy, sad, angry, afraid,
surprised, guilty, and disgusted (l=not at all, 7=very much). In order to assure that
the segments did not differ on other dimensions, subjects were also asked to rate them
on other factors such as interestingness (l=not at all interesting, 7=very interesting)
and execution style, such as clarity (l=not at all clear, 7=very clear), quality (l=very
poor quality, 7=very high quality) and completeness (l=not at all cohesive, 7=very
cohesive). These are the same scales that were used to evaluate program segments in
previous context effects studies (e.g. Mathur & Chattopadhyay, 1991). They were
also asked to indicate whether the segments were engaging (l= not at all engaging,
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7=very engaging) and exciting (l=not at all exciting, 7=very exciting). Subjects were
also asked whether they had seen the movie from which the clips were taken. After
evaluating the movie segments, they answered demographic questions, were debriefed
and dismissed. The study took about 45 minutes to complete.

Results
Because PSAs and television programs can elicit more than one emotion,
programs were considered to successfully elicit a discrete emotion if the target
emotion was rated significantly higher than other emotions. This pre-test also
functioned as a test o f Hypothesis I.
Public Service Announcements
Three PSAs were selected based on the scores they generated. The happy
PSA that was chosen was a self-esteem building message that did not contain an overt
anti-drug message. The PSA consisted o f a group o f young people laughing and
skateboarding outside. The scenes were interspersed with individual teens who said
various phrases such as “we’re not slackers

we’re fighters”, “w e’re not lazy....we

have many gifts”, and the tag line said “w e’re not Generation X ... .we are generation
Excellent”. A screen showing the logo o f Partnership for a Drug Free American then
appeared. This message o f the PSA was therefore, implicit rather than explicit.
The sad PSA was shot in black and white and showed a woman who looked
like she was in her 40s and appeared to be on drugs and very unhealthy. Her voice
was raspy, she slurred her words, and she appeared unable to focus. She discussed
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how she swore she would never “shoot up”, but after starting to do heroin she had
lost her spirit and motivation, and that a part o f her had died. While she was talking,
images o f her in the years before she started doing heroin were interspersed. A
picture o f her from her high school yearbook at age 18, and a picture o f her at age 24
as the Creative Director o f an advertising agency were shown. Both pictures were in
color and showed her as a beautiful, vibrant woman. The final picture showed her in
her current state, and underneath were the words “Ashley, age 28. Heroin addict” .
The neutral PSA that was chosen was a “talking head” PSA which consisted
of musician Lauryn Hill standing on a city street talking about how people should
avoid doing drugs because they “destroy people, they destroy lives, they destroy
families”. Her speech was unanimated, and she simply asked people to “stay positive”
and “stay away from drugs” because nothing positive can come from doing drugs.
The happy PSA, which was evaluated by 30 subjects, received the highest
happiness rating of all the PSAs (M = 4.37, SD = 1.67). The mean rating o f the PSA
on the happiness scale was also significantly higher than the mean rating o f the PSA
on any other emotion. The mean score for all other emotions was 2.00 or lower. The
sad PSA (evaluated by 28 subjects) received the highest sadness rating o f all the PSAs
(M = S. 14, SD =1.15). It was also rated significantly higher on sadness relative to
the other emotions. All other emotions received a mean score o f 3.5 or lower. The
neutral PSA (evaluated by 28 subjects) scored low on all emotion scales (M = 2.2 or
lower).
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The sad PSA was rated as significantly sadder than the happy PSA was rated
happy, (t = -2.05, p < .05). In terms o f other qualities measured, the happy PSA was
rated as significantly more well-liked (t = 4.24, p < .001, more interesting, (t = 2.01,
p = .05), and more exciting, (t = 4.88, p < .001) than the sad PSA. No significant
differences were found between ratings o f the PSAs as irritating, motivating or their
overall rating (bad - good).
Although differences were found between PSAs, on several dimensions, this is
probably not problematic. It is not surprising that the happy PSA was liked more,
and was rated as more exciting given the depressing nature o f the sad PSA. The
nature o f events that would evoke sadness in people are by definition more likely to
be negative, and less exciting than those that evoke happiness. In addition, while the
happy PSA was rated as being significantly more interesting than the sad PSA, the
difference was not large, i.e. the PSAs were both rated around a mean o f 5 on the
scale on this dimension (mean o f happy PSA = 5.4, mean o f sad PSA = 4.7).
In order to calculate the perceived persuasiveness o f the PSAs, a factor
analysis was conducted on the four measures (perceived effectiveness,
convincingness, believability, and argument strength). One factor with an eigenvalue
o f 3.35 emerged accounting for 84% o f the variance, so the persuasiveness scores
were averaged. The sad PSA (M = 5.65, SD = .93) was rated as significantly more
persuasive than the happy PSA (M = 4.26, SD = 1.50), t = -4.22, p < .001 . This is
not surprising given that PSAs which evoke negative emotions are often more likely
to be perceived as persuasive than positively toned messages.
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The neutral PSA was rated as significantly less well-liked (t = 6.57, p < .001),
less interesting (t = 6.04, p < .001), less motivating (t = 2.34, p < .05) and less
exciting (t = 7.37, p < .001) than the happy PSA. It also was rated significantly lower
on the overall rating (bad-good) (t = 5.46, p < .001). However it was not rated
significantly different from the happy PSA in terms o f perceived persuasiveness (mean
o f neutral PSA = 3.76), t = 1.32, n.s.. The neutral PSA was also rated as
significantly less interesting (t = -3.69, p = .001), less well-liked (t = -2.29, p < .05),
less motivating (t = -5.15, p < .001), and received an overall lower rating than the sad
PSA (t = -4.19, p < .001). It also was rated significantly lower in terms o f perceived
persuasiveness (t = -6.02, p < .001) than the sad PSA.

Movie Segments
Two movies were considered for final selection (“Dad” was eliminated
because the Happy segment chosen did not elicit adequate scores on the happiness
measure). The final selection was made between “My Life” and “The Champ”. While
the segments from “My Life” generated strong scores (the happy segment earned a
mean o f 5.75 on the happy scale, and the sad segment earned a mean o f 6.13 on the
sadness scale), and did not differ significantly from each other on other dimensions
(interesting, engaging, quality, cohesiveness), two problems emerged with this movie.
First, because the sad segment dealt with a man dying o f cancer, ratings on the fear
measure were somewhat high (M = 4.33). In addition, may subjects had seen the
movie, and knew that the movie had a sad ending. Thus, many o f the subjects who
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saw the happy clip rated it fairly high on the sad scale. Although the mean on the
sadness scale was only 3.14 for the happy clip, the fact that the clip evoked sadness in
some subjects was problematic.
The movie that was finally chosen was “The Champ”, which is about a boxer
who had retired from fighting, but who decides to make a comeback at the age o f 37.
He has a grade-school age son with whom he is very close. The movie is somewhat
older than the other movies tested (it was made in the early 80s), which ensured that
few subjects had seen the movie before (only 2 subjects indicated that they had seen
the movie before).
As mentioned earlier, it was crucial to find clips that would not differ in terms
o f plot, characters, acting, etc. in order to be able to argue that any effects that would
be found would be due to the emotion elicited and not the content o f the clips. The
clips from this movie met these demands very closely. Both clips were about 6
minutes in length. The happy clip depicts the father and son spending time together
outside. The father is training for the upcoming fight and is jogging, while his son
follows him on his bike. The music is very upbeat, and at one point the father and son
pretend to box with each other while both are laughing. The next scene shows them
at the beach. They decide to go swimming and race each other to the ocean. The
scene ends with them laughing and playing in the waves together.
The sad scene comes from the very end o f the movie. The boxer is hurt badly
during his comeback fight, and his trainers bring him down to the locker room to
assess his injuries. The scene shows a doctor looking at “the Champ” as he lays on
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the table, and then pronouncing him dead. The rest o f the scene involves a heartwrenching performance by the little boy who cries and pleads to the people around
him as he tries to wake his father, not believing that he is dead.
The benefits o f using these scenes is that they both have very little dialogue,
and the main characters depicted are the father and son. The scenes capture an
extreme moment o f happiness in their relationship and an extreme moment o f sadness,
and are able to stand by themselves, in that little background information is needed to
set up the scenes because they are simple and easy to understand without having seen
the rest o f the movie. At the same time, they are engaging enough so that subjects
would not be bored watching them without having seen the rest o f the movie, and
without having established familiarity with the characters.
Both the happy and sad clips successfully elicited the target emotion to a
greater extent than any other emotions. The mean o f the happy clip on the happy scale
was 4.73, while the mean o f the sad clip on the sad scale was 6.15. The sad clip was
rated as significantly more interesting, (t = -2.21, p < .05), and more engaging, (t = 3.20, P < .01) than the happy clip. This is not surprising given that the sad clip dealt
with the death o f the little boy’s father. It was not rated significantly clearer, better
quality, more cohesive or more exciting than the happy clip.
Support for Hypothesis 1:
Because it has not been established that television material can elicit discrete
emotions in the same way as written scenarios and personal experiences can, it was
first necessary to establish that this can occur. Thus, pre-test 1 was also used as a test
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o f hypothesis 1 which predicted that television programs and public service
announcements would be able to elicit discrete emotions such that the target emotion
would be reported at significantly higher levels than other emotions. Although movie
segments were tested in place o f television programs, both the segments and the
PSAs were shown to elicit the target emotions (happiness and sadness) to a
significantly greater extent than any other emotions test. This provides evidence to
support Hypothesis 1.

PRE-TEST 2: Test o f the influence o f emotion on inform ation processing
Because most studies o f the influence of affect on message processing focus
on the effects o f mood, there is very limited evidence to suggest that discrete
emotions will influence processing in the ways predicted in this study. Nor is there
evidence that emotions elicited from television programming will have the predicted
effect on processing strategy. Thus, in order to test hypothesis 2 (that discrete
emotions elicited from television programming will influence the extent o f message
elaboration that will take place), a second pre-test was conducted. Using the
programming stimuli that were selected in pretest 1, subjects were recruited to test
whether the emotion elicited from the clips would influence subsequent processing of
a PSA. However, because the purpose o f this pretest was to assess whether the
emotion evoked from the segments will influence the amount o f message elaboration,
independent o f the emotion elicited by the PSAs, an affectively neutral message was
used.
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Method
Subjects: Subjects were undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania. Eighty
students participated in this second pre-test. Students were recruited from
communications classes and from the general student population via internet
newsgroup postings. They were paid $7.00 for their participation. Five students had
participated in the first pre-test, and so their results were not included in the analysis.
Subjects ranged in age from 18-22. The mean age was 19.9. 67% o f the sample was
female, and 69% o f the sample was Caucasian.

Procedure:

Results from pre-test 1 showed that the sad PSA was earning very high

ratings in terms o f perceived persuasiveness (M = 5.65 out of 7). Because o f this it
was decided that ratings o f the PSAs should be measured on a 9-point scale to avoid
possible ceiling effects. It was also decided that the persuasiveness o f the PSAs
within each o f the programming contexts used in the experiment would be determined
by computing a difference score between ratings o f the PSAs within each o f the
programming contexts, and ratings o f the PSAs out o f context. Thus the three PSAs
chosen in the first pre-test were tested again using nine point scales, so that the means
from this pre-test could be used as base-lines against which to compare the
performance o f the PSAs in the programming contexts used in the experiment. In
addition, three other PSAs (one happy, one sad, one neutral) were tested to ensure
that the three selected were still the best contenders. Thus six PSAs were tested in
this second pre-test.
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Subjects were randomly assigned to one o f four conditions. They were simply
told that the study involved evaluating public service announcements and movie clips.
They were first shown three PSAs. After each one, the tape was paused and they
were asked to rate the PSA on the same measures used in the first pre-test (emotion
scales, traits, and perceived persuasiveness). The PSAs were rotated to control for
order effects.
Subjects were then shown a “neutral” clip selected from the movie “The
Champ”. This clip was the opening scene of the movie, and showed the boxer and his
son discussing whether he was going to try to make a comeback. The clip was
chosen because it introduced the viewer to the main characters o f the movie and set
up the plot, without giving away the tone or outcome o f the movie, because it was
ambiguous as to whether he would fight again. After viewing the neutral clip,
subjects were asked to rate it on the same measures used to evaluate the sad and
happy segments in Pre-test 1 (emotion scales, and other characteristics such as
interesting, engaging, quality, cohesiveness, clarity, and exciting). All ratings were
given on a nine point scale (l=not at all, 9=very much).
Finally, subjects were told that they would see another clip from the same
movie, but this time the clip would be followed by a commercial break, as if they were
watching a movie on television at home. They were then shown either the happy or
sad clip from “The Champ”, which was followed by one o f two neutral PSAs selected
in the first pre-test (both o f which featured female musicians delivering an anti-drug
message using a “talking head” approach). After viewing the clip and PSA, they
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turned the page o f the questionnaire which brought them to a blank page with
instructions at the top which asked them to “write down any and all thoughts,
comments, feelings or reactions they had while they were watching the PSA”. Rather
than allowing subjects to write down their thoughts in essay form, the page was
numbered from one to eight (indicating that up to eight responses could be given).
This was done to make the coding process easier and more systematic, because
individual thoughts were clearly segmented. Responses were then coded for whether
they were argument-related (support arguments, counter arguments) and whether
they were positively or negatively valenced (see below for further details on coding
scheme). It was predicted that those viewing the happy segment would engage in
significantly less cognitive elaboration o f the PSA than those viewing the sad movie
segment.
After completing the thought listing procedure, subjects were asked to rate
the extent to which they found the PSA to be effective, convincing, believable, and
the strength o f the argument presented in the PSA on nine-point scales (l= not at all,
9=very much). They were also asked to indicate whether they had seen the movie
from which the clip had been taken. They were then told that the remaining questions
would pertain to the movie clip they had seen that had preceded the PSA. They were
then asked to indicate (on a nine point scale) the extent to which the movie clip made
them feel afraid, happy, angry, sad, guilty, cheerful, disgusted, sorrowful and
surprised. They were then asked to rate the clip in terms o f the qualities measured in
Pre-test 1: interesting, clear, engaging, quality, cohesive, exciting. Lastly, they
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answered demographic questions, were debriefed, and dismissed. They study took
about 45 minutes to complete. (See below for an outline of the four conditions).
Note that the neutral PSA which followed the emotional clip was not the same neutral
PSA tested earlier in the Pre-test. The reason for using two neutral PSAs is that one
o f the PSAs (featuring Lauryn Hill) had been chosen after the first pre-test to be used
as the neutral PSA in the experiment, so I wanted to use it as the test PSA to follow
the emotionally evocative clips in this second Pre-test. However, it also needed it to
be re-evaluated during this second round o f testing so that it could be judged using
nine point scales. Thus a second neutral PSA was chosen (also featuring a female
musician), so that the PSAs could both act as the target stimuli, as well as be
evaluated out of context along with the other PSAs.

Condition 1 (n=I5j
Happy PSA 1
Neutral PSA 1
Sad PSA 1

Condition 2 (n=18)
Sad PSA 2
Neutral PSA 2
Happy PSA 2

Condition 3 (n=19)
Sad PSA 1
Neutral PSA 1
Happy PSA 1

Condition 4 (n=23)
Happy PSA 2
Neutral PSA 2
Sad PSA 2

Happy Segment
Neutral PSA 2

Happy Segment
Neutral PSA 1

Sad Segment
Neutral PSA 2

Sad Segment
Neutral PSA 1

(Note: Uneven sample sizes resulted from having to discard three responses from Condition 1 and
two responses from Condition 2).
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Results
Public Service Announcements:
The three PSAs that were selected in the first pre-test again outscored the
additional three PSAs tested in the second test. Unlike in the first pre-test, the sad
PSA was rated as significantly more interesting than the happy PSA (in the first pre
test the happy PSA was found to be more interesting). The sad PSA was also rated
as more motivating, and received a higher overall rating than the happy PSA (no
differences were found between the PSAs on these measures in the first round of
testing). As with the first pre-test, the happy PSA was found to be more exciting than
the sad PSA, but the sad PSA was rated as being more persuasive.
The scores o f the neutral PSA improved in this round o f testing which is
probably explained by the fact that the PSA featured Lauryn Hill, a singer who
received several Grammy awards and generated much publicity in the period between
the first and second pre-tests. Whereas the PSA was rated as significantly lower than
both the happy and sad PSAs on almost all dimensions in the first pre-test, few
differences were found between the PSA and either o f the emotionally evocative
messages. The neutral PSA was only rated as significantly less exciting than the
happy PSA (t = 3.24, p < .01) and, in fact, was rated as significantly less irritating
than the happy PSA (t = 1.97, p = .05). Compared to the sad PSA, the neutral PSA
was found to be significantly less motivating, (t = -2.16, p < .05) and less persuasive,
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(t = -2.21, p < .05). The means and t-test results for each o f the three PSAs on all
measures are reported below.

Table 3. Mean emotion and attribute ratings for happy, sad and neutral PSAs
(on a 9 point scale)
Sad PSA
(**1)
M
SD
2.48
3.86
.60
1.31
2.19
3.52
2.24
6.25
1.65
2.14
.54
1.27
2.56
4.84
2.38
5.73
2.34
4.89

Neutral PSA
(*■34)
SD
M
1.46
1.84
1.99
2.90
1.83
1.97
2.01
2.48
1.17
1.65
1.67
2.26
1.59
1.84
1.94
2.22
2.08
3.42

T-tests between
Sad and
Haspy PSAa

Afraid
Happy
Angry
Sad
Guilty
Cheerful
Disgusted
Sorrowful
Surprised

Happy PSA
(*■34)
M
SD
.99
1.48
1.71
5.07
1.20
1.69
.97
1.66
1.18
1.62
1.84
4.59
1.05
1.62
1.15
1.62
1.48
2.76

Like
Interesting
Good
Not Irritating
Motivating
Exciting

5.86
5.41
5.38
5.00
5.48
5.28

2.21
2.03
2.26
3.01
2.20
1.85

5.84
6.36
6.50
5.52
6.64
3.48

1.79
1.93
1.96
2.53
1.59
1.91

6.16
5.77
6.26
6.39
5.68
3.81

2.05
2.03
1.90
2.42
2.26
1.66

.05
-2.02*
-2.25*
-.80
-2.61**
3.99” *

Persuasiveness

5.30

2.05

7.14

1.46

6.24

2.04

-4.46***

p < .05,"*

.01. ~ p < ; .ooi

Movie Segments
Neutral Segment: The neutral clip that was selected scored fairly low on all
emotions (mean o f 2.5 or less), although it scored slightly higher on the happiness (M
= 4.22, SD = 1.71) and sadness (M = 3.16, SD = 1.95) measures. Although these
scores were higher than expected, the segment scored below the midpoint o f the scale

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

105

on these measures, and the scores were significantly lower than those generated by
the happy and sad segments on these measures respectively, at p < .001. The neutral
segment also performed fairly well on other measures, considering that it was not very
emotionally evocative. Compared to the happy segment, the neutral segment was
only rated as being somewhat less engaging (t = 2.12, p < .05), and somewhat less
exciting (t = 2.21, p < .05). No differences were found between the segments on
ratings o f interestingness, clarity, quality or cohesiveness. Compared to the sad
segment, the neutral segment was rated as less interesting (t = -4.89, p < .001), less
engaging (t = -6.60, p < .001), poorer quality
(t = -4.23, p < .001), and less cohesive (t = -3.46, p = .001). No differences were
found between the segments on ratings o f clarity or excitement.
Happy and Sad Segments: As mentioned before, the happy and sad segments
were again evaluated in this pre-test (despite the fact that they had been measured in
the first pre-test), in order to have a base line for them using 9 point scales, and also
because in this pre-test, the segments were shown after the neutral segment, which is
similar to the way they would be presented in the experiment. It was reasonable to
assume that reactions to the happy and sad clips would differ from those in pre-test 1,
because seeing the additional neutral clip would increase familiarity with the
characters, and build further involvement and interest in the movie.
Results showed that both the happy and sad clips successfully evoked the
target emotions, although the sad clip was significantly more sad than the happy clip
was happy. The sad clip was also rated significantly more interesting, engaging,
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cohesive and better quality than the happy clip (see table 4 below). While it seems
potentially problematic that the clips differed significantly in terms o f being perceived
as interesting and engaging, it is not surprising that these results were found given
that the sad clip deals with the death o f a parent while the happy clip is somewhat
frivolous. While there is some concern that the clips differed on these measures, both
o f the clips scored above the midpoint on these scales, and their means were only
slightly over one point apart. In addition, it seems somewhat inherent in the nature of
sad events that they would be perceived as more engaging and interesting than happy
events (especially given that sadness is thought to lead to more cognitive elaboration).
Nevertheless, the differences will be taken account in interpreting future results. Only
two people (out o f 75) indicated that they had seen the movie before. Results from
all three segments are reported in table 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 4. Mean emotion and attribute ratings for happy, sad and neutral movie
clips (on a 9 point scale)
Happy Clip

Sad Clip

Neutral Clip

(■-42)

Afraid
Happy
Angry
Sad
Guilty
Cheerful
Disgusted
Sorrowful
Surprised

0*-33)
M
SD
2.18
1.51
6.36 2.01
1.48
.76
3.58 2.08
1.67 1.19
5.42 2.17
1.39
.90
3.00 2.03
1.87
2.64

M
4.38
1.31
3.67
8.07
2.45
1.33
3.00
7.95
5.17

2.58
.64
2.03
1.11
1.74
.72
2.00
1.29
2.37

(*—75)
M
SD
1.28
1.80
4.22
1.71
1.07
1.69
1.95
3.16
.74
133
1.88
4.11
1.44
.98
2.54
1.83
1.61
2.27

Interesting
Clear
Engaging
Quality
Cohesiveness
Exciting

5.94
6.61
6.36
5.58
6.06
5.18

2.03
1.60
1.76
1.46
1.37
1.88

7.07
7.17
7.55
6.48
6.95
4.98

1.20
1.50
1.23
1.61
1.58
1.81

5.51
6.71
5.61
5.25
5.97
4.40

SD

1.87
1.79
1.66
1.43
1.40
1.61

T-tests between
Sad and
Happy PSAs

-3.01**
-1.56
-3.41**
-2.50*
-2.58**
.48

.05, " p £ .01. •'> < ; .001

Thought listing:
The thought listing portion o f the pre-test was used to evaluate the extent o f
cognitive elaboration in which subjects engaged after viewing either the Happy or Sad
movie segment. As mentioned earlier, subjects were shown a neutral PSA following
one o f the emotionally evocative segments. Subjects were then asked to write down
up to eight comments, thoughts, or feelings they had in response to the PSA. After
the study was completed, the responses were removed from the questionnaires
(identification numbers and condition numbers were written on the back) so that the
coders would not know the condition to which the subjects belonged. The author and
one other person coded the responses.
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Thought listing Coding Scheme: Responses to the thought-listing portion o f
the questionnaire were coded on several dimensions. Batra and Ray (1986)
developed a coding scheme which seemed to include all o f the categories relevant to
this study, so many o f their categories were adopted. The following categories were
used to distinguish whether responses were argument-relevant vs. argument
irrelevant, support arguments vs. counter arguments, and the valence o f emotional
responses. See the appendix for the complete code book used.

Table 5. Thought-listing coding categories
Coding Category
Argument-relevant
Support-arguments
Counter-arguments
Argument-irrelevant
Execution discounting
Execution bolstering

Includes
Reasoned affirmations, simple affirmations
Reasoned disaffirmations, simple disaffirmadons
Negative reactions to execution elements: style, source,
source credibility
Positive reactions to execution elements: style, source, source
credibility

Affective comments
Happy cognitions
Sad (non-happy) cognitions

Reports of feeling happy, positive associations made
Reports of feeling sad, negative associations made

Thoughts about the movie plot
Thoughts about movie themes

Comments about the plot or actors from the preceding movie
Comments related to themes brought up in the movie

Other - positive
Other - negative

General comments such as “the ad was entertaining”
General comments such as “I didn’t like it”

The coders discussed the coding scheme and then went over several o f the
responses together to iron out differences into how statements should be categorized.
They then both coded five responses and discussed their results. After coming to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109

agreement on how those responses should be coded, they each coded ten more
responses. Inter-coder reliability was tested using Krippendorf s Alpha. Reliability for
several measures was below acceptable standards, so further discussion o f the coding
categories was conducted. Coders then coded twenty more responses (which was
27% o f the total sample). After generating acceptable levels o f reliability, the author
went on to code the remaining responses. Inter-coder reliability for the various
categories was as follows: Support arguments/simple affirmations (.85), Counter
arguments/simple disaffirmations (.71), Execution positive (.95), Execution negative
(.83), Happy cognitions (1.00), Sad cognitions (.76), thoughts about movie plot
(1.00), thoughts about movie themes (.79), other positive (.95), other negative (.66).

Does emotion from television programming influence cognitive processing?
In order to assess the extent o f message elaboration in which subjects
engaged, support-arguments and counter-arguments were totaled. Evidence o f
heuristic processing was evaluated by summing message-irrelevant comments which
included comments about the production elements o f the PSA (positive, negative,
neutral), and comments about the spokesperson’s appearance, talent or credibility
(positive, negative1, neutral).
Results from conditions one and two (in which subjects saw the happy
segment) were combined and were compared to the results from conditions three and

1Negative comments about the speaker’s credibility which challenged the legitimacy of the message
were coded as counter arguments (e.g. “Why should we listen to her, I bet she smokes up all the
time”), whereas comments such as “I wonder if she has ever done drugs” were coded as source
comments.
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four (in which subjects saw the sad segment). Subjects in the happy condition(s)
listed significantly more thoughts than those in the sad conditions). The mean
number o f thoughts listed for those in the happy condition was 4.48, versus 3.71 for
those in the sad condition (t = 2.25, p < .05). Subjects in both the happy and sad
conditions were more likely to make message-irrelevant comments (production and
source comments combined) than comments about the message o f the PSA. Subjects
in the happy condition made an average o f 2.55 message-irrelevant comments, versus
an average o f .67 message-relevant comments (t = 6.38, p < .001). For those in the
sad condition, the mean o f the message-irrelevant comments (1.41) was also
significantly higher than the mean o f the message relevant comments (.55) (t = -4.10,
p < .001).
Because those in the happy condition generated a greater number o f thoughts
than those in the sad condition, comparisons between conditions needed to be
conducted in terms o f the ratio o f message relevant and irrelevant thoughts generated
relative to the total number o f thoughts. However, several absolute comparisons are
worth noting. No differences were found between conditions in terms o f the number
o f message relevant thoughts (support arguments, counter arguments) generated.
However, subjects in the happy condition were more likely than those in the sad
condition to make message irrelevant comments. When the valence o f these
comments was taken into account, it appeared that those in the happy condition were
only significantly more likely to make positive comments related to the execution o f
the PSAs. No differences were found between conditions on negative comments
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related to the execution o f the PSAs. In addition, subjects in the happy condition
were more likely than those in the sad condition to report feeling happy, or to make
general positive comments than those in the sad condition. No differences were
found between conditions on general negative comments made. See Table 6 below
for statistical tests.

Table 6. Mean number of message relevant and message irrelevant comments generated
in the happy and sad program conditions

Happy Condition Sad Condition
a-33
a-42
M
SD
SD
M
.96
.67
.67
.48
.70
.17
.44
.39
.67
.27
.48
.24

Message Relevant
Support Arguments
Counter arguments

T-test
1.01
1.62
.26

Message Irrelevant
Execution Bolstering
Execution Discounting

2.55
1.09
.42

1.12
1.18
.66

1.40
.33
.48

1.25
.61
.77

Happy/Positive Cognitions
Sad/Negative Cognitions

.27
.24

.45
.56

.05
.38

.22
.62

2.63**
-1.00

Movie plot thoughts
Movie theme thoughts
p < .05,"’
.01,

.27
.24

.57
.61

.55
.21

1.06
.61

-1.43
.20

4.10***
3.35**
-.31

p £ .001

When the ratio o f message relevant and irrelevant thoughts to the total
thoughts (relevant plus irrelevant) was computed, subjects in the happy condition
were found to generate a significantly higher proportion o f message irrelevant
thoughts than those in the sad condition. Subjects in the sad condition generated a
significantly higher proportion o f message relevant thoughts than those in the happy
condition. This suggests that those in the happy condition were more likely than those
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in the sad condition to engage in heuristic processing, while those in the sad condition
were more likely than those in the happy condition to engage in systematic
processing. Subjects in the happy condition were also significantly more likely to
generate happy/positive thoughts than those in the sad condition. No significant
differences were found between conditions on the proportion o f sad/negative
thoughts generated.

Table 7. Ratio of message relevant and message irrelevant thoughts generated in the
happy and sad program condition
Happy Condition Sad Coodifiim
*-33
' a-42 .-.
M

T-tcst

Message Relevant
Support Arguments
Counter arguments

.32
.07
.05

SD
.15
.12
.11

.41
.03
.05

SD
.13
.09
.10

-2.94**
1.36
.09

Message Irrelevant
Execution Bolstering
Execution Discounting

.68
.20
.07

.15
.20
.13

.59
.07
.08

.13
.13
.13

2.94**
3.33**
-.21

Happy/Positive Cognitions'1
Sad/Negative Cognitions

.05
.04

.09
.09

.02
.12

.07
.24

"p < .05,'* p ^

M

1.96*
-1.86

.01, - p £ .001

* Note that for happy/positive and sad/negative thoughts, the proportion was calculated relative to
the total number of thoughts generated (not just the total of message relevant and message irrelevant
thoughts).

Systematic versus Heuristic Processing
While the findings above suggest that those in the happy condition were more
likely to engage in heuristic processing relative to those in the sad condition, and
those in the sad condition were more likely to engage in systematic processing relative
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to those in the happy condition, this analysis does not tell us whether subjects in each
condition were more likely to engage in one type o f processing more than the other.
In the first analysis (see table 6), subjects in both the happy and sad conditions were
found to make significantly fewer message-relevant comments than messageirrelevant comments, which would suggest that subjects in both conditions were
engaging in heuristic processing over systematic processing. However, the
comparison o f message-irrelevant thoughts and message relevant thoughts in that
analysis seems somewhat biased, because o f the way message-irrelevant thoughts
were scored. In that analysis, comments related to both the production elements o f
the PSA and comments related to the source (spokesperson) o f the PSA were
combined to evaluate the number o f message-irrelevant thoughts subjects generated.
Because both o f the neutral “target” PSAs used celebrities (popular female musicians)
as spokespersons, and because subjects had been asked to evaluate the execution
quality o f PSAs in the first part o f the pre-test, it seemed likely that this would
increase the probability that subjects would comment on some execution element o f
the PSA. In fact, 79% o f all subjects made at least one comment about the source or
production quality o f the PSA, (vs. 43% who made at least one message related
comment). Thus it seemed somewhat unfair to compare message related thoughts to
aU thoughts related to the execution o f the PSA (i.e. comments about the production
elements as well as comments about the spokesperson o f the PSAs ). Taking this into
consideration, these measures were separated out in the second analysis, and the
results changed. Those in the happy condition were still more likely to make both

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

source comments and production comments than message relevant comments.
However, those in the sad condition were not significantly more likely to make more
source comments or production comments than message related comments (see table
8). This seems to suggest that while those in the happy condition were engaging in
more heuristic thinking, those in the sad condition were engaging in both heuristic as
well as systematic thinking.
Table 8. Mean number of message-relevant and message-irrelevant comments (total,
production, and source) generated in the happy and sad program conditions
Message Irrelevant

Message Relevant
% of subjects making at least
one comment o f this type
Happy Condition (mean)
T-test (vs. Message Relevant)

Total

Total

Production

Source

43%

79%

53%

59%

.67

2.55
-6.38***

1.12
-i.6 r

1.42
-2.54**

.74
n.s.

.67
n.s.

Sad Condition (mean)
.55
T-test (vs. Message Relevant)
p £ .10," p ^ .0 5 ,’* p £ .01, "” p ^ .001

1.40
-4.10
.

_

In order to further test whether subjects in each o f the conditions were more
likely to engage in systematic versus heuristic processing, the ratio o f message
relevant and message irrelevant thoughts to the total (relevant plus irrelevant) was
calculated. Subjects in both conditions listed a significantly greater number of
message irrelevant thoughts than message relevant thoughts. For happy subjects, the
mean ratio o f message irrelevant thoughts to message relevant thoughts was .68 vs.
.32 (t = -7.20, p < .001), for sad subjects the ratio o f irrelevant to relevant thoughts
was .59 vs. .41 (t = -4.41, p < .001). However, if the message irrelevant thoughts
were broken down into comments related to production elements and source
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comments, the results were somewhat different. Happy subjects were still
significantly more likely to comment on both the production elements o f the PSA and
the spokesperson than to make message related comments, but sad subjects were not
significantly more likely to comment on either elements o f the execution o f the PSA
than to make message-related comments. See tables 9a-c.
Table 9a. Ratio of message-relevant comments and total message-irrelevant comments by
program condition
Message
Happy Condition
Sad Condition

IM eis^»iI& Sev^^: Irrelevant-Total
M
SD
M
SD
.15
.15
.68
.32
.41

.13

.59

.13

T-test
-7.20***
-4.41***

Table 9b. Ratio of message-relevant comments and production comments by program
condition
Message
Irrelevant- Production

T-test

Happy Condition

M
.45

SD
.16

M
.55

SD
.16

-1.8 T

Sad Condition

.48

.14

.52

.14

-.80

Table 9c. Ratio of message-relevant comments and source comments by program
condition

Message Relevant
Happy Condition

M
.43

Sad Condition

.50

Message'Irreievaatt - Source

SD
.17

M
.56

SD
.17

.14

.50

.14

* p£ .10,* p<£ .05, *‘ p^ .01, * * * P < ;

: T-test /
-2.11’
.20

.001
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Again this seems to suggest that while those in the happy condition are clearly
engaging in heuristic processing o f the PSAs, those in the sad condition are engaging
in both heuristic and systematic processing.

Summary: The results from these analysis clearly indicate that those in the happy
condition were significantly more likely than those in the sad condition to think about
the execution elements o f the PSAs than the messages themselves, which suggests
that they were more likely to engage in heuristic processing than those in the sad
condition. They were also significantly more likely to engage in heuristic processing
over systematic processing.
Subjects in the sad condition generated a significantly greater proportion o f
message related thoughts than those in the happy condition which suggests that they
were more likely to engage in systematic processing than those in the happy
condition. However, they were also more likely to generate message irrelevant
thoughts than message related thoughts (when the irrelevant thoughts were defined as
the total o f both execution and source related comments), which suggests that they
were also engaging in heuristic processing. When these comments were separated
into production related comments and source related comments, the difference
between the proportion o f message-relevant and message-irrelevant comments
disappeared, which suggests that subjects in the sad condition were engaging in both
systematic and heuristic processing.
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Support for Hypotheses 2 and 3:
Hypothesis 2 predicted that after viewing a happy program, viewers would be
more likely to engage in simplified (heuristic) information processing when processing
a subsequent PSA. It was predicted that relative to viewers in the sad condition, they
would generate fewer thoughts related to the message and would generate more
argument-irrelevant thoughts in response to the message. Results from this pre-test
support this hypothesis. Subjects in the happy condition generated proportionately
more message irrelevant thoughts than message relevant thoughts. They also
generated proportionately fewer message related thoughts, and proportionately more
message-irrelevant thoughts than those in the sad condition.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that after viewing a sad program, viewers would be
more likely to engage in more elaborate, argument related (systematic) thinking when
processing a subsequent PSA It was predicted that relative to viewers in the happy
condition, they would generate more thoughts related to the message, and fewer
message irrelevant thoughts. Contrary to what was hypothesized, viewers in the sad
condition appeared to engage in both heuristic as well as systematic processing (see
Chaiken, et al., (1989) for other evidence that this can occur). While they generated
proportionately more message related thoughts than those in the happy condition,
viewers in the sad condition did not generate proportionately more message relevant
thoughts than irrelevant thoughts. Thus, there is partial support for Hypothesis 3,
although it appears that the type o f information processing in which sad viewers
engage is more complex than hypothesized.
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Valence o f cognitions
One final analysis was conducted to assess the overall affective tone, or
valence o f subjects’ comments. For each subject, a valenced cognitive score was
computed by subtracting the number o f negative cognitions from the number of
positive cognitions. Positive cognitions included support arguments, simple
affirmations, execution bolsters, general positive comments and reports o f feeling
happy. Negative cognitions included counter arguments, simple disaffirmations,
execution discounts, general negative comments and reports o f feeling unhappy. As
table 10 shows, subjects in the happy condition listed significantly more favorable
cognitions than those in the sad condition.
Table 10. Mean difference in the valence of thoughts generated (positive minus negative
thoughts) between the happy and sad program condition
Happy Condition
b=13
Difference between positive
and negative cognitions

Sad Condition

M

SD

M

SD

.88

2.19

-.52

1.78

T-Test

3.06**

As table 11 shows, subjects were significantly more likely to generate positive
thoughts in the happy condition, and negative thoughts in the sad condition.
However, these results did not indicate whether a more extensive associative network
was triggered by the emotion evoked in either condition.
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Positive Cognitions
Happy Condition
Sad Condition
+ p < .10,’ p <

.0 5 ."

|1

Table 11. Mean number of positive and negative thoughts generated in the happy and
sad program conditions

M

SD

M

1.76
.55

1.48
.92

.88
1.07

.0 1 ,’" p ^

SWlitHHlil
SD

1.17
1.16

T-Test
2.30’
-1.90*

.001

In order to assess this, the ratio o f happy to sad cognitions generated in the
happy condition was compared to the ratio o f sad to happy cognitions generated in
the sad condition. In order to compute the ratios, a “ 1” was added to each subject’s
total positive and total negative cognition score in order to avoid divisions by zero.
No significant differences were found between conditions in terms o f the ratio of
positive to negative (and negative to positive) thoughts generated. The ratio of
happy to sad thoughts generated by subjects in the happy condition was 2.10, while
the ratio o f sad to happy thoughts generated by subjects in the sad condition was 1.82
(p > .05, n.s.). Thus, no evidence was found to suggest that either the happy or sad
clip triggered a more extensive network o f thoughts which corresponded to the
emotion evoked.
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EXPERIMENT
Method
Subjects: Subjects were undergraduate students at the University o f Pennsylvania.
The total number o f participants in the study was 148. One hundred and fifteen
students were recruited from communications classes and were offered extra credit
for their participation. An additional 33 students were recruited through internet
newsgroups and signs posted in classroom buildings. They were paid $7.00 for their
participation.
Subjects ranged in age from 18-23. The mean age was 19.7. Sixty-one
percent o f the subjects were female. Sixty-six percent o f the subjects were Caucasian,
19% were Asian-American, 6% were African-American, 5% were Hispanic, and 3%
were o f mixed racial background.

Design: Subjects were exposed to a total o f three clips, each o f which was followed
by a PSA. A 2x2 factorial design was used for the happy and sad program/PSA
conditions. The study was constructed as a between-subjects design, so that subjects
were only exposed to one o f the four key program-PS A combinations. However, in
order to familiarize subjects with the thought listing procedure, all subjects were
initially shown the neutral clip, followed by the neutral PSA. Next they were shown
one o f the four key clip-PS A combinations. Finally, in order to assess the final
exploratory hypothesis, subjects were exposed to a fear clip followed by either the
happy or sad PSA. The four conditions were constructed as follows:
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Condition 1
(«“39)

Condition 2

Condition 3
(■-37)

C ondition 4
Cn-36)

Neutral Clip
Neutral PSA

Neutral Clip
Neutral PSA

Neutral Clip
Neutral PSA

Neutral Clip
Neutral PSA

Happy Clip
Happy PSA

Happy Clip
Sad PSA

Sad Clip
Sad PSA

Sad Clip
Happy PSA

Fear Clip
Sad PSA

Fear Clip
Happy PSA

Fear Clip
Happy PSA

Fear Clip
Sad PSA

Procedure: Subjects were randomly assigned to one o f the four program-PSA
conditions. The study was administered in groups ranging in size from one to five.
Subjects were told simply that the study involved people’s responses to television
material, and that they were going to be shown several movie clips which would be
followed by a commercial break, just as if they were watching a movie on television at
home. They were also told that after each break they would be asked a series of
questions related to what they saw. Subjects were warned about the commercial
break so that they would not be confused when the PSA appeared, which could
influence the thoughts they would generate during the airing o f the PSA. They were
instructed to try to act as if they were watching television at home, but were asked to
keep all comments and reactions to themselves.
Subjects were told that the first clip that they would see was from a movie
about a boxer who was thinking about making a comeback. All subjects were then
shown the neutral clip from “the Champ”, followed by the neutral (Lauryn Hill) PSA.
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This neutral clip/PSA combination was used in order to introduce the subjects to the
plot and characters o f the movie, and to establish greater involvement in the film. It
was also used as a warm-up for subjects because it enabled them to familiarize
themselves with the thought listing procedure, and provided baseline information for
each subject on their tendency to be light versus heavy “listers”. In addition, the
neutral clip acted as a within-subjects control “condition” because subjects responses
to the ensuing emotional clip/PSA could be compared to their responses to the neutral
clip/PSA
After viewing the neutral clip and PSA the tape was paused, and subjects
were asked to turn to the first page o f the questionnaire which was a blank page
designed for them to list the thoughts they had while they were watching the movie
clip and PSA The instructions at the top o f the page read: “What thoughts or
feelings were going through your mind while you were watching this movie clip and
public service announcement (PSA)? Please list up to eight thoughts, comments,
reactions and feelings you had while you were watching”. The page was numbered
from 1 to 8 in order to help subjects structure their thoughts, and to simplify the
coding procedure. Subjects were then asked to write down what they thought the
main argument o f the PSA was in order to assess whether they correctly
comprehended the main message o f the PS A They were also asked to indicate
whether they had seen the PSA before. They then turned to a page which asked them
to stop and wait for further instructions.
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When all subjects had completed the first section o f the questionnaire, they
were told that they would next see another clip from the same movie. They were told
simply that the scene takes place later in the movie after the Champ had decided to
fight again. They were then shown either the happy or sad clip followed by either the
happy or sad PSA. After the clip and PSA were shown, the tape was paused again,
and subjects completed the second section o f the questionnaire. Subjects were again
instructed to list the thoughts they had while they were watching. However, this time
the instructions changed slightly, and they were asked only to list thoughts and
feelings they had while they were watching the PSA. The instructions read: “You
just saw two segments. One was a movie clip, and one was a public service
announcement (PSA). As you watched the PSA, what thoughts or feelings were
going through your mind? Please list up to 8 thoughts, comments, reactions and
feelings you had while you were watching the PSA”. The page was again numbered
from 1 to 8, so that thoughts would be clearly defined, which would decrease
ambiguity during coding.
Subjects were then asked a series o f questions designed to directly measure
the extent o f message elaboration in which subjects engaged. These questions were
used as an additional method to try to measure the extent o f processing in which
subjects were engaged, in case this was not adequately captured via the thought
listing procedure. Subjects were asked to indicate the extent to which the PSA made
them think about the issue o f drug abuse, the extent to which the PSA made them
weigh the pros and cons o f using drugs, the extent to which the PSA made them think
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about reasons why they shouldn’t use drugs, etc. These questions were taken from
Chaudhuri and Buck (1995) who used these measures to assess the extent to which
subjects engage in analytic (reason-oriented) thinking. The items were all shown to
load heavily on the same factor (all loadings were over .80) in the Chaudhuri and
Buck study.
Subjects were then asked to answer a series o f persuasion questions. The first
set o f questions were designed to measure the extent to which subjects were
persuaded by the PSA by assessing their attitudes towards using drugs every month
for the next twelve months. These questions are similar to those used by Fishbein.
The second set o f questions were designed to measure subjects’ perceptions o f the
persuasiveness o f the PSA. Subjects were also asked to write down the main
argument o f the PSA, and were asked to indicate whether they had seen the PSA
before.
The next set o f questions was designed to measure the extent to which
subjects would interpret the issue o f drug abuse in terms o f the specific appraisal
dimensions that were related to the emotion they had experienced while watching the
movie clip. It was predicted that subjects in the happy and sad conditions would
differ in the extent to which they attributed drug abuse problems to individual versus
situational factors, and the extent to which they viewed drug abuse problems as
hopeless.
Subjects were then asked an open-ended question which was designed to
measure the extent to which they described the consequences o f drug use in terms o f
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themes primed by the movie clip. Subjects were asked to: “Imagine that you found
out that a close friend o f yours had been taking drugs, and you were concerned that
this person had a serious drug problem. What reasons would you give to convince
your friend to stop abusing drugs?”. It was predicted that those in the happy
condition (who were assumed to be engaging in heuristic processing) would be more
likely to list reasons which were related to themes primed by the movie such as family
relations.
Lastly, subjects were asked to answer a series o f questions designed to
measure whether they would give higher estimates o f the chances o f negatively or
positively framed outcomes occurring depending on the programming condition to
which they were exposed. Subjects were asked to estimate the chances that a series of
consequences would occur if they did not follow the advice given in the PSA. They
were first asked to indicate the likelihood that several negatively framed outcomes
would occur if they ignored the message o f the PSA They were then asked to
indicate the likelihood that several positively framed outcomes would occur if they
followed the advice given in the PSA. It was predicted that those viewing a sad PSA
embedded in a sad movie clip would rate the negative consequence o f not adopting
the advocated behavior as more likely than those viewing a happy PSA embedded in a
sad program.
Subjects were then asked to stop and wait for further instructions. After all
subjects had completed that section o f the questionnaire, they were told that they
would next be shown a clip from the movie “The Shinning”. This portion o f the study
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was exploratory, and used to test the effects o f fear on persuasion and information
processing. It was also used to test the final hypothesis which was designed to assess
whether happy or sad PSAs would perform better when embedded in a fear-evoking
PSA. Because this portion o f the study was exploratory, the movie clip was not pre
tested. However, subjects were asked to rate their emotional response to the clip
during the experiment, and it was found to evoke fear as a discrete emotion at a
moderately high level (mean o f 5.72). The mean for all other emotions measured was
3.4 or lower, indicating that fear was generated at a significantly higher level than any
o f the other emotions.
Following the clip, subjects were shown either the happy or sad PSA. If they
had seen the happy PSA following the previous clip, they were shown the sad PSA
following the fear clip. After viewing the fear-evoking clip and PSA, subjects were
again asked to thought list. They were then asked to answer the questions designed
to measure systematic processing. Next they were asked to rate the PSA in terms o f
perceived persuasiveness. They were then asked to rate the extent to which the
movie clip made them feel any o f the emotions tested in the pre-tests (anger,
happiness, fear, sadness, surprise, disgust, guilt).
Finally subjects were asked to complete an emotionality scale designed to
measure the extent to which they value their emotions and use them to guide their
decisions and behaviors. The questionnaire concluded with a series o f demographic
questions. After all subjects had completed the questionnaire, they were debriefed,
thanked and excused. The study took about 50 minutes to complete.
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Dependent variables:
Thought-Listing
Because thought-listing is the primary method o f measurement used in this
study, it is worthwhile to evaluate the research which establishes the validity o f this
method as well as criticisms o f this approach. The thought-listing technique is based
on the assumption that the significance o f people’s thoughts and feelings as well as
the cognitive processes underlying them can be assessed by content analyzing their
reported thoughts, ideas, and feelings (Cacioppo, von Hippel, & Ernst, 1997). The
technique has been found to be both valid and reliable. In terms of reliability, Cullen
(1968) compared the reliability o f several standard attitude scales with a measure o f
cognitive response (thought-listing). The author found acceptable levels o f reliability
(split-half and test-retest correlations) for all measures. Thought listing was found to
be more reliable than Thurstone scales, and slightly less reliable than Likert scales.
The validity o f thought-listing has been challenged by some who argue that
subjects can not accurately report their thoughts (see below), however Cacioppo,
Harkins, & Petty (1981) argue that motives and behaviors have long been ascertained
through analyses o f self-reports. Miller and Colman (1981) argue that thought listing
has been shown to exhibit internal consistency (evidence that the thoughts all reflect
one thing) but not discriminant validity, in that it does not appear to measure
something other than what is captured by other measures o f attitude. The authors
argue that Cullen’s (1968) findings and evidence provided by Fishbein and Ajzen
(1975) suggest that the thought listing technique has internal consistency, because
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indices derived from thought listing consistently contain beliefs and evaluations.
However these are the same elements tapped by other measures o f attitude. In terms
o f being able to provide a causal link between message and attitude then, the authors
argue that the value o f thought listing lies in the ability to derive indices o f cognitive
structure from the thoughts (e.g. beliefs, affective arousal, etc.).
There are several limitations and criticisms that have been made o f the
thought-listing technique. Cacioppo et al. (1997) outlined several limitation o f this
technique. First, individuals may not be willing to report their thoughts accurately,
especially if their responses are socially inappropriate. Second, people’s memory for
their thoughts and feelings is imperfect and retrospective accounts o f one’s cognitions
may be biased (e.g. by particular thoughts or feelings that may be more extreme and
therefore more salient at the time the respondent is recording his/her thoughts). Miller
and Colman (1981) acknowledge that it is difficult to be certain whether subjects are
accurately reporting their cognitions during exposure to a persuasive message. They
argue that subjects may take the thought listing procedure as an opportunity to assert
their position on the issue because if a subject has been persuaded by the message,
they may use the thought-listing as a way to justify their stated position. This may
make them less willing to report reasons why he/she should have resisted the message
(by listing counter arguments, and few support arguments). Thus, they say there is a
chance that the cognitions reported will reflect any attitude change that has already
taken place, rather than the thought process leading to that attitude. They argue that
the probability of this happening may be reduced by having subjects list their thoughts
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immediately after they are exposed to the message, and by shortening the time
subjects are allowed to report their thoughts. They also argue in favor o f thought
listing during exposure to the message.
Third, the way in which the valence o f thoughts are scored can be
problematic. A number o f studies take simple counts o f the positive or negative
thoughts listed, and then form a ratio o f positive thoughts/(positive -+- negative
thoughts). However, some studies compute a difference score between positive and
negative thoughts (or a ratio o f the difference divided by the total number o f thoughts
listed). Because these simple difference scores assume that affective processes are
interchangeable and can be captured by a bipolar (positive-negative) dimension, they
may mask important differences in cognitive responses. For instance, a low number
o f positive and negative listed thoughts may reflect neutrality or indifference whereas
a high number o f positive and negative thoughts may reflect ambivalence or conflicted
thoughts. The authors suggest that positive and negative thoughts be treated as
separable rather than as falling along a bipolar continuum. This study will attempt to
take these observations and cautions into account in implementing the thought-listing
technique.

Thought listing responses:
In order to assess the extent o f message elaboration in which subjects
engaged, support-arguments and counter-arguments were totaled. Evidence o f
heuristic processing was also judged by the ratio o f argument-irrelevant to argument

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

relevant thoughts that were generated (hypotheses 2-3, 9, 10). In order to evaluate
the extent o f associative priming that took place (hypotheses 13, 14), the ratio o f sad
to happy cognitions was calculated. Favorable cognitions were calculated as the
number o f support arguments plus the number o f execution bolsters (positive
comments related to the execution, style, or spokesperson) (hypothesis 12, 15).
Unfavorable cognitions were calculated as the number o f counter arguments plus the
number o f execution discounts (negative comments related to the execution, style or
spokesperson).

Processing strategy questions:
In order to better evaluate whether subjects were engaging in heuristic versus
systematic processing, they were asked to rate on a 9-point scale (l= not at all, 9=very
much) the extent to which the PSA made them: think about the issue o f drug abuse,
think o f reasons why they shouldn’t do drugs, weigh the pros and cons o f using
drugs, think about their opinion o f drug use, compare their beliefs about drug use to
what was said in the PSA, think o f arguments to support or contradict what was said
in the PS A and think rather than feel.

Persuasion questions:
Two types o f persuasion questions were used to assess whether subjects were
persuaded by the P S A
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Attitude questions: The first set o f questions was designed to measure subjects’
attitudes towards drug use. Although the sad PSA was aimed at changing attitudes
towards a particular drug (heroin), the neutral and happy PSAs were aimed at
changing attitudes towards drugs in general. Thus subjects were asked about their
attitude towards drugs in general. Subjects were asked to indicate on a bipolar 9-point
scale the extent to which using drugs every month for the next twelve months would
be: extremely bad - extremely good, extremely harmful - extremely beneficial,
extremely foolish - extremely wise, and extremely negative - extremely positive.

Perceived Persuasiveness questions: Subjects were then asked to indicate (using 9point scales) the extent to which they felt that the PSA was effective (l= not at all,
9=very much), convincing, believable, persuasive, and the strength o f the argument
presented (l=w eak argument, 9=strong argument).

Appraisal questions:
Several questions were asked to assess how the emotion elicited by the program
influenced subjects’ appraisal o f the events depicted in a subsequently viewed PSA.
Subjects were asked to rate on a nine-point scale the extent to which they feel that
anything can be done to solve the problem o f drug abuse (l=nothing can be done, 9=a
lot can be done), the extent to which they think that the drug abuse problem in this
country is hopeless (l=not at all hopeless, 9=very hopeless), the extent to which
individuals themselves are responsible for their drug use (l=not at all, 9=very much),
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the extent to which societal pressures cause people to use drugs (l=not at all, 9=very
much), the extent to which uncontrollable forces are responsible for the drug abuse
problem in this country (l=not at all, 9=very much) and the extent to which drug
abuse and its consequences can be modified by human action.

Schema question:
Subjects were asked to write down what they would say to a friend who they knew
had a drug problem. The question asked them to: “Imagine that you found out that a
close friend o f yours had been taking drugs, and you were concerned that this person
had a serious drug problem. What reasons would you give to convince your friend to
stop abusing drugs?”
Responses to this question were used to assess subjects’ tendency to discuss
the issue in terms o f themes primed by the program. For the happy segment, it was
assumed that the themes most likely to be primed would be those related to family
and health. For the sad segment, it was assumed that the themes most likely to be
primed were those related to death.

Likelihood estimations:
Subjects were asked to rate (on a nine-point scale) the likelihood o f several negative
outcomes occurring if viewers do not heed the advice given in the PSA. They were
also asked to rate the likelihood o f several positive outcomes occurring if they do
follow the advice given. Negatively framed outcomes included the likelihood that they
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will suffer permanent physical and mental damage, stop enjoying things they used to
like to do, they will begin to use even harder drugs, their grades will suffer, they will
lose friends, they will become addicted, and they will have strained relationships with
their parents. Positively framed outcomes included that they will perform better in
school than if they didn’t do drugs, they will be more successful in the future, they
will be able to achieve their goals and aspirations, they will feel happier about their
lives, they will be well-liked by their peers, and they will get along well with their
parents.

Data Analysis
T-tests were used to analyze the difference in means between conditions for
each o f the dependent variables. Because the hypotheses make a priori predictions
about differences between conditions, and specify the direction o f those differences
(e.g. those in the sad program condition will be significantly more likely than those in
the happy condition to generate argument-relevant thoughts), t-tests were appropriate
to use in most cases. In most instances the distribution o f scores were not normal,
however as Boneau (1971) argues, t and F tests are almost immune to violations o f
the assumption o f a normal distribution.
The p-values for two-tailed tests are reported throughout the text and in
tables, however p’s o f less th a n . 10 are reported when the direction o f the test was
specified in the hypothesis (in which case the tests being conducted at that point are in
fact one-tailed).
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Results
Hypothesis 4: Happiness will lead to increased use o f schemas when interpreting
PSAs
Hypothesis 4 predicted that because happiness is likely to trigger heuristic
processing, viewers o f a happy program would be more likely than viewers o f a sad
program to interpret a subsequent PSA in terms o f themes that are primed by the
program (regardless o f the emotion evoked by the PSA). Because the movie selected
for the experiment had to do with the relationship between father and son, and also
had to do with health and fitness (because it centered around a boxer training for a
boxing match), it was assumed that the most salient themes that would be primed by
the movie segments would be those related to family relationships and those related to
health/physical well-being. In order to assess the extent to which subjects used these
themes when processing the anti-drug PSA, subjects were asked to imagine that a
good friend o f theirs had a serious drug problem, and to write down the reasons they
would give that friend in order to encourage him/her to stop using drugs. Hypothesis
4 was re-written to reflect the question that was asked:

Hypothesis 4a: Viewers o f a happy program will be more likely than viewers o f a sad
program to discuss the consequences o f drug use in terms o f the effects that it has on
one’s family, and in terms o f the effects that it has on one’s physical health.
In addition, because the sad movie segment depicted the death o f the father, it
seemed likely that the sad clip would prime thoughts related to death. However,
because it was assumed that those who were sad would be less likely to use schema-
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based information when interpreting a subsequent PSA, it was hypothesized that
subjects in the sad conditions would be no more likely than those in the happy
conditions to list death as a possible consequence o f heavy drug use, despite the fact
that they had been exposed to a vivid death scene.

Hypothesis 4b: Subjects in the sad conditions would be no more likely than those in
the happy conditions to list death as a possible consequence o f heavy drug use.

Subjects’ responses were coded to assess the types o f themes that were salient
in their minds when they processed the PSA. The full range o f coding categories are
listed in the appendix, but they included comments related to death, physical damage,
mental damage, the pain that they would cause their family, loss o f friends, comments
that they were wasting their future, and comments that life offered many positive
benefits that made drug use unnecessary.
No significant differences were found between conditions in terms o f the
number o f reasons listed. Subjects in the happy conditions (conditions 1 and 2) listed
an average o f 3.95 thoughts (SD = 2.26), while those in the sad conditions
(conditions 3 and 4) listed an average o f 3.43 thoughts (SD = 1.81), t = 1.52, n.s..
Subjects who were exposed to the happy movie clip were no more likely to
cite consequences related to family than those exposed to the sad clip (M happy = .43,
SD = .64; M

= .42, SD = .65; t = .06, n.s.). They were also not more likely to cite

consequences related to physical damage (M happy = -37, SD = .56; M ad = .45, SD =
.50; t = -.86, n.s.). Thus no support was found for hypothesis 4a. As predicted in
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Hypothesis 4b, subjects in the sad conditions were not more likely than those in the
happy conditions to cite death as a reason why people should not use drugs (M hippy =
.33, SD = .48; M ud = .23, SD = .43; t = 1.35, n.s.).
Despite the lack o f evidence to support the hypothesis that those in the happy
conditions would be more likely to use schemas evoked by the movie clip when
interpreting the PSA, one interesting finding did emerge. Comments which were
positively framed such as “you have too many things to look forward to in the
future”, “there are so many better ways to have fun”, “you are too smart and talented
to use drugs”, or “life is too valuable” were combined into one category. Subjects in
the happy conditions were significantly more likely to make positively framed
comments than subjects in the sad conditions. The mean number o f positively framed
comments for those in the happy conditions was .55 (SD = .50), while it was .30 (SD
= .46) for those in the sad conditions (t = 3.01, p < .01). No differences were found
between conditions in terms o f negatively framed comments (such as loss o f friends,
decreased school performance, damaged health) (M h*ppy= -95, SD = .23; M ad = 96,
SD = .21; t = -.27, n.s.). Thus, while the happiness evoked by the happy clip may not
have led subjects to rely on schemas related to the concrete themes o f the movie, it
may have triggered a more general positive frame o f mind which may have led
subjects to interpret the subsequent anti-drug message in terms o f the positive benefits
associated with not doing drugs. The lack o f difference between conditions in terms
o f negatively framed comments suggests that the sadness evoked by the sad clip did
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not lead subjects to interpret the PSAs using a more negative frame than those in the
happy conditions.
The fact that neither the happy nor the sad clip appeared to trigger thoughts
related to the actual content o f the movie has an important implication that is
unrelated to the schema hypothesis proposed. One concern that has been raised about
this study is that any differences found between conditions could be caused by
differences in the content o f the happy and sad clips. However, the fact that subjects
did not mention movie-related themes strengthens the argument that the differences in
cognitive processing that were found between programming conditions were due to
the emotion elicited by the clips, and not the content o f the clips.

Hypotheses 5 and 6: Happiness and Sadness will lead to interpretations o f PSAs
which reflect underlying appraisal dimensions
Hypotheses 5 and 6 predicted that subjects would be more likely to interpret a
PSA in ways that would reflect the underlying appraisal dimensions o f the emotion
that was triggered by the movie clip. Hypothesis 5 predicted that viewers o f a happy
clip would be more likely to judge a subsequent PSA in terms o f individual control,
and would be more likely to have a positive outlook for the drug situation in this
country. Hypothesis 6 predicted that viewers o f a sad clip would be more likely to
judge subsequently viewed PSAs in terms o f impersonal situational factors, and would
be more likely to see the drug situation in this country as hopeless.
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In order to test these hypotheses, subjects were asked to rate their opinion
about the relationship between drug abuse and individual control and to rate their
opinion on the future outlook for the drug abuse problem in this country. These
questions included: the extent to which they feel that the drug abuse situation in this
country is hopeless, the extent to which anything can be done to help the drug abuse
problem, the extent to which societal pressures cause people to use drugs, and the
extent to which individuals themselves are responsible for their own drug abuse
problems.
A factor analysis was conducted to assess the commonality between the seven
measures. Three factors with eigenvalues over 1 emerged, explaining 65% o f the
variation. The first factor, which explained 26% of the variation included two
measures related to individual responsibility for drug use (the extent to which
individuals themselves are responsible for their drug use, and the extent to which
individuals are responsible for any drug abuse problems that they have). The second
factor, which explained 23% o f the variation included two items related to the future
outlook o f the drug situation in this country (the extent to which anything can be
done to solve the drug abuse problem in this country, and the extent to which the
drug abuse problem in this country is hopeless (reverse coded)). The third factor
(accounting for 17% o f the variation), included three items related to societal
responsibility for drug use (the extent to which societal pressures cause people to use
drugs, the extent to which uncontrollable forces cause people to use drugs, and the
extent to which drug use can be modified by human action (reverse coded)).
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A reliability analysis was conducted to gauge whether the items which
clustered together in the factor analysis could be collapsed into one measure. The
two items which were related to individual responsibility for drug use earned an alpha
o f .71, (above the standard level o f acceptable reliability), so the mean o f the two
items was computed for each subject. The two items related to future outlook o f the
drug abuse situation in this country scored an alpha o f .70 and so the mean o f these
measures was also computed for each subject. The additional three measures did not
generate acceptable level o f reliability (alpha o f .22), so they were analyzed as
separate measures.
Subjects who had seen the happy movie clip were no more likely than those
who viewed the sad clip to say that individuals themselves were responsible for their
drug abuse problems (M happy = 7.39, SD = 1.23; M ud = 7.47, SD = 1.16; t = -.42,
n.s.), and were not more likely to express a positive outlook for a future solution to
the drug abuse problem in this country (M happy = 6.28, SD = 1.55; M ud = 6.11, SD =
1.45; t = .67, n.s.). In addition, subjects in the sad conditions were no more likely
than those in the happy conditions to say that societal pressures are responsible for
drug use (M „d = 6.57, SD = 1.62; M happy = 6.57, SD = 1.85; t = .04, n.s.), and were
not more likely to say that impersonal forces cause drug use (M ud = 3.68, SD = 2.03;
M happy - 3.67, SD = 2.16; t = .01, n.s.) or that drug abuse could not be modified by

human action (M Md = 6.76, SD = 1.80; M 1. . ^ = 6.91, SD = 1.71; t = .50, n.s.). Thus
no support was found for hypothesis 5 or 6. Tests were also run to see if differences
could be found between happy and sad conditions among those who scored high on
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the emotionality scale, and among females. No evidence was found to support either
of the hypotheses among members o f these groups.
However, because the PSAs also evoked an emotional response in subjects, it
was important to assess whether there were differences among all four conditions on
any o f the measures. As table 12 shows, significant differences were found between
conditions on ratings of individual responsibility for drug use, and on beliefs that
anything can be done to help the drug abuse problem in this country. These
differences indicated a main effect for the PSA, such that those who had seen the
happy PSA (regardless o f context) were significantly more likely to have a positive
outlook towards the drug situation in this country than those who had seen the sad
PSA. Those who had seen the sad PSA were also somewhat more likely to say that
individuals are responsible for their own drug use than those who had seen the happy
PSA (although this result was only found when the PSAs were placed in the happy
movie clip. N o differences were found between any conditions on measures o f
societal pressures as a cause o f drug abuse. The fact that a main effect was found for
the PSAs suggests that subjects were more influenced by the themes (subject matter)
of the PSAs themselves, as opposed to the emotion they were feeling. Because the
Happy PSA focused on positive themes related to the benefits o f not doing drugs, it
makes sense that those viewing that PSA were more likely to say that there is hope
for the drug abuse problem in this country. Similarly, because the sad PSA depicted a
woman describing her downfall due to drug abuse, it was not surprising that subjects
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were more likely to indicate that individuals themselves are responsible for their drug
abuse problems after viewing it.
Although the results only suggest a main effect for the PSA, it is interesting to
note that the ratings on the “positive outlook” measure was highest when the happy
PSA followed the happy clip, and the ratings on the “individuals responsible” measure
were highest when the sad PSA followed the happy clip. This may suggest that the
happiness elicited by the previously viewed segment may influence the extent to which
the themes depicted in the PSAs resonate with viewers. For instance, for the happy
PSA, subjects were more likely to interpret the drug issue in terms o f the positive
themes stressed in the PSA, when the PSA followed the happy clip. Similarly, for the
sad PSA, subjects were more likely to interpret the drug issue in terms o f individual
responsibility (a theme stressed in the sad PSA) when the PSA followed the happy
clip.
Table 12. M ean differences betw een th e fou r con d ition s on tw o appraisal dim ensions:
p o sitiv e fu tu re outlook and individual resp on sib ility

Positive O utlook

Individuals Responsible

Clip-PSA combination
Condition 1: Happy-Happy
Condition 4: Sad - Happy

6.65 23
6.51 23

7.13 2
7.54

Condition 2: Happy —Sad
Condition 3: Sad - Sad

5.89 M
5.72 w

7.661
7.40

Superscript numbers indicate a significant difference with the condition indicated. Differences
indicated are significant at p < .05
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Context Effects Hypotheses
Hypotheses 7 and 8: Emotional consistency between programming context and PSA
will lead to higher ratings o f the PSAs
Hypotheses 7 and 8 were based on previous programming context studies
which found that consistency in mood between a program and commercial would lead
to more favorable ratings o f the commercial. Two types o f questions were used to
assess the persuasiveness o f the PSAs. Five questions were asked to gauge subjects’
perceptions o f the persuasiveness o f the PSAs (effectiveness, convincingness,
believable, argument strength, persuasiveness), and four questions were used to
measure subjects attitudes towards drug use after viewing the PSAs.
A factor analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the five measures o f
perceived persuasiveness could be averaged to make an index. The factor analysis
showed that the items were highly correlated. One factor emerged with an
eigenvalue o f 4.17 and explained 83% o f the variance. A reliability test o f the
measures showed them to be well over the acceptable alpha level, with an alpha of
.95. Thus, the mean o f the five items was computed for each subject to form an
overall perceived persuasiveness index.
As was found in the second pre-test, ratings o f the happy PSA were
significantly lower than they were for the sad PSA. The happy PSA earned an overall
persuasiveness rating o f 3.27, while the sad PSA earned an overall rating o f 7.03.
These overall scores were calculated without the fifth measure o f persuasiveness (the
direct question “how persuasive do you think this PSA is”) in order to compare the
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PSAs to their pre-test scores (which had not included the fifth measure). The sad
PSA earned a comparable score when it was shown in the context o f a program
versus out o f context. The PSA earned an average persuasiveness score o f 7.03 in
context (i.e. in the experiment) versus 7.14 out o f context (i.e. in pre-test 2).
However, the happy PSA earned a significantly lower score in-context (3.27) than out
o f context (5.30). It is unclear whether this shift is due to viewing the PSA within a
program, versus viewing it in a series with other PSAs, or whether this has to do with
the sample o f students who participated in the experiment versus those who
participated in the second pre-test. There were no clear demographic differences
between the students who participated in pre-test 2 and the experiment, so no
conclusions can be drawn as to why the PSA performed so differently in the
experimental conditions.
Nevertheless, contrary to what had been found in previous studies, results o f
the t-test between the conditions showed that the happy PSA was not rated as
significantly more persuasive when it was embedded in the Happy segment than when
it was embedded in the Sad segment. The mean o f the happy PSA in the Happy
program context was 3.19 (S.D. = 1.66), while the mean o f the happy PSA in the Sad
program context was 2.95 (SD = 1.56); t = .66, n.s.. Similarly, no difference was
found in ratings o f the sad PSA depending on the programming context in which it
was placed. The mean o f the sad PSA within the Sad context was 6.46 (SD = 2.10),
while the mean o f the sad PSA in the happy context was 6.97 (SD = 1.34); t = 1.25,
n.s.. Note that while the mean differences between conditions were not significant,
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both PSAs were rated directionally higher when they were placed in the happy
program context. No differences were found between conditions for those scoring
high on the emotionality scale, female subjects, younger subjects, those who had not
seen the PSA before, or among those who rated drug use as very relevant to their
lives.
In order to evaluate differences between conditions on measures o f attitudes
towards drug use (beliefs that drug use is bad, harmful, foolish and negative), a factor
analysis was conducted on the four measures. One factor emerged accounting for
91% o f the variance (eigenvalue o f 3.66), so the items were averaged for each
subject. A smaller number indicated stronger anti-drug attitudes because the scales
were labeled from negative to positive (e.g. “using drugs every month for the next 12
months would be....extremely harmful (1)

extremely beneficial (9) ). Again, no

differences were found between subjects based on the context in which they viewed
the PSAs. Those viewing the happy PSA in the context of the happy program were
somewhat less likely to have a negative attitude towards drug use (M = 2.54, SD =
1.82) than those who saw the PSA in the sad context (M = 2.08, SD = 1.44), but the
difference was not significant (t = 1.23, n.s.). There was also no difference between
the mean ratings o f subjects who viewed the sad PSA in a sad program context (M =
1.99, SD = 1.61) and those who viewed the sad PSA in the context o f a happy
program (M = 1.95, SD = 1.61), t = -. 12, n.s.. Similarly, there were no significant
differences in the predicted directions among younger subjects, those who had not
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seen the PSA before, those who scored higher on the emotionality index, or among
those who rated drug use as very relevant to their lives.

T able 13: M ean differen ce in th e persu asiven ess ratings o f th e happy and sad P SA as a
function o f program condition

H ap p y P S A
H appy
S ad
P rogram
Program
n = 39
n=36

T-

test

S ad PSA
H appy
Sad
Program
P rogram
n=36
n=37

T-

test

M

SD

M

SD

6.97

1.34

6.46

2.10

1.25

-.78

.14

1.34

.37

2.14

-1.21

1.23

1.95

1.61

1.99

1.61

-.12

M

SD

M

SD

Perceived Persuasiveness

3.19

1.66

2.95

1.56

.66

Mean difference from
out-of-context perceived
persuasiveness score

1.88

1.83

2.19

1.64

Attitude towards drugs

2.54

1.82

2.08

1.44

Hypothesis 9: Consistency Hypothesis Emotion o f PSA will lead to different
processing strategy
Because results from pre-test 2 indicated that happy and sad programs will
influence processing strategy, it was also necessary to test whether the PSAs
themselves would influence processing strategy. Hypothesis 9 predicted that there
would be a main effect for the PSAs such that regardless o f programming context, the
happy PSA would be processed less systematically than the sad PS A It was expected
that the total number o f thoughts, and the number o f argument-related thoughts that
were generated in response to a happy PSA would be significantly lower than those
generated in response to a sad PSA.
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The same two coders who coded the thought-listing responses in the second
pre-test, coded the thought-listing responses in the experiment (the author, plus one
other person). All o f the thought listing responses were removed from the
questionnaires, and the condition numbers and identification numbers were written on
the back. In order to keep coders oblivious to the condition to which each subject
belonged, responses were shuffled, and were given a coding id number which was
used to keep track o f the responses, but which was not connected in any way to the
condition number. Inter-coder reliability was again tested using K rippendorfs Alpha.
The coders discussed the coding categories, and then coded five responses. After
discussing their results, the coders went on to code thirty more responses (which was
20% o f the total sample). After generating acceptable levels o f reliability, the author
went on to code the remaining responses. Inter-coder reliability for the various
categories was as follows: Support arguments/simple affirmations (.97), Counter
arguments/simple disaffirmations (.80), Execution positive (.97), Execution negative
(.60), Happy cognitions (1.00), Sad cognitions (.73), thoughts about movie plot
(1.00), other positive (1.00), other negative (.62).
In order to test hypothesis 9, the mean number o f thoughts and mean number
o f message-relevant thoughts were compared between those who had seen the happy
PSA and those who had seen the sad PSA. As table 14 shows, no significant
differences were found between conditions in terms o f the number o f thoughts that
were generated. However, those who had seen the sad PSA were significantly more
likely to make message-relevant comments. This difference, however is due to the
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difference between conditions on the tendency to make support arguments. Those
who viewed the sad PSA were significantly more likely to make support arguments
than those who viewed the happy PSA. However, they were significantly less likely
to make counter-arguments than those who viewed the happy PSA. This is probably
due to the fact that the sad PSA was rated as highly persuasive, so almost no counter
arguments were generated in response to it. In fact, because the PSAs earned such
different scores on perceived persuasiveness, it was necessary to control for ratings o f
the PSAs in terms o f their persuasiveness ratings. When I controlled for the perceived
persuasiveness o f the PSAs, the differences between the happy and sad PSA on total
message relevant thoughts, support arguments and counter arguments generated were
no longer significant. This indicates that the thoughts generated in response to a
message mediate the relationship between an advertising or public service execution
and viewers’ perceptions o f that execution’s persuasiveness.
Subjects who viewed the happy PSA were significantly more likely to make
message-irrelevant comments than those who viewed the sad PSA. This was true
both for execution bolstering as well as execution discounting. The differences were
still significant for total message-irrelevant comments, and execution bolstering even
after controlling for the perceived persuasiveness o f the PSAs. The difference was no
longer significant for execution discounting after controlling for perceived
persuasiveness.
No differences were found between conditions in terms o f general comments
related to subjects’ feelings. Subjects who viewed the happy PSA were no more
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likely to report feeling happy, or to make general positive comments than those who
viewed the sad PSA, and those who viewed the sad PSA were no more likely to
report feeling sad or to make general negative comments than those who viewed the
happy PSA. Thus it appeared that the differences between those who viewed the
happy and sad PSA were most evident in the extent o f information processing in
which subjects engaged.

T ab le 14. M ean num ber o f m essage relevan t and m essage irrelevan t thoughts gen erated
in resp on se to th e happy and sad PSA

Happy PSA
u=75

T-test
73

CointroQiiig for
persuasiveness

M

SD

M

SD

Number o f Thoughts

5.11

1.73

5.29

1.74

-.64

n.s.

Message-Relevant thoughts
Support arguments
Counter-arguments

.41
.17
.24

.70
.50
.57

.70
.67

.97
.97
.16

-2.06*
-3.93***
3.09**

n.s
n.s.
n.s.

2.01
.46

1.62
.84
.92

.07

1.08
.53
.30

6.41***
2.13*
5.28***

15.52***
11.82***
n.s.

.50
.50

1.51
.38

.50
.83

-.32
-1.04

Message Irrelevant*
Execution Bolstering
Execution Discounting

.67

Happy/Positive Cognitions
1.48
Sad/Negative Cognitions
.27
’p £ .05,'* p £ .01, ”'p £ .001

.03
.56
.22

F

a Note that this did n o t include source comments because the sad PSA featured the physical deterioration o f the actress which

n.s.
n.s.
comments related to

her (Le. alm ost all subjects made a comment related to ber physical appearance such as **sbe looked terrible” . ). Comments which were related to the
effects o f drugs o n her appearance (e.g. “Doing heroin really made b er look old”) were coded as m rnsgr relevant comments.

In order to test whether subjects were more likely to engage in one type o f
processing over the other depending on the PSA they viewed, t-tests were run to
compare the extent to which subjects engaged in message-relevant vs. message-
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irrelevant thinking. Subjects who viewed the happy PSA were significantly more
likely to make comments related to the execution o f the PSA than comments about
the message o f the PSA. This suggests that they were more likely to engage in
heuristic processing than systematic processing. However, subjects who viewed the
sad PSA were not significantly more likely to make message-relevant comments than
message-irrelevant comments. This suggests that they were engaging in both
systematic as well as heuristic processing. This is similar to what was found in pre
test 2 where subjects who viewed a happy clip were more likely to engage in heuristic
processing, while those who viewed a sad clip appeared to be engaging in both
systematic as well as heuristic processing. However, because the happy PSA
generated such low persuasiveness scores, this (rather than the emotion itself) may
explain why so few message relevant comments were generated in response to it.

T ab le 15. M ean num ber o f m essage relevant and m essage irrelevant thoughts generated
by program con text

M essage Relevant M essage Irrelevant
Happy PSA

.41

2.01

Sad PSA

.70

.56

t-fest
-7.48***
.77

In order to further test the differences in processing depending on the emotion
o f the PSA, separate comparisons were made between the happy and sad PSAs in
each o f the two programming contexts (note that this was not a hypothesized effect).
As table 16 shows, the same pattern o f results was found: subjects viewing the sad
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PSA were more likely to make message relevant comments than those viewing the
happy PSA, although the difference between conditions was not significant for
counter-arguments in the happy programming context, and was reversed in the sad
programming context. Again, these differences disappeared (for both programming
contexts) after controlling for the perceived persuasiveness o f the PSAs.
Those viewing the happy PSA were more likely to make message irrelevant
comments than those viewing the sad PSA (although the difference was not
significant for execution bolstering in the happy programming context). Following
both the happy and sad programming context, the differences were still significant for
total execution related comments (Ft..rry = 5.94*, F„d = 9.42**), and execution
bolstering (Fi..^ = 3.20", F„d= 10.50**), even after controlling for the persuasiveness
o f the PSAs. The difference was no longer significant for execution discounting after
controlling for perceived persuasiveness. No differences were found between PSAs
in either program context on the tendency to make general positive/happy or
negative/sad comments.
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Table 16. Mean number of message relevant and message irrelevant comments
generated in response to a happy and sad PSA embedded in the same programming
context
V H ap p y P rogram m ing C on text
Happy
Sad
PSA
PSA
o=39

0=36

S a d V r a p iiu iin ^ O H ite it
Sad
Happy

T-test

PSA

PSA

o=36

o=37

T-test

M

SD

M

SD

.63

4.94

1.64

5.57

1.69

-1.60

.81
.81
.00

-2.43'
-2.88""
1.38

.72
.28
.44

.85
.33
.74

.92
.86
.05

1.06
1.08
.23

-.87
-2.79*"
3.08

.83
.36
.06

1.34
.68
.23

4.16*’"
.69
4.34"'*

1.67
.44
.50

1.41
.81
.70

.30
.08
.08

.66
.28
.36

5.28'"'
2.55*’
3.21"

.03
.19

.17
.53

.51
-.37

.11
.39

.32
.55

.05
.57

.33
1.02

.75
-.93

M

SD

M

SD

Number of Thoughts

5.26

1.79

5.00

1.76

Message-Relevant
Support arguments
Counter-arguments

.13
.08
.05

.34
.27
.22

.47
.47
.00

Message Irrelevant
Execution Bolsters
Execution Discounts

2.33
.49
.82

1.74
.89
1.07

Happy/Positive
Sad/Negative

.05
.15

.22
.43

p £ .05;*" p S .01;""* p £ .001

Thus, very little evidence was found to support hypothesis 9. Because the
PSAs were very different in their content, and because the sad PSA was rated as
significantly more persuasive than the happy PSA, it appears that the differences in
the number o f message-relevant thoughts that were generated were due to the
differences in the strength o f the arguments presented in the PSAs, and not the
emotion evoked by the PSAs. However, differences were found between conditions
on the number o f positive message-irrelevant thoughts generated, even after
controlling for the persuasiveness o f the PSAs, which suggests that the emotion
evoked by the PSAs may influence the extent to which subjects engage in heuristic
processing. However, it is unclear whether the emotion o f the PSAs influenced
subjects’ processing, because it is likely that fewer message irrelevant thoughts were
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generated by subjects in the sad condition, simply because they were more likely to
list message relevant thoughts.
The results from pre-test 2 showed that program clips which evoke sadness
and happiness can lead to different processing strategies. The results from this
analysis, although unclear, suggest that the emotional tone o f the PSAs may also
influence cognitive processing. This suggests that both programs and PSAs can
influence processing. However, because no evidence was found that consistency in
the emotional tone o f the program and PSA leads to higher ratings o f the
persuasiveness o f the PSA, we can not argue that consistency in processing strategy
will lead to higher ratings o f perceived persuasiveness, or actual persuasion. Thus,
we do not have evidence to support the hypothesis that people prefer to maintain
consistency in the type o f processing in which they are engaged between programs
and commercials. Unfortunately, subjects were not asked to rate the PSAs on
dimensions other than their persuasiveness (such as likeability) in order to assess
whether consistency o f processing strategy would lead to improved ratings o f the
PSAs on other factors.
ATM Theory Hypotheses
While the results from the above analyses suggest that the emotion elicited
from PSAs will influence how they are processed, and that emotion from programs
will influence subsequent processing of neutral PSAs, it is still unclear whether the
interaction between the emotion in the program and the emotion in the PSA will
influence cognitive processing.
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Hypothesis 10: Sad programs will lead to greater systematic processing than happy
programs
Hypothesis 10 predicted that the total number o f thoughts, and the number o f
argument-related thoughts generated would be higher for those viewing a happy PSA
in the context o f a sad program than for those viewing a happy PSA in the context o f
a happy program. It also predicted that the total number o f thoughts, and number o f
argument-related thoughts would be higher for subjects viewing a sad PSA in the
context o f a sad program than for those viewing a sad PSA in the context o f a happy
program.

Table 17a. Mean number of message relevant and message irrelevant thoughts
generated in response to the happy and sad PSA depending on program context

Sad PSA

Bbppy PSA
Happy
Program
n=39

Sad
Program
n=36

T-test

Happy
Program
n=36

Sad
Program
n=37

M

SD

M

SD

T-test

M

SD

M

SD

Number of Thoughts

5.26

1.79

4.94

1.64

.79

5.00

1.76

5.57

1.69

-1.41

Message-Relevant
Support arguments
Counter-arguments

.13
.08
.05

.34
.27
.22

.72
.28
.44

.85
.33
.74

-3.92’**
-l.70+
-3.08"

.47
.47
.00

.81
.81
.00

.92
.86
.05

1.06
1.08
.23

-2.02*
-i ne
-1.43

Message Irrelevant
Execution Bolsters
Execution Discounts

2.33
.49
.82

1.74
.89
1.07

1.67
.44
.50

1.41
.81
.70

i.sr
.22
1.55

.83
.36
.06

1.34
.68
.23

.30
.08
.08

.66
.28
.36

2.16’
2.29’
-.36

.11
.39

.32
.55

-.95
-2.05*

.03
.19

.17
.53

.05
.57

.33
1.02

-.43
-1.98*

Happy/Positive
.22
.05
Sad/Negative
.43
.15
p £ .05;’* p £ .01;’** p £ .001

As table 17a shows, no significant differences were found between conditions
on the number o f thoughts generated. However, as was predicted, subjects who
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viewed the happy PSA in the context o f the happy movie clip made significantly
fewer message related comments than subjects who viewed the happy PSA in the
context o f the sad clip. The difference between conditions was m ost notable in the
number o f counter arguments generated. Those viewing the sad movie clip were
significantly more likely to generate counter arguments in response to the happy PSA
than those viewing the happy clip.
Similarly, those who viewed the sad PSA in the context o f the happy movie
clip made significantly fewer message related comments than subjects who viewed the
sad PSA in the context o f the sad clip. The difference between conditions was due to
the greater tendency o f those viewing the sad clip to generate support arguments in
response to the PSA.
Thus it appears that subjects who watched either the happy o r sad PSA were
more likely to make message-related comments when the PSA was embedded in a sad
movie clip than when it was embedded in a happy clip. In addition, the nature o f the
arguments generated appeared to depend on the emotional consistency o f the clip and
PSA Those who viewed a happy PSA in the context o f a sad clip w ere significantly
more likely to generate counter-arguments than those who saw it in a happy clip.
Conversely, those who viewed a sad PSA in the context o f a sad clip were more likely
to generate support arguments in response to the PSA than those who saw it in a
happy clip. O f course, this may be coincidental, because the happy PSA received
much lower ratings o f its persuasiveness. The sad program context may have merely
elicited greater systematic processing, which could have made subjects more critical
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o f the less persuasive happy PSA, and more responsive to the highly persuasive sad
PSA.
In terms o f message-irrelevant comments, those who viewed the happy PSA
made more comments related to the execution o f the PSA than those who viewed the
sad PSA. In addition, subjects who viewed the happy or sad PSA in the context o f
the happy movie clip made significantly more message-irrelevant (execution)
comments than those who viewed the happy or sad PSA in the context o f the sad
movie clip. No significant differences were found between programming conditions
for the happy PSA in terms o f execution bolstering or discounting. However, for the
sad PSA, those who had seen the happy clip were more likely to make positive
comments about the execution o f the PSA than those who had seen the sad clip.
Subjects who viewed the sad movie clip were also significantly more likely to
make general negative comments or to report feeling sad than those who viewed the
happy clip. However, those who viewed the happy clip were no more likely to report
feeling happy, or to make positive general comments than those who saw the sad clip.
This may suggest that the sad clip triggered more negative thoughts or associations in
subjects’ minds than the happy clip did happy thoughts o r associations.
Interaction effects
In order to assess whether differences found between conditions were main
effects, or whether they could be explained by an interaction between the clips and the
PSAs, an analysis o f variance was conducted for each o f the thought listing outcome
measures. Both the PSAs (happy/sad) and program segments (happy/sad) were
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entered as factors, and the perceived persuasiveness o f the PSAs was entered as a
covariate.
As table 17b shows, the program-PSA interaction was only significant for the
number o f counter-arguments generated. A main effect for the program segment was
significant for total message-relevant comments, support arguments, counter
arguments, execution total, execution discounting, and sad/negative comments. A
main effect for PSA was significant for execution total, and execution bolstering.

T able 17b. A n alysis o f varian ce: Significant m ain effects and in teraction effects for
thought listin g m easures, con trollin g for the p erceived p ersu asiven ess o f th e PSA s

Main effect for
PSA

M in id fectfer
program

Interaction
effect

F

F

F

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

17.83***
8.44**
10.33**

n.s.
n.s.
7.43“

14.07***
10.97***
n.s.

7.65**
n.s.
3.76*

n.s.
n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
n.s.

n.s.
7.19**

n.s.
n.s.

Message-Relevant thoughts
Support arguments
Counter-arguments
Message Irrelevant
Execution Bolsters
Execution Discounts
Happy/Positive Cognitions
Sad/Negative Cognitions
.05;"’
.01;
p ^ .001

In addition to the open-ended thought listing questions asked, subjects were
also asked to directly evaluate the extent to which the PSA made them think
systematically about drug use. Subjects were asked to respond to seven questions
designed to measure the extent to which they were engaging in systematic processing.
Subjects were asked to rate the extent to which the PSA made them think about the
issue o f drug use, think about reasons why they shouldn’t use drugs, weigh the pros
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and cons o f using drugs, think about their opinion o f drugs, think o f arguments why
they shouldn’t use drugs, think about their beliefs about the consequences o f drugs,
and think rather than feel. A factor analysis was conducted on the seven measures.
Two factors emerged accounting for 74.8% o f the variance. The first factor
(eigenvalue o f 4.21) accounted for 60.1% o f the variance, and included four o f the
measures - the degree to which the PSA made them: think about the issue, think
about reasons why they shouldn’t do drugs, think about the pros and cons o f using
drugs, think about their opinions, and think about their beliefs about the consequences
o f drug use. The second factor (eigenvalue o f 1.03) explained 14.6% o f the variance,
and included the remaining two measures: the extent to which the PSA made them
think about arguments why they shouldn’t use drugs, and the extent to which the PSA
made them think rather than feel. These two items didn’t seem to really have a
cohesive underlying reason for hanging together, so they were dropped from the
analysis. The remaining four items were tested for reliability, and were found to be
highly correlated (alpha o f .90), so a scale was created using the mean o f these four
measures.
Results from the t-tests on this measure did not support the hypothesis.
Subjects who saw the happy PSA in a sad context were not significantly more likely
than those who saw the PSA in a happy context to say that the PSA made them think
deeply about the message. The mean rating for the happy PSA in the sad segment
was 2.71 (SD = 1.37), and the mean rating for the happy PSA in the happy segment
was 2.52 (SD = 1.41), t = -.58, n.s..
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However, for the sad PSA, the results were the reverse o f what was predicted.
Subjects who saw the sad PSA in a happy context were significantly more likely to
say that the PSA made them think hard about the consequences o f drug use than
those who saw the PSA in a sad context (M

happy co n te x t

= 6.45, SD = 1.60; M

sad context

5.61, SD = 2.01; t = 1.96, p = .05). This is interesting, especially given the fact that it
contradicts the thought-listing results which showed significantly less systematic
processing o f the sad PSA following the happy movie clip. Perhaps this indicates that
these items were measuring “effort” to process, and the difference in scores is due to
the fact that it took subjects a greater amount o f effort to process the sad PSA
following the happy clip than it did to process the sad PSA following the sad clip.

Hypothesis 11: Happy programs will lead to greater reliance on schemas than sad
programs
Hypothesis 11 predicted that happy and sad PSAs that are embedded in a
happy program would be more likely to be interpreted in terms o f themes that were
primed by the program than PSAs that were embedded in a sad program. Based on
the reasons discussed under hypothesis 4, it was expected that subjects who viewed
the happy or sad PSA in the context o f the happy movie clip would be more likely to
discuss the consequences o f drug use in terms o f the effects that drug abuse has on
one’s family, and in terms o f the effects that drug use has on one’s physical health
than viewers who saw either the happy or sad PSA in the context o f the sad movie
clip.
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In addition, because it was not predicted that sadness would lead to greater
use o f schemas, it was predicted that subjects who viewed the happy or sad PSA in
the context o f the sad clip would be no more likely than those who saw the happy or
sad PSA in the happy clip to list death as a possible consequence o f heavy drug use.
The same coding categories were used to test this hypothesis as were used to
test hypothesis 4. As table 18 shows, for both the happy and sad PSA, programming
context did not influence subjects’ tendency to discuss the consequences o f drug
abuse in terms o f the physical damage it can do. Subjects who viewed a happy PSA
in the context o f the happy clip were not significantly more likely than those who
viewed the PSA in the sad context to mention the negative health consequences
associated with drug use. No differences were found between program conditions for
the sad PSA either.
In addition, subjects who viewed the happy PSA in the context o f the happy
movie clip were no more likely to discuss the effects o f drug use in terms o f family
relations. They were not more likely than those who saw the PSA in the sad context
to say that drug use may cause pain to people’s families, and were no more likely to
make general comments related to family relations such as “drug use may cause
problems between you and your parents”, “you may ruin your chances to have a
family o f your own”, etc. They were also not more likely to make general comments
related to relationships with friends or family such as “you could lose your friends and
family”, “you could effect the people around you who love you”, “you could ruin
relationships with people who care about you” . However, subjects who watched the
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sad PSA in the context o f the happy movie clip were significantly more likely than
those who saw the PSA in the sad context to say that drug abuse may cause pain to
one’s family. They were also more likely to say that drug use may damage people’s
relationships with their friends and family.
As was predicted, subjects who viewed either the happy or sad PSA in the sad
movie clip were not more likely than those who viewed the PSAs in the happy movie
clip to mention the possibility o f death as a consequence o f drug use.
An additional finding (although not predicted), was that subjects who viewed
the happy PSA in the context o f the happy movie clip were significantly more likely
than those who saw the PSA in the sad context to list the positive benefits o f not
doing drugs as a reason why people should avoid drugs. Subjects who saw the sad
PSA in the happy context were also more likely than those who saw the PSA in the
sad context to make positively framed comments, although the difference between
conditions was not significant.
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Table 18. Mean number o f schema-based thoughts generated In response to the
happy and sad PSA depending on program context
H ippy PSA
Sad
Happy
Program
Program

T-

N=39
SD
M

n=36
M
SD

test

Physical damage

.37

.49

.47

.51

Family pain

.10

3.1

.19

Family general

.34

.61

Damage relationships
with friends/family

.45

Death

Sad PSA
Sad
Happy
Program
Program
n=37

n=36

Ttest

M

SD

M

SD

-.90

.38

.64

.42

.50

-.33

.40

-1.07

.32

.48

.09

.29

2.51’

.42

.65

-.49

.51

.61

.42

.66

.59

.49

.61

.57

-.90

.89

.87

.45

.53

2.24’

.32

.47

.25

.44

.62

.35

.48

.21

.42

1.30

Positively Framed

.58

.50

.28

.45

2.71”

.51

.51

.33

.48

1.52

Negatively Framed

.92

.27

.97

.17

-.98

.97

.16

.94

.24

.68

p £ .05; “ p S

.01;

p £ .001

These results lend some support to the hypothesis that happy programs
trigger greater use o f schemas when interpreting subsequent PSAs. The interesting
aspect o f these findings is that they seem to highlight the relationship between the
emotion generated by the program, and the themes depicted in the PSAs. The
happiness generated by the positive movie clip seemed to make subjects who viewed
the happy PSA more receptive to the positive, self-esteem oriented theme o f the PSA,
while it made subjects who viewed the sad PSA more aware o f the loss-oriented,
negatively framed message o f that PSA. Thus, rather than causing the movie themes
to resonate with viewers, the happiness seemed to cause the themes o f the PSAs to
resonate with viewers.
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Hypothesis 12: Happy programs will lead to more positive ratings o f happy PSAs
than sad PSAs, although the number o f favorable and unfavorable cognitions
generated will not differ
Hypothesis 12 predicted that because happy programs cause subjects to
process subsequent PSAs heuristically, subjects would use the emotion elicited by the
PSAs as information when judging them. Thus it was predicted that happy PSAs
would be rated positively, while sad PSAs would be rated negatively. In addition,
because happiness would cause people to use the emotion from the PSAs as
information, their emotion would have a direct effect on their ratings o f the PSAs,
without influencing the favorability o f their cognitions - thus the number o f favorable
and unfavorable cognitions generated in response to the PSAs would not differ.
As was discussed earlier, ratings o f the sad PSA were much higher than
ratings o f the happy PSA, in both program contexts. The happy PSA received a
perceived persuasiveness score o f 3.19 when embedded in the happy movie clip, while
the sad PSA received a perceived persuasiveness score o f 6.97. Thus the first part o f
the hypothesis was not supported.
Because the first part o f this hypothesis was not supported, the second part
did not need to be tested. However, it still seemed relevant to assess whether the
number o f favorable and unfavorable cognitions generated in response to the happy
and sad PSAs would differ significantly following the happy movie clip. It seemed
possible that although subjects’ ratings o f happy and sad PSAs would not be affected
by their emotional response, their greater use o f heuristic processing could still be
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reflected in the number o f favorable and unfavorable thoughts generated in response
to the PSAs. Thus, for both the happy and sad programming conditions, t-tests were
conducted to compare the number o f favorable and unfavorable thoughts that were
generated in response to the happy and sad PSAs. Favorable comments were
calculated as the sum o f supportive elaborations, simple affirmations, and execution
bolsters. Unfavorable comments were calculated as the sum o f counter arguments,
simple disaffirmations, and execution discounts.
As table 19 shows, no significant differences were found in the number o f
favorable comments that were generated in response to the happy and sad PSAs
following the happy movie clip. However, subjects were significantly more likely to
generate unfavorable comments in response to the happy PSA than the sad PSA.
The same pattern o f results was found for the PSAs following the sad clip.
No significant differences were found in the number o f favorable cognitions generated
in response to the happy and sad PSA. However subjects were significantly more
likely to generate unfavorable comments in response to the happy PSA than the sad
PSA. This suggests a main effect for the PSA, and does not support the hypothesis
that happiness from a program leads people to use their emotional response to a
subsequent PSA as information when forming judgments about that PSA. In
addition, it does not appear that subjects who are exposed to happy programming are
less likely than those who are exposed to sad programming to generate an extensive
network o f positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) thoughts in response to
persuasive messages. It appears that the difference in information processing that is
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spurred by emotional response is limited to message-relevant, versus messageirrelevant thinking.
T able 19. M ean num ber o f favorable and unfavorable com m ents generated in response
to th e happy and sad PSA em bedded in th e sam e program context

Happy Froeram
Sad
Happy
PSA
PSA
n=39
SD
M

T-test

o=36
SD
M

n==36
SD
M

Favorable Comments

.56

.91

.83

1.11

Unfavorable Comments

.87

1.11

.06

.23

Sad Program
Sad
Happy
PSA
PSA

-1.15
4.51'”

T-test

o=37
M
SD

.72

1.14

.95

1.15

-.83

.94

1.01

.14

.42

4.44'”

*p< .05.’’ p £ .01,’” p^ .001

Hypothesis 13 and 14 were based on the premise that sadness would trigger
greater associative priming than happiness. It was predicted that sad programs would
lead to the activation o f a more extensive network o f thoughts which would be
affectively consistent with the sadness elicited by the program clip.

Hypothesis 13: Sad programs will elicit sad cognitions in response to both happy and
sad PSAs
Hypothesis 13 predicted that the sadness elicited from the sad movie clip
would trigger thoughts that were affectively consistent with the emotion elicited by
the clip, such that more sad than happy cognitions would be generated in response to
both happy and sad PSAs. Sad cognitions included statements which reflected
subjects’ sad feelings or negative/sad thoughts related to the movie clip such as “I was
really depressed” , “I was thinking about how sad it would be if my own parents
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died” . Happy comments included statements which reflected their feelings o f
happiness, or other positive/happy thoughts such as “I felt elated - 1 was almost
embarrassed by how happy I felt”, “It made me feel good about life” .
As table 20 shows, results from the t-tests supported this hypothesis. Subjects
who had viewed the sad movie clip generated significantly more sad cognitions than
happy cognitions in response to both the sad and happy PSA. In contrast, subjects
who had seen the happy movie clip did not generate significantly more happy than sad
comments in response to either o f the PSAs. In fact, subjects were more likely to
generate sad comments than happy comments following both program segments,
suggesting that perhaps the topic o f drugs itself may encourage sad comments.

Table 20. Mean number of sad and happy comments generated in response to the sad
and happy PSA in each program context
Happy Program
Sad
Happy
Comments Comments
SD
SD
M
M

T-test

Sad Program
Happy
Sad
Comments
Comments

M

SD

M

SD

T-test

Happy PSA

.05

.22

.15

.43

-1.28

.11

.32

.39

.55

-2.71**

Sad PSA

.03

.17

.19

.53

-1.78

.05

.33

.57

1.02

-2.85**

*p< .05; * ' p £ .01;

p < .001
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Hypothesis 14: The ratio o f sad to happy cognitions will be greater in response to
PSAs embedded in a sad program than the ratio o f happy to sad cognitions generated
in response to PSAs embedded in a happy program
Hypothesis 14 was based on the premise that the systematic processing
triggered by the sad program would lead to a more extensive network o f affectcongruent thoughts available in memory when viewers processed the PSAs. Thus,
the hypothesis predicted that the ratio o f sad to happy thoughts that were generated in
response to the sad movie clip would be greater than the ratio o f happy to sad
thoughts generated in response to the happy clip.
Given the results found above, i.e. that sad thoughts were more likely to be
generated than happy thoughts in both program conditions, this result was almost
guaranteed. Nevertheless, I compared the ratios anyway just to verify that they were
significantly different.
In order to calculate the ratio o f sad to happy thoughts generated by those in
the sad conditions, the number o f sad thoughts plus one was divided by the number o f
happy thoughts plus one (the ones were added to avoid division by zero). The
division was reversed in order to calculate the number o f happy to sad thoughts
generated by those in the happy program conditions. As table 21 shows, the results
from the t-tests supported this hypothesis. The ratio o f sad to happy thoughts was
greater for those who viewed the happy PSA in the context o f the sad movie clip than
the ratio o f happy to sad thoughts generated by those who saw the same PSA in the
context o f the happy movie clip. Results were similar for the sad PSA, with the ratio
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o f affective-congruent thoughts being higher for the sad programming condition than
the happy condition.

T ab le 21. R atio o f th ou gh ts th at w ere congruent w ith th e em otion o f th e program
segm ent to thoughts th at w ere incongruent w ith the em otion o f th e p rogram segm ent

Happ;rPSA
Happy
Sad
Program Program
n=39

n=36

.98

1.30

Ratio of emotion-congruent to
emotion-incongruent thoughts
" p 5 .05. " p < .01,*"

T-test

-3.06"

SadiPSA
Sad
Happy
Program Program
n=36

n=37

.95

1.52

T-test

-3.42"'

.001

Hypothesis 15: Sad programs will lead to less favorable comments in response to
happy PSAs and more favorable comments in response to sad PSAs than happy
programs
Hypothesis 15 was based on the AIM model and proposed that happiness
would lead to direct evaluations o f the PSAs based on the emotions elicited, such that
happy PSAs embedded in happy programs would be evaluated positively, while sad
PSAs would be evaluated negatively. In contrast, because sadness was thought to
influence thoughts indirectly via the network o f negative associations triggered, it was
thought that sad programming would lead subjects to generate less favorable
comments in response to happy PSAs, and more favorable comments in response to
sad PSAs. Again, favorable comments were calculated as the sum o f supportive
elaborations, simple affirmations, and execution bolsters. Unfavorable comments
were calculated as the sum o f counter arguments, simple disaffirmations, and
execution discounts.
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No convincing evidence was found to support this hypothesis. Although the
results were directionally consistent with the hypothesis, subjects were not
significantly less likely to generate favorable or unfavorable cognitions about the
happy PSA when it was placed in a happy clip compared to when it was placed in a
sad clip. When the PSA was placed in a happy clip, subjects made an average o f .56
favorable comments (SD = .91), compared to .72 comments (SD = 1.14) when the
PSA was embedded in a sad clip (t = -.67, n.s.). No significant differences were
found between conditions on the number o f unfavorable comments generated either
(M happydip = -87, SD = 1.11; MadcUp =-94, SD = 1.01; t =-.30, n.s.).
Similarly, for the sad PSA, the difference in the number o f favorable
cognitions generated was not significant between the happy and sad movie conditions
(M happydip = -83, S D = 1.11, M ad cIip = .95, SD = 1.15;t = -.43, n.s.), nor was it
significant for the number o f unfavorable comments generated (M hjppydip = .06, SD =
23; M „d dip = .14, SD = .42; t = -1.01, n.s.).

Hypothesis 16: Subjects viewing a sad PSA embedded in a sad program will judge
the negative outcomes o f not adopting the advocated behavior as more likely than
those viewing a happy PSA embedded in a sad program
Hypothesis 16 predicted that because sadness is thought to trigger an
extensive network o f negative material in memory, negatively framed messages will
be salient in memory, making the negative consequences o f taking drugs shown in the
sad PSA seem more likely to occur than the positive outcomes associated with
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avoiding drugs depicted in the happy PSA. In order to assess subject’s perceptions
o f the likelihood o f negatively framed consequences occurring as a result o f drug use,
subjects were asked to rate the likelihood that drug use would lead to: physical and
mental damage, addiction, loss o f enjoyment in activities, use o f harder drugs, strained
relationships with parents, loss o f friends, and decreased performance in school.
To assess perceptions o f the likelihood o f positively framed consequences
occurring if drug use was avoided, subjects were asked to rate the likelihood that
students who avoided drugs would: do better in school than if they did take drugs, be
successful in life, achieve their goals and aspirations, be happier with their lives, be
well-liked by their peers, and get along well with their parents. These items were
analyzed individually because it was thought that important differences may emerge
between questions which reflected the themes o f the PSA (physical damage,
addiction, use o f harder drugs) and those not discussed in the PSA (loss o f friends,
grades suffer, relationship with parents).
Comparisons were made between those who saw the sad PSA in the sad
context and those who saw the happy PSA in the sad context. As table 22a shows,
out o f the seven negatively framed consequences tested, only two significant
differences were found. Compared to subjects who saw the happy PSA in the sad
context, subjects who saw the sad PSA in the sad program context gave significantly
higher ratings o f the likelihood o f drug users becoming addicted to drugs, and turning
to harder drugs. Subjects who had seen the sad PSA were also more likely to give
higher ratings o f the likelihood that drug users would stop enjoying things, would lose
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friends, and that their grades would suffer, although the differences were not
significant. No significant differences were found between conditions on the six
positively framed outcomes tested. Thus, only minimal evidence was ibund to
support this hypothesis.

Table 22a. Mean likelihood rating of negatively and positively framed consequences of
drug use/avoidance for the sad and happy PSA embedded in the sad program
SadProgram
Sad PSA
Happy PSA
SD
M
SD
M

T-test

Neeativelv Framed Conseuuences
Physical damage
Addicted
Stop enjoying things
Turn to harder drugs
Hurt relationship with parents
Lose friends
Grades suffer

6.75
7.19
6.47
7.36
7.17
6.92
7.56

1.76
1.77
1.93
1.74
1.92
2.10
1.76

6.83
6.44
5.94
6.72
7.14
6.42
7.22

1.70
1.73
1.84
1.58
1.73
1.84
1.46

-.20
-1.82*
-1.19
-1.63~
-.07
-1.07
-.87

6.33
6.92
6.56
6.28
5.22
5.44

2.06
1.93
2.02
1.95
1.79
1.92

5.86
6.33
6.08
6.25
5.50
5.53

2.51
2.34
2.20
2.25
1.90
1.96

-.87
-1.15
-.95
-.06
.64
.18

Positively Framed Conseauences
Better in school
More successful in future
Achieve goals
Happier
Well-liked by peers
Get along well with parents
+ p<.10
In order to further assess whether the differences that were found were due to
the sad programming context, or the PSAs themselves, a comparison was made
between those who had seen the sad PSA in the happy context, and those who had
seen the happy PSA in the happy context. In contrast to what was found above, no
significant differences were found between conditions on any o f the negatively framed
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consequences tested (although directionally, the means were higher following the sad
PSA). Subjects who had seen the sad PSA in the context o f the happy clip gave
higher ratings o f the likelihood o f five o f the positive outcomes occurring than those
who saw the happy PSA in the happy context, although only two o f these were
marginally significant: the likelihood that people will be happier if they avoid drugs
(M „dPSA = 7.16, SD = 1.64; M i ^ p s a = 6.38, SD = 1.89; t = 1.91, p = .06) and the
likelihood that people will be better liked if they avoid drugs (M „d p s a = 6.05, SD =
1.63; M happypsA = 5.38, SD = 1.76; t = 1.72, p < .10).

Table 22b. Mean likelihood rating of negatively and positively framed consequences of
drug use/avoidance for the sad and happy PSA embedded in the happy program
Happy Program
Sad PSA
Happy PSA
SD
SD
M
M

T-test

Negatively Framed Conseauences
Physical damage
Addicted
Stop enjoying things
Turn to harder drugs
Hurt relationship with parents
Lose friends
Grades suffer

6.92
7.00
6.75
6.92
7.16
7.00
7.32

1.59
1.70
2.29
1.83
2.06
1.96
2.07

6.26
6.53
6.18
6.67
7.21
6.54
7.08

1.99
1.91
2.01
1.68
1.36
1.68
1.46

-1.59
-1.10
-1.15
-.63
.11
1.10
-.61

6.43
7.08
6.70
7.16
6.05
6.27

2.44
1.99
1.78
1.64
1.63
1.99

6.46
6.54
6.10
6.38
5.38
5.87

2.14
2.02
1.89
1.89
1.76
1.78

.06
-1.18
-1.43
-1.91*
-1.72+
-.92

Positively Framed Conseauences
Better in school
More successful in future
Achieve goals
Happier
Well-liked by peers
Get along well with parents
+ p < .10

I
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The above evidence (although weak), suggests a main effect for the PSA, such
that both positive and negative consequences o f drug use seemed more likely among
subjects who had viewed the sad PSA compared to those who had seen the happy
PSA. However the difference between the sad and happy PSA conditions is
somewhat more pronounced for the negative consequences following the sad
program, and for the positive consequences following the happy program. This may
suggest that unlike what was predicted, the emotion from the programs may influence
whether PSAs are interpreted in positive or negative ways. However, the
programming context only seemed to influence processing o f the sad PSA, which
suggests that perhaps the influence of the emotion from the segment only occurs for
PSAs which are more persuasive and perhaps more engaging (or just more intense),
as is the case with the sad PSA.
In order to directly evaluate whether these differences were only significant
for the sad PSA, a comparison was made between the programming conditions for
both the sad and happy PSAs. For the happy PSA, no significant differences were
found between the happy and sad programming conditions on any o f the seven
negatively framed consequences, nor were any significant differences found between
conditions for any o f the six positively framed consequences.
For the sad PSA, no significant differences were found between the
programming conditions for the negatively framed outcomes. However, a significant
difference was found between conditions on ratings o f the likelihood o f several
positively framed outcomes. Subjects who saw the sad PSA in the context o f the
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happy clip judged three outcomes as significantly more likely than those who saw the
sad PSA in the context o f the sad clip. Compared to subjects who saw the sad PSA
in a sad clip, subjects who saw the sad PSA in a happy clip gave significantly higher
ratings o f the likelihood that avoidance o f drugs would lead people to be: happier
about their lives (M luppycUp = 7.16, SD = 1.64; M „d dip = 6.28, SD = 1.95; t = 2.10, p
< .05), well-liked by their peers (M happydip = 6.05, SD = 1.63; M

d>> = 5.22, SD =

1.79; t = 2.08, p < .05), and get along well with their parents (M happydip = 6.27, SD =
2.00; M „d dip = 5.44, SD = 1.92; t = 1.80, p < . 10). Therefore, for the sad PSA,
several differences emerged that appear to be related to the program context and not
the PSA itself.
It appears that the emotion from the programming only influences
interpretations o f the sad PSA (perhaps because the PSA is more engaging than the
happy PSA, or perhaps because the sad PSA elicits systematic processing which
encourages the infusion o f the emotion from the program). In addition, it appears
that the emotion from the program may influence whether PSAs are interpreted in
terms o f negative frames (loss) or positive frames (gains). It is unclear from this data
whether the sad programming leads to more negative interpretations o f persuasive
messages (which could be reflected in lowered evaluations o f the likelihood o f
positive outcomes occurring if drugs are avoided), or whether happy programming
leads to more positive interpretation o f persuasive messages (i.e. in terms o f the
benefits that could be gained by avoiding drugs).
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Fear hypothesis: Happy PSAs which are embedded in a fear-evoking program will be
rated as more persuasive than sad PSAs which are embedded in a fear-evoking
program
The final hypothesis was designed to assess whether PSAs would be rated as
more persuasive in programming contexts which elicit the same degree o f cognitive
processing (which would support the consistency hypothesis), or whether they would
be rated as more persuasive if the programming context was similarly valenced. It
was assumed that fear would trigger heuristic processing in the same way that
happiness does. Thus, if the consistency hypothesis were true, the happy PSA would
perform better in the context o f a fear-evoking segment than the sad PSA. However,
if it is true that people prefer to watch television material that is consistently valenced
because it does not break their mood (as some researchers have hypothesized), then
we would expect the sad PSA to be rated better than the happy PSA in the fearevoking context, because it would allow viewers to maintain the negative feelings
they were experiencing from the sad program.
Because the sad PSA generated much higher ratings o f perceived
persuasiveness than the happy PSA, it no longer made sense to compare ratings o f the
persuasiveness o f the PSAs in the fear context. However, it was still possible to
evaluate whether each PSA was perceived as more persuasive in the fear context
compared to the happy and sad contexts.
In the first part o f this analysis, the mean persuasiveness scores (based on the
mean o f the five persuasion questions asked) were compared for both the sad and
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happy PSA in each o f the three program contexts (happy, sad, fear). Because the
study was structured as a 2 x 2 design, the fear clip was presented to subjects after
they had been exposed to one o f the 4 experimental combinations. Thus, all subjects
saw the fear clip after seeing either the happy or sad clip - if they had seen the happy
PSA following the first segment, they saw the sad PSA following the fear clip, and
vice versa. Because the study was designed this way, the happy and sad PSA both
followed the fear segment in two o f the conditions.
Table 23 shows the mean difference in the persuasiveness scores o f the happy
PSA for each o f the four comparisons. Note that comparisons were made between
the happy and sad contexts and both o f the conditions in which the happy PSA
followed the fear clip. None o f the differences between conditions were significant.
However, it is interesting to note that the happy PSA earned the highest ratings when
it followed the fear evoking clip, and the first clip that had been seen was the happy
clip (M = 3.63). In addition, the lowest persuasiveness rating was given to the happy
PSA when it followed the fear clip, and the first clip that had been seen was the sad
clip (M = 2.70). The difference between these conditions was significant (t = 2.13, p
< .05). Note that the only difference between the condition in which the happy PSA
earned the highest rating, and the condition in which it earned the lowest rating was
the emotion elicited by the first clip. If it is true that viewers prefer to maintain
consistency in the amount o f cognitive processing in which they are engaged, and
assuming that both happiness and fear elicit heuristic processing, then perhaps
viewing the happy clip followed by the fear clip led subjects to give higher ratings to
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the happy PSA which was also processed heuristically. Conversely, the happy PSA
may have been rated lower in the condition where subjects were first shown the sad
clip, and then the fear clip, because sadness and fear are thought to elicit different
degrees o f processing effort. Perhaps ratings o f the happy PSA decreased when
subjects shifted from systematic processing (elicited by the sad clip), to heuristic
processing (elicited by the fear clip). This explanation assumes that the sad PSA did
not interact with the program segments in any way.
Interestingly, if we look at the persuasiveness score o f the happy PSA
following the happy clip (in the first position), and use this score as a “baseline” for
the persuasiveness rating o f the happy P SA we see that the baseline fell in between
the PSA’s rating in the other two conditions (M = 3.19). This suggests that when the
sequence of the two clips that were shown both elicited heuristic processing (i.e.
happy clip - fear clip), then the perceived persuasiveness score o f the happy PSA went
up relative to the baseline (M = 3.63). When the sequence o f the two clips elicited
incongruent processing strategies (i.e. sad clip - fear clip), then the perceived
persuasiveness score o f the happy PSA went down relative to the baseline
(M = 2.70).
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Table 23. M ean perceived persuasiveness rating for the happy PSA following
the happy, sad, and fear evoking clips
Mean
3.19
3.63

SD
1.66
2.08

Happy - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Sad - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

3.19
2.70

1.66
1.60

1.31

Sad - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Sad - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

2.95
2.70

1.56
1.60

.67

Sad - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Happy - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

2.95
3.63

1.56
2.08

1.57

Happy - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Happy - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

t-test
1.00

Note: The difference in means between the condition which earned the highest rating, and that
which earned the lowest rating was significant: t = 2.13, p < .05

For the sad PSA, a very consistent pattern o f results emerged. As table 24
shows, the sad PSA was rated as significantly more persuasive when it followed the
fear segment compared to when it followed either the sad or happy segment. This
contradicts the consistency hypothesis which predicted that subjects would rate the
sad PSA as less persuasive in the fear context than in the sad context because the
systematic processing elicited by the sad PSA would conflict with the heuristic
processing triggered by the fear-evoking clip.
Instead these results suggest a number o f possible interpretations. First,
because the fear clip was always shown in the second position, the conditions in
which the sad PSA was rated as significantly more persuasive always occurred when
the sad PSA was shown in the second spot, after the happy PSA had already been
seen. Thus, perhaps these results merely reflect subjects’ comparison o f the two
PSAs, so that the sad PSA earned higher ratings because it was compared to the
happy PSA (which did not generate high persuasiveness scores) which led to inflated
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judgments o f the sad PSA when contrasted with the happy PSA. However, if this
explanation were accurate, then we would expect the happy PSA to be rated as
significantly lower when it was placed in the second position, because the contrast
with the more persuasive sad PSA would lower judgments o f the happy PSA. As
table 23 shows, evidence was not found to support this.
Assuming that it is not the position o f the PSA in the experiment that caused
the results that were found, an alternative explanation seems possible that would
explain why the sad PSA would be rated as more persuasive following the fear
segment. Fear is an emotion that is relevant to preventing drug use. Perhaps when
subjects were exposed to a fear evoking clip, it made the ensuing PSA seem more
real, or more frightening. The sad PSA was, in fact, described as “creepy” or “scary”
by some subjects, and thus the frightening clip shown before may have heightened
fear about the negative consequences o f drug use. This may suggest that
programming context can influence the persuasiveness o f PSAs, but only if the
emotion elicited by the context is relevant to the behavior that is being addressed in
the PSA. Perhaps because sadness is not an emotion that is as relevant in preventing
drug use as fear, heightened sadness from a program clip will not lead to ratings o f a
sad PSA as more persuasive (despite the fact that it may lead to more extensive
cognitive processing).
An additional explanation for this finding could be that the arousal from the
fear segment elevated responses to the sad PSA which was also highly arousing.
Zillmann’s (1971) excitation- transfer theory predicts that arousal (excitation)
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produced by a preceding stimuli will combine with excitation from a subsequent
stimuli to intensify the affective reaction to the subsequent stimuli. Thus, if viewers
are exposed to an arousing program segment, and are then shown a message which
causes them to respond emotionally, they will experience that emotion more intensely,
and they may also respond more intensely to that message. Arousal from a fearevoking segment may, then, intensify the sadness that is felt in response to an ensuing
sad PSA. The greater degree o f negative emotion that is felt may lead viewers to rate
the message as more highly persuasive (especially because people often think that
PSAs which elicit high levels o f negative emotion will be persuasive). However,
excitation-transfer theory states that arousal may intensify both positive and negative
emotions that are experienced in response to a subsequent message, which means that
we would expect the same pattern o f results for the happy PSA. That is, we would
expect the happy PSA to earn the highest persuasiveness ratings following the fearevoking clip, because the arousal from the fear clip should elevate viewers emotional
response to the happy PSA. Results were not found to support this. Perhaps this is
because the happy PSA did not elicit high enough levels o f happiness to begin with, or
because viewers do not perceive anti-drug PSAs which elicit high levels o f happiness
to be persuasive.
These results may also suggest some important implications for future context
effects studies, because they contradict what some researchers have predicted: that
viewers prefer to maintain the mood they are in, such that negatively valenced
material will perform better in negative program contexts, and positively valenced
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material will perform better in positive contexts. If this were true, then we would
have expected the sad PSA to be rated as more persuasive following the sad clip, and
the happy PSA to be rated as more persuasive following the happy clip. This was not
shown to be the case. The fact that the sad PSA was judged as more persuasive
following the fear evoking clip may indicate that the emotion evoked by the program
clip will only affect evaluations o f the PSA if the emotion is relevant to the behavior
change that is sought in the PS A Thus, the specific emotion o f the program clip and
PSA (not just the valence o f the clip and PSA) may influence judgments o f persuasive
messages. This may explain why the happy PSA was not found to be rated as
consistently more persuasive following the fear-evoking clip.
While it is unclear at this point why the results from this part o f the analysis
differed so greatly for the happy and sad PSA, the results suggest that it is important
to consider both the program context as well as the nature o f the PSAs when
evaluating the effects o f program context on perceptions o f persuasive messages.
Perhaps for less persuasive messages, or messages which use emotions which are not
particularly relevant to the behavior change that is addressed, consistency in the
amount o f cognitive processing that is required is important. In the case o f the happy
PSA (which was not very persuasive), it may be more important to place the PSA in a
program which allows viewers to consistently engage in heuristic processing, which
may make them less likely to counter argue, and will prevent disruption o f their
“superficial” thinking.
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For more persuasive messages, consistency in the level o f processing in which
viewers are engaged may be less important (perhaps because viewers are more likely
to engage in both systematic as well as heuristic processing when a message is more
persuasive). In this case, the relevancy o f the emotion induced by the segment to the
message may have a greater influence on ratings of the persuasiveness o f the message.
Clearly, these interpretations are merely speculative at this point, and much
more research is needed to sort through these possible explanations.
Table 24. Mean perceived persuasiveness rating for the sad PSA following the happy,
sad, and fear evoking clips
Happy - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Happy - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

Mean
7.76
6.97

SD
1.08
1.34

2.85**

Happy - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Sad - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

7.76
6.46

1.08
2.10

3.42***

Sad - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.
Sad - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA

7.43
6.46

1.07
2.10

2.46*

Sad - Happy PSA - Fear - Sad PSA vs.

7.43
6.97

1.07
1.34

1.60

Happy - Sad PSA - Fear - Happy PSA
.0 5 ,"

pS

t-test

.01,"* P S .001
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CONCLUSION
The purpose o f this study was to assess how the emotion evoked by television
programs influences how we process advertisements and public service
announcements. Although a number o f the hypotheses put forth in this study were
supported, no evidence was found to support the main context effects hypothesis that
a PSA which is placed in a program which evokes the same emotion will be rated
more highly than if it is placed in a program which evokes a different emotion.
Nevertheless, a number o f results from this study suggest some interesting ways in
which emotional programming may influence the way we process advertisements and
public service announcement. The following is a summary o f the results found in this
study which is intended to help clarify and synthesize the findings.
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Hypothesis 1: Programs and PSAs can elicit discrete emotions

Supported

H2: Happy programs will lead to heuristic processing of neutral PSA

Supported

H3: Sad programs will lead to systematic processing of neutral PSA

Led to both systematic and
heuristic processing

H4: Happy programs will lead viewers to interpret a PSA in terms of
themes primed by the program

Led to more positively framed
comments

H5: Happy programs will lead viewers to judge a PSA in terms of
individual control, and positive outlook for the future of the problem

Not supported, but themes of
happy and sad PSAs were
rated highest following happy
clip

H6: Sad programs will lead viewers to judge a PSA in terms of
situational factors, hopelessness for the future of the problem

Not supported

H7: Happy PSAs will be rated more persuasive following a happy prog.

Not supported

H8: Sad PSAs will be rated more persuasive following a sad program

Not supported

H9: Fewer argument related thoughts will be generated in response to
a happy PSA than a sad PSA

Not supported after
controlling for persuasiveness,
although greater # of positive
execution comments held

H10: Argument-related thoughts generated in response to a happy or
sad PSA will be higher following a sad program, than following a
happy program

Supported

HI 1: A PSA will be more likely to be interpreted in terms of themes
primed by the program following a happy program than following a sad
program

Partially supported

H12: Happy programs will lead to direct evaluations of PSAs based on
the emotion elicited by the PSAs, and will not influence the favorability
of thoughts

Not supported

H13: Sad programs will elicit more sad than happy cognitions in
response to both happy and sad PSAs

Supported

H14: The ratio of sad to happy thoughts will be greater in response to
PSAs embedded in a sad program than the ratio of happy to sad
thoughts generated in response to PSAs embedded in a happy program

Supported

HIS: Sad programs will lead to less favorable comments in response to
happy PSAs and more favorable comments in response to a sad PSA

Not supported

H16: Subjects viewing a sad PSA embedded in a sad program will rate
the negative consequences of not adopting the behavior as more likely
than those viewing a happy PSA embedded in a sad program

Partially supported - negative
outcomes judged more likely
for sad PSA following sad
clip, and positive outcomes
judged more likely for sad
PSA following happy clip

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

No evidence was found to suggest that PSAs would be rated as more
persuasive if they were emotionally consistent with the program in which they were
embedded. There are a number o f reasons why the results that were obtained in other
studies were not in this study.
First, other context effects studies have used television commercials for
consumer products, and not public service announcements about risky behaviors.
Attitudes towards risky health behaviors such as drug use are much more complex
and strongly held than attitudes towards consumer products, and therefore it is not
surprising that the same types of effects that were found for consumer goods
advertisements were not found here.
However, this is not to say that attitudes towards drug use are so strongly
held, that one exposure to an anti-drug PSA would not have any influence on
subjects’ perceptions o f the dangers o f drug use (even if temporarily), nor does it
preclude subjects from being able to rate an anti-drug communication as effective or
not. Instead, it seems possible that the PSAs that were selected for this study were in
fact too different in their perceived persuasiveness. This is one o f the dangers o f using
real PSAs as opposed to manipulated stimuli: the sad PSA earned very high ratings
on persuasiveness, while the happy PSA earned fairly low ratings. Perhaps reactions
to the PSAs were so strong, that subjects’ attitudes towards them were resistant to
any o f the effects o f program context. For a sensitive issue like drug use, a poorly
executed PSA may lead to very strong negative reactions (or may lead viewers to feel
insulted), which may override any program context effects. Such strong reactions are
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not as likely to be found in response to a non-controversial advertisement for a
company like McDonald’s (whose ads were used in a previous context effects study).
It is possible that for public service announcements about important issues, the
content and arguments themselves may overwhelm the cues that are triggered by the
program context, whereas for inconsequential messages (such as commercial
advertisements), the programming context may be more influential. Thus, future
context effects studies which use public service announcements as the stimuli should
try to ensure that the messages that are selected are at least moderately persuasive out
of context. Unfortunately, there were very few happy anti-drug PSAs available, and
the one that was selected earned the highest persuasiveness ratings o f those available.
It was disappointing that ratings o f the PSA went down substantially when the PSA
was viewed in the context o f a program, however this was not something that could
have been anticipated. In fact, this outcome is interesting in itself^ and is something
that is worth further exploration. Effort should also be made to use PSAs which have
a greater degree o f variability in perceived persuasiveness (out o f context) than the
sad PSA that was used in this study. While an effort was made to avoid ceiling
effects, perhaps program context is less influential on perceptions o f PSAs which are
rated as highly persuasive. However, there is not way to be certain o f this until there
is a clear test o f happy and sad PSAs that are equivalent in perceived strength.
Because results were not found to support the main context effects
hypothesis, limited discussion will be given to the context-effects models that were
proposed. Instead, the results will be discussed in terms o f the specific ways that the
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emotion generated by the programs seemed to influence the cognitive processing o f
the PSAs, and the implications o f those findings. Some attention will also be given to
additional findings which are suggestive o f possible effects, but which are still
tentative.

Can emotion from programs influence the subsequent cognitive processing o f PSAs?
The most robust finding from this study was a main effect for program
context, such that emotions elicited by television programs can influence the
processing o f persuasive messages which are embedded in them. Based on past
research, it was hypothesized that happy programs would create a low elaboration
condition which would encourage subjects to process persuasive messages
heuristically, while sad programs would crate a high elaboration condition, and
encourage subjects to process messages systematically. Results from pre-test 2
showed that after viewing a happy program, subjects were more likely to make
message-irrelevant comments in response to a neutral PSA than message relevant
comments. They were also more likely to make message irrelevant comments than
those in the sad condition. Subjects in the sad condition were more likely to make
message relevant comments in response to a neutral PSA than those in the happy
condition, but evidence was found that they engaged in both heuristic as well as
systematic processing when processing the PSA.
Results from the experiment also showed a significant main effect for the
programs, such that subjects were significantly more likely to engage in heuristic
processing o f a PSA following a happy program, and were more likely to engage in
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systematic processing o f a PSA following a sad program. Subjects in the happy
program condition were more likely to make message irrelevant comments
(comments about the execution o f the PSA) in response to both a happy and sad PSA
than those in the sad program condition. Conversely, subjects in the sad program
condition were more likely to make message relevant comments in response to both
the happy and sad PSA than those in the happy program condition. Thus evidence
was found to support the hypothesis that emotion from programs may influence the
extent to which subjects engage in extensive message elaboration when processing a
persuasive message.

How does happiness evoked bv programs influence the processing o f PSAs?
The second element o f the AIM model that was assessed was how the
emotion from the programs would interact with the emotion from the PSAs to
determine how the PSAs were processed. It was predicted that because happiness
had been shown to elicit heuristic processing, subjects would be more likely to use the
emotion o f a PSA as a cue to how they felt about the P S A such that a happy PSA
would be evaluated positively, and a sad PSA would be evaluated negatively. Because
the happy PSA was not rated as more persuasive following the happy program than
the sad program, there was no evidence to suggest that viewers use the emotion from
a PSA as a simple heuristic cue in low elaboration conditions (i.e. following a happy
program). However, it was still possible to evaluate whether subjects were less likely
to generate favorable o r unfavorable thoughts in response to the PSAs following the
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happy program. It was hypothesized that if happiness leads to direct evaluations o f a
PSA, subjects in the happy condition would be less likely to generate positive or
negative thoughts in response to the PSAs than those in the sad condition. No
evidence was found to support this hypothesis, and thus it does not appear that the
heuristic processing elicited by happy programs causes people to judge PSAs simply
by their emotional tone. Nevertheless, it appears that the heuristic processing elicited
by happy programs may influence how viewers process information in persuasive
messages. In particular, happiness was shown to influence subjects’ reliance on
schemas, and was shown to influence the extent to which the themes o f the PSAs
resonate with viewers.

Reliance on Schemas
It was predicted that subjects who had viewed a happy program would be
more likely to interpret a subsequent PSA in terms o f themes that were primed by the
program (in this case, family or health issues) than those who had viewed a sad
program.

Little evidence was found to support this hypothesis. However, evidence

was found to suggest that after viewing a happy program, subjects were more likely
to interpret the PSAs in terms o f themes that were depicted in the PSAs. Subjects
were more likely to give positive reasons why people shouldn’t use drugs (e.g. “you
have too much to live for”, “y ° u

are

beautiful and fun without drugs”) after viewing

the happy PSA in a happy program, than after viewing it in a sad program. This
seems to suggest that the positive, self-esteem oriented message o f the happy PSA
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resonated more with those who had seen the happy program. Similarly, subjects who
viewed the sad PSA (which discussed the negative effects o f drug use) in the context
o f a happy program were more likely than those who saw the PSA in the sad context
to say that drug use can cause people to hurt their families, and can damage peoples’
relationships with their friends or family. This may indicate again that the happiness
evoked by the happy clip may have caused the negative loss-oriented message o f the
sad PSA to resonate more with viewers. In other words, when asked to discuss the
issue o f drug use, subjects who had seen the PSAs in the happy context were more
likely to rely on the positive or negative themes that were triggered by the PSAs. On
the one hand, this may indicate that subjects in the happy condition had really
processed the message o f the PSA, and were reiterating it. This would suggest that
seeing the PSAs in a happy context made subjects more receptive to the message.
However, subjects’ comments did not reflect the overt messages o f the PSAs, but
rather reflected a general positive or negative bias in the way they discussed the issue
o f drugs.
Alternatively, the subjects’ responses may suggest that they were relying on
the positive or negative frames that were recently portrayed in the PSAs, and that the
PSA had not been processed on a deeper level. As Hansen and Krygowski (1994)
argue, under conditions where cognitive processing effort is diminished, people may
become more reliant on schematic processing which is simpler and requires fewer
resources.
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Interpreted in this way, the evidence lends support to the hypothesis put forth
by the AIM theory, that emotion can both tell us how to think, as well as what to
think about it. In this case, the happiness from the program may have influenced
viewers to process the PSAs heuristically (i.e. schematically), and the emotion o f the
PSAs may have increased their tendency to think about the issue discussed in the PSA
in terms o f positive or negative frames.

Appraisal dimensions
Further evidence was found to suggest that program-elicited happiness can
influence the extent to which the themes depicted in the PSAs resonate with viewers.
It was hypothesized that subjects would be more likely to interpret PSAs in ways that
would reflect underlying appraisal dimensions. Based on the central appraisal
components o f happiness and sadness, it was proposed that viewers o f the happy
program would be more likely to judge a subsequent PSA in terms o f individual
control, while those in the sad condition would be more likely to interpret it in terms
o f situational factors. It was also proposed that viewers o f the happy program would
be more likely to have a positive outlook for the drug situation in this country, while
viewers o f the sad program would be more likely to see the drug situation in this
country as hopeless.
No evidence was found to support this hypothesis. However subjects were
most likely to express a positive outlook for the drug situation when the happy PSA
followed the happy clip, and were most likely to indicate that individuals are
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responsible for their own drug abuse problems when the sad PSA followed the happy
clip. This may suggest that heuristic processing elicited by the previously viewed
happy segment influences the extent to which the themes depicted in the PSAs
resonate with viewers. For instance, for the happy PSA, subjects were more likely to
interpret the drug issue in terms o f the positive gains associated with avoiding drugs
when the PSA followed the happy clip. Similarly, for the sad PSA, subjects were
more likely to interpret the drug issue in terms o f individual responsibility (a theme
that was underlying the message of the sad PSA) when the PSA followed the happy
clip. Again, this seems to indicate that after viewing a happy program, subjects were
more likely to process ensuing information schematically, or thematically, which
suggests that subjects’ judgments o f a PSA may be based more on accessible schema
content than the actual message that is conveyed in the PS A This may suggest either
that 1) information that is found in PSAs which follow happy programs will be
remembered better because the schemas which are primed during viewing will make
the information in the PSA more easily encoded in memory (via associative priming),
or 2) a PSA that is processed following a happy program will be distorted because the
PSA will be interpreted in terms o f the schema that is triggered, and not the actual
message o f the PS A For instance, a PSA which follows a happy program may be less
influential because it may trigger a schema for “anti-drug PSAs”, which could make
viewers more conscious o f the effort being made to convince them not to use drugs,
and less receptive to the actual message. The evidence that was found in this study
may suggest that subjects in the happy program condition were interpreting the
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subsequent PSAs in terms o f themes that are traditionally used with anti-drug PSAs..
Thus, after viewing a happy PSA in a happy context, subjects may have merely been
discussing the drug issue in terms o f themes that are often used in positive anti-drug
campaigns (e.g. future achievement, a happy life). Those who saw the sad PSA in the
happy context may have been discussing the drug issue in terms o f themes that are
often used in negative anti-drug campaigns (e.g. “just say no” - individual
responsibility, loss o f family or friends). These findings are not overwhelmingly
convincing at this point, but do suggest an area worthy o f future research.

How does sadness evoked by programs influence the processing o f PSAs?
Following the assumption that sadness would elicit systematic processing, it
was predicted that sad programs would trigger a network o f sad/negative thoughts,
making negatively framed outcomes seem more likely to occur. As was predicted,
subjects who had viewed the sad program generated significantly more sad/negative
thoughts than happy/positive thoughts, but those who had viewed the happy program
did not generate significantly more happy than sad thoughts. This suggests that the
sad program triggered a greater network o f sad thoughts than the happy program did
happy thoughts, which may indicate that a greater degree o f associative priming was
triggered in the sad context relative to the happy context. Additional research would
need to be conducted in order to fully assess whether sadness triggers a greater
network o f related thoughts.
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What are the implications for greater associative priming following a sad
program? One possibility is that because o f the activation o f a number o f emotioncongruent thoughts, information processing would be more difficult following a sad
program. On the other hand, the extensive network of related thoughts that are
activated could make it easier to integrate negatively framed material into memory,
and thus negatively framed outcomes may seem more likely to occur than positively
framed outcomes.
Because it was assumed that a greater degree o f associative priming would be
triggered by a sad program relative to a happy program, it was predicted that any
judgments about a persuasive message that would take place following a sad program
would result from indirect evaluations, and would be based on the favorability o f the
comments generated. No evidence was found to suggest that sadness encouraged a
greater number o f favorable or unfavorable thoughts in response to either the happy
or sad PSA.
In addition, very little evidence was found to suggest that following a sad
program segment, the negatively framed outcomes depicted in a sad PSA would be
judged as more likely to occur than the positive outcomes depicted in a happy PSA
Subjects in the sad program condition who had seen the sad PSA were only slightly
more likely to judge two o f the negative outcomes associated with drug use
(addiction, use o f harder drugs) as more likely compared to those who saw the happy
PSA.
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Thus, it appears that the greatest influence that program-induced sadness has
on information processing stems from its influence on the extent o f message relevant
thinking in which subjects are willing to engage, and the activation o f a more
extensive network o f emotion related thoughts. It would appear that any persuasion
that would take place in the context o f a sad program would occur through more
extensive cognitive elaboration, and probably would occur indirectly through
thoughts that were generated in response to the message (although no evidence was
found to suggest that sadness encouraged a greater number o f favorable or
unfavorable thoughts in response to either PSA - this is probably due to the fact that
the messages themselves varied greatly in their perceived persuasiveness, so this
hypothesis could not adequately be tested). The implication o f this is that persuasive
messages which are shown in sad programming will be processed more extensively
than those shown in a happy context, and therefore any persuasion that takes place in
a sad programming context will be more stable and enduring.

Negatively and positively framed consequences
As mentioned above, very little evidence was found to suggest that subjects
who viewed a sad PSA following a sad program would be more likely than those who
saw a happy PSA following a sad program to give higher estimates o f negative
consequences of drug use occurring. However, because o f methodological issues
(i.e. the extreme difference in perceptions o f the sad and happy PSAs), it was not
possible to adequately test this hypothesis.
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However some evidence was found to suggest, that negatively framed
outcomes were judged as more likely when a sad PSA was placed in a sad context
compared to when a happy PSA was placed in a sad context, and that positively
framed outcomes were judged as more likely when a sad PSA was placed in a happy
context compared to when a happy PSA was placed in a happy context. These
findings are quite tentative at this point, and are only offered as a possible area for
future research. Interpreted cautiously, they suggest that the emotion from the
program may influence the extent to which PSAs are interpreted in terms o f positive
or negative frames. This is similar to what was found in the results from the analysis
o f schematic processing. However in that analysis, only the happy clip was shown to
increase viewers’ tendency to interpret a PSA in terms of the emotion that was
primed by the program.
The results o f this analysis suggest an interesting pattern (which is tentative, at
best, considering that the differences between conditions were not substantial).
Differences between the happy and sad program conditions were only found for the
sad PSA, such that subjects who saw the sad PSA in the context o f the happy
program gave higher estimates o f positive consequences occurring than those who
saw the sad PSA in the context o f the sad program. The fact that these results were
only found for the sad PSA may indicate several things. First, it could be that the
influence o f programming context on perceptions o f consequences is only significant
for PSAs which are persuasive, such that any beliefs in the positive benefits o f
avoiding drugs, or negative consequences o f taking drugs may be heightened by the
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emotion induced by the program, but only for messages that are already at least
moderately persuasive. Thus, for messages which are already perceived to be
persuasive, the emotion from the preceding program may influence the extent to
which that message is interpreted in terms o f gains or losses.
However, an additional interpretation is that the sadness from the sad PSA
created a high-elaboration condition, and that this increased the extent to which the
emotion from the program infused viewers’ interpretations o f the message. This
would explain why the same results were not found for the happy PSA, where the
happiness evoked by the PSA would have created a low-elaboration condition. In
fact, this would support the results o f Wegener (1994) who found that in high
elaboration conditions, subjects who were in a negative mood rated negatively framed
consequences as more likely, while subjects who were in a positive mood rated
positively framed consequences as more likely. However, in low elaboration
conditions, no differences were found between mood conditions. This idea is the
opposite o f what had been proposed earlier (that the emotion from the programs
dictates how we think, while the emotion from the PSAs tells us what to think), by
suggesting that the PSAs themselves can dictate the extent to which the emotion from
the programs influences our judgments. Because no other evidence was found to
suggest that the PSAs themselves triggered a particular type of cognitive processing,
it seems less likely that this speculation is accurate.
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Implications
While no evidence was found to support the two “models” that were proposed
in this study, several interesting findings emerged which suggest that television
programs can influence the way in which viewers process advertisements and public
service announcements. The most noteworthy finding from this study is that
emotions elicited by television programs may influence the extent o f information
processing in which subjects are willing to engage.
Evidence was found that sad programs may increase the extent to which
subjects engage in message relevant thinking, while happy programs may increase the
extent to which subjects engage in message irrelevant thinking by focusing on factors
which are secondary to the message itself (such as the actors, the music, the camera
angles, etc.). While no evidence was found to suggest that PSAs will be rated as more
persuasive when placed in a program which shares the same emotional tone, there are
several implications to these findings.
First, the results suggest that for public service announcements, or messages
on a topic about which viewers have strong beliefs, sad programs may provide a
better context in which to place them because subjects are more likely to engage in
extensive processing o f the message. According to the ELM, greater message
elaboration should lead to more stable and enduring attitude change, so PSAs which
are embedded in sad programs may be more effective. However, greater message
elaboration is only beneficial if that elaboration leads to positive thoughts about the
message. For instance, in this study, both the sad and happy PSAs were processed
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more systematically when they were placed in the sad program, compared to when
they were placed in the happy program. However, because the happy PSA contained
a weaker message, the greater amount o f message relevant thinking that took place in
response to it was in the form o f counter arguments. This suggests that PSAs which
have a strong message, or PSAs which provide new information should be placed in
sad programming, because viewers will be more likely to process the information
more extensively. However, PSAs which have a weaker message (or perhaps do not
provide any new information), should probably not be placed in sad programs,
because viewers may be more likely to counter argue against them.
The results for the sad programming context do not suggest that the emotion
elicited by PSAs interacts with the emotion elicited by programs in any significant
ways. However, because it appears that sad programming may trigger a greater
network o f negative thoughts than happy programs do happy thoughts, it may be that
negatively framed (or valenced) PSAs will be more easily integrated into memory than
happy or positively framed messages.
In addition, the findings o f this study suggest that PSAs which have a weaker
message, or do not provide any new information, should be placed in happy
programs, as opposed to sad programs where viewers are more likely to counter
argue against them. Because happy programs were found to elicit heuristic
processing, and encourage viewers to process PSAs more schematically, it seems that
PSAs which have a less overt message, or are designed to build image o r reinforce
ideas indirectly will be received better when they are embedded in happy PSAs.
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Evidence from this study suggested that when viewers watched a happy or sad PSA in
a happy context, they were more likely to interpret the PSA in terms of an overall
positive or negative frame (depending on the emotional tone o f the PSA), and were
more likely to think schematically about the topic o f the PSA. This suggests that
viewers who see a PSA in a happy program may be less likely to focus on the actual
message o f a PSA, but that the themes o f the PSAs may resonate more with them.
This may suggest that attitude change following a happy program may come less from
cognitive elaboration o f the message, and more from an overall gestalt or feeling
about the issue that resonates after seeing the PSA.
Again, there was no evidence to suggest that a happy or sad PSA would
perform better in a happy program. The interaction between the emotion o f the
program and PSA seemed to indicate that a happy PSA embedded in a happy
program would lead to interpretations o f the drug problems in terms of the positive
benefits associated with not doing drugs, while a negative PSA embedded in a happy
program would encourage more thoughts (or feelings) related to the loss associated
with drug use.
Lastly, there were obviously some significant methodological drawbacks to
this study, especially because actual PSAs were used. Unfortunately, because the
PSAs varied so much in their persuasiveness, it was difficult to adequately assess how
the emotion from the PSAs may have interacted with the programs. It was also
unclear whether the difference in the PSAs’ persuasiveness ratings prevented me from
duplicating previous findings which suggested that emotional consistency in the
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program and ad would lead to higher evaluations o f the ad, or whether the lack o f
finding is due to the fact that I used PSAs instead o f commercial advertisements. This
is certainly a problem associated with using real stimuli as opposed to manipulated
stimuli. Because the influence o f emotion is so difficult to separate from other
aspects o f persuasive messages (such as involvement, intensity, etc.), it may be
necessary in future studies using emotional PSAs, to manipulate the stimuli in order to
better control for the factors which confounded this study.
The most significant problem with this study was most likely that I used
happiness as one o f the emotions that I tested. My reasoning for this was that
previous context effects studies had compared happy and sad advertisements in happy
and sad program contexts. Similarly, a number o f studies had shown that happiness
elicits heuristic processing, whereas it is unclear how other emotions (such as fear)
influence cognitive processing. However, the problem with using a happy PSA about
a risky health behavior like drug use, is that happiness is not as relevant to people’s
beliefs about the behavior as many negative emotions such as fear, or guilt. Highly
emotional messages are often perceived to be more persuasive than less emotionally
evocative messages. In addition, messages which elicit negative emotions are often
thought to be more persuasive than positive emotional messages. Thus, it would have
been very difficult to find a happy anti-drug PSA which would trigger the same
degree o f emotion as a sad PSA, and which would also be rated as persuasive as the
sad PSA. In hindsight, it would have been better to use a PSA which evoked another
negative emotion (such as fear), because it would have been easier to find a fear
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evoking PSA which would be equally emotionally evocative as the sad PSA, and
which would also be comparable on ratings o f perceived persuasiveness.
In addition, the study was limited because several o f the PSAs which were
used were geared towards a younger audience than college age students. This may
have decreased subjects’ involvement with the PSAs, especially since many collegeage students have seen numerous anti-drug PSAs, which may have caused them to be
more likely to tune out to these messages. Future research with younger students
would be beneficial in this area.
Other problems include the number o f PSAs that were tested, and the thought
listing procedure itself. Because the results o f this study are only based on one
exemplar o f each type o f emotionally evocative PSA, it is unclear whether the results
I found (or didn’t find) are specific to the particular stimuli I used. Thus I am unable
to generalize my findings, or make firm conclusions that the hypothesized effects for
which I did not find support are false. It is clear that the happy PSA that was used
had some serious disadvantages. Perhaps if more PSAs had been tested, I would have
been able to average scores across several exemplars, which would have strengthened
my ability to draw conclusions. This could have been accomplished in two ways,
either by exposing participants to more than one program-PS A combination, or by
using multiple PSAs for each condition (for instance, 10 subjects see happy PSA1, 10
see happy PSA2, etc.), and averaging the results across the sample o f PSAs. O f
course, these alternatives have problems as well. Showing subjects multiple exposures
may cause order effects which could contaminate the results. Similarly, exposing a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202

small sample o f subjects one o f several possible PSAs, and then averaging across
PSAs may be problematic if the results differ between PSAs which evoke the same
emotion. It seems that the best alternative to this issue would be to conduct a series
o f experiments using different stimuli in order to see whether the same pattern o f
results is consistently found, and whether any o f the results found from the first study
could be replicated.
One final concern is that the multiple thought listing exercises that subjects
completed changed the viewing context to which subjects were exposed before seeing
the experimental PSA. Subjects were first shown a neutral program clip followed by
a neutral PSA, and were then asked to thought list (both as a warm-up exercise, and
to provide baseline information on their tendency to generate thoughts). They were
then shown the experimental program-PSA combination, and were asked to thought
list a second time. Although the thought listing instructions were slightly changed for
the experimental thought listing procedure, the fact that they were alerted to the fact
that they would be asked what they were thinking when watching the program, may
have influenced the way in which they viewed the crucial experimental program-PSA
clip. This may have changed the nature o f the viewing experience. For instance,
subjects may have been artificially involved in what they were watching when exposed
to the experimental stimuli. Although this potential problem should theoretically be
tempered by the fact that all subjects participated in the first thought listing task, the
thought listing exercise may have transformed the experience o f viewing the
experimental clips. Thus any effects that were found may have been caused by the
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combination o f the clip watched, plus the thought listing experience. Conversely, the
thought listing exercise may have changed the way that subjects viewed the
experimental program and PSA, suppressing effects that may have been found if they
had not been asked to thought list earlier in the study. This issue was considered
when the study was being designed, and it was decided that the initial thought listing
exercise was important enough to risk its potential influence on the second thought
listing exercise.
The purpose o f this study was to evaluate how emotion from programming
influences the cognitive processing o f persuasive messages. While several o f the
hypotheses o f this study were not supported, enough evidence was found to suggest
that the context in which commercials and PSAs are placed is important to our
understanding o f how viewers are processing them. The results o f this study suggest
that rather than focusing on the consistency between the program and commercials in
terms o f emotion, future studies should focus on the cognitive processing style
evoked by programming, and how different types o f executions may perform in
contexts where greater or lesser cognitive elaboration is likely to occur. Future
studies should attempt to replicate some o f results found here, particularly the main
effect o f program context, perhaps using other emotions such as fear or anger.
Studies should also attempt to address some o f the tentative results found here, such
as the influence o f program- induced emotion on schema reliance, associative priming,
and estimations o f the likelihood o f negatively and positively framed consequences. It
would also be beneficial if future studies applied the theories presented here to
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different types of
o f advertisements such as high and low involvement ads, image ads,
rational vs. emotional ads, and celebrity endorsements.
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Appendix A
Pre-test 1 Questionnaire
l.U sing the seven-point scale below, please circle the number which best
indicates the extent to which you felt each of the following emotions while you
were watching the PSA........

Afraid
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very Much

Happy
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Angry
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Sad
I
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Guilty
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Disgusted
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much

Surprised
1
2
Not at all

6

7
Very much
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Using the following scales, please circle the number which best indicates your
opinion o f the PSA.....

1
2
Disliked
Very much

3

4

5

6

1
Boring

2

3

4

5

6

7
Interesting

1
Bad

2

3

4

5

6

7
Good

1
2
Irritating

3

4

5

6

7
Not Irritating

1
2
Not at all
Motivating

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Motivating

1
2
Not at all
Silly

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Silly

1
2
Not at all
Exciting

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Exciting

1
2
Not at all
Memorable

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Memorable
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Overall, how effective do you think the PSA was?
1
2
Not at all
Effective

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Effective

5

6

7
Very
Convincing

5

6

7
Very
Believable

How convincing do you think the PSA was?
1
2
Not at all
Convincing

3

4

How believable do you think the PSA was?
1
2
Not at all
Believable

3

4

How would you rate the strength o f the argument presented in the PSA?
1
2
Weak
Argument

3

4

5

6

Had you ever seen this PSA before today?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]
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Using the seven-point scale below, please circle the number which best indicates
the extent to which you felt each of the following emotions while you were
watching the program segment.......

Afraid
1
2
Not at all

Very much

Happy
1
2
Not at all

Very much

Angry
1
2
Not at all

Very much

Sad
1
2
Not at all

Very much

Guilty
1
2
Not at all

Very much

Disgusted
I
2
Not at all

Very much

Surprised
1
2
Not at all

Very much
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Using the following scales, please circle the number which best indicates your
opinion of the segment.....

1
2
Not at all
Interesting

3

4

5

6

1
2
Not at all
Clear

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Clear

1
2
Not at all
Engaging

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Engaging

1
2
Very poor
Quality

3

4

5

6

1
2
Not at all
Cohesive

3

4

5

6

1
2
Not at all
Silly

3

4

5

6

1
2
Not at all
Exciting

3

4

5

6

7
Very
Exciting

1
2
Not at all
Memorable

3

4

6

7
Very
Memorable

5
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Do you know the name o f the movie this clip was taken from?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]

If yes, what is it? _____________________

Have you seen this movie?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]
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Please place an ‘x’ in the box, or write in the following information about yourself. These
questions are for classification purposes only.

1. Gender:

Male [

]

Female [

]

2. Age:

3. Yearin School:

Freshman

[

]

Sophomore

[

]

Junior

[

]

Senior

[

]

Caucasian

[

]

African-American

[

]

Asian-American

[

]

Hispanic

[

]

Other _____________

4. Race:

Other _____________

Thank you!!!
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Appendix B
Pre-test 2 Questionnaire
1. As you watched this PSA, what thoughts or feelings were going through your
mind? Please list up to 8 thoughts, comments, reactions and feelings you had
while you were watching.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
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1. Using the nine-point scale below, please circle the number which best
indicates the extent to which you felt each o f the following emotions while you
were watching the PSA........
Afraid
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Happy
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Angry
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Sad
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Guilty
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Cheerful
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Disgusted
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Sorrowful
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Surprised
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much
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Using the following scales, please circle the number which best indicates your
opinion of the PSA.__
1
2
Disliked
Very much

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Liked
Very much

1
2
Boring

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Interesting

1
Bad

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Good

1
2
Irritating

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Not Irritating

1
2
Not at all
Motivating

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Motivating

1
2
Not at all
Silly

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Silly

1
2
Not at all
Exciting

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Exciting

1
2
N ot at all
Memorable

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Memorable
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Overall, how effective do you think the PSA was?
1
2
Not at all
Effective

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Effective

7

8

9
Very
Convincing

7

8

9
Very
Believable

How convincing do you think the PSA was?
1
2
3
Not at all
Convincing

4

5

6

How believable do you think the PSA was?
1
2
3
Not at all
Believable

4

5

6

How would you rate the strength of the anti-drug argument presented in the PSA?
1
2
Weak
Argument

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Strong
Argument

In your own words, write down what you think the main argument o f this PSA is:

Had you ever seen this PSA before today?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]
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5.
S. As you watched this PSA, what thoughts or feelings were going through your
feeUngs you
mind? Please list any and aU
all thoughts, comments, reactions and feelings
bad
had while you were watching.

L
1.

2.
2.

3.

4.
4

5.

6.
6
.

7.
7

8.
8.
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Overall, how effective do you think the PSA was?
1
2
N ot at all
Effective

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Effective

How convincing do you think the PSA was?
1
2
Not at all
Convincing

3

4

5

9
Very
Convincing

How believable do you think the PSA was?
1
2
N ot at all
Believable

3

4

5

8

9
Very
Believable

How would you rate the strength o f the anti-drug argument presented in the PSA?
1
2
Weak
Argument

3

4

5

6

7

8

Had you ever seen this PSA before today?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]
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The next two pages of questions pertain to the movie clip that you
just saw about the boxer. Please think about the clip (not the PSA)
when answering these questions.
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Please circle the number which best indicates the extent to which you felt each
of the following emotions while you were watching the movie d ip about the
boxer.......
Afraid
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Happy
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Angry
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Sad
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Guilty
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Cheerful
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Disgusted
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Sorrowful
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much

Surprised
1
2
Not at all

8
9
Very much
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Using the following scales, please circle the number which best indicates your
opinion o f the movie din__

1
2
Not at all
Interesting

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1
2
N ot at all
Clear

3

1
2
Not at all
Engaging

3

1
2
Very poor
Quality

3

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very good
Quality

1
2
Not at all
Cohesive

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1
2
Not at all
Silly

3

1
2
Not at all
Exciting

3

1
2
Not at all
Memorable

3

Very
Interesting
4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Clear

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Engaging

Very
Cohesive
4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Silly

4

5

6

7

8

9
Very
Exciting

4

5

6

7

8
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Please place an ‘x’ in the box, or write in the following information about yourself. These
questions are for classification purposes only.

1. G ender

Male [

]

Female [

]

2. Age:

3. Year in School:

Freshman

[

]

Sophomore

[

]

Junior

[

]

Senior

[

]

Other

4. Major

5. Race:

Caucasian

[

]

African-American

[

]

Asian-American

[

]

Hispanic

[

]

Other

Thank you!!!
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Appendix C
Pre-test 2 Thought Listing Coding Book
Message Relevant
Positive Statem ents
Reasoned affirmations: Includes positive message elaborations, i.e. “Drugs
really can ruin lives”.
Simple affirmations: Includes simple statements about the effectiveness o f
the message, i.e. “It was effective”, “Strong message”, “I like it when she
said
”.

Negative Statements
Counterargum ents: Includes reasoned disaffirmations. i.e. “The PSA
didn’t tell me anything new”, “Drugs aren’t bad if taken in moderation”.
Simple disaffirmations: Includes simple statements about the ineffectiveness
o f the message, i.e. “It wasn’t very convincing”, “I don’t think it would be
effective”, “It was confusing when he said
”

Message Irrelevant
Production comments: Includes statements about the executional style,
elements o f the PSA
Positive: “I liked the music”, “Realistic”, “Nice man-on-the street
approach”, “Seemed real, so you can relate to it”.
Negative: “Too loud”, “The colors hurt my eyes”, “Too jumpy”, “I
couldn’t tell what the PSA was for”.
Neutral: “Try to target younger kids”, “Using a celebrity to reach kids”
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Source comments: Includes comments about the spokesperson/celebrity in
the PSA
Neutral: “I recognized that woman as Lauryn Hill”, “She looks tough”, “She
looks different now”, “I just bought one o f her CDs”
Appearance/skill positive: “She looks good”, “I like her clothes”, “I like
her music”, “I like her”
Appearance/skill - negative: “Those glasses are nasty”, “I don’t like them”
Credibility - positive: “She’s a good role model”, “Kids will listen to her”
Credibility - negative: “Not a good role model for kids”, “I bet he/she does
drugs”.
I bet he/she does drugs: Separate column to tally these comments...may use
as a counterargument.... “I wonder if he/she does drugs” ...

Affective comments: Includes statements about one’s emotional response to
the PSA
Positive: Reports o f feeling happy, content.
Negative: Reports o f feeling sad, unhappy.

General comments:
Positive: “The PSA was entertaining”
Negative: “I didn’t like it”
Neutral: “I ’ve seen this PSA before”, “I ’m glad I don’t watch TV”
Movie comments: Includes statements about the plot, characters o f the
movie (“I wonder what happened to the little boy”, “Who was that actor?”)
as well as comments that the subject was “still thinking about the movie”.
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Movie/PSA connection: Includes positive and negative statements about
how the movie and PSA are related. “I was wondering why this PSA came
after this clip”, “The PSA seems out o f place following this clip”, “The
transition between the clip and PSA was jarring”.
Movie themes: Includes comments related to the theme o f the movie. “I was
thinking about how scary death is”, “I was thinking about parental roles and
responsibilities”.
Thoughts about thinking: Includes comments about the way the subject
was thinking. “It was good to see that PSA after that movie clip, because it
made me focus on what he was saying”, “I watched the PSA critically after
seeing that clip”.
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Appendix D
Main Experiment Questionnaire
1. What thoughts or feelings were going through your mind while you were
watching this movie clip and public service announcement (PSA)? Please list up
to 8 thoughts, comments, reactions and feelings you had while you were
watching.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6

.

7.

8.
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In your own words, write down what you think the main argument o f the PSA is:

Had you ever seen this PSA before today?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]
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PLEASE STOP

DO NOT TURN THE PAGE UNTIL INSTRUCTED TO DO SO

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228

You just saw two segments. One was a movie clip, and one was a public service
announcement (PSA). As vou watched the PSA, what thoughts or feelings were
going through your mind? On the next page, please list up to 8 thoughts,
comments, reactions and feelings you had while you were watching the PSA.

1.

2.

3.

4

5.

6.

7.

8.
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Using the scales below, please circle a number between “ 1” and “9” which best
represents your opinion o f the PSA.
1. To what extent did the PSA make you think about the issue o f drug abuse?
Not a t a l l l

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 9

Very Much

2. To what extent did the PSA make you think o f reasons why people shouldn’t take
drugs?
Not a t a l l l

3.

2

4

5

6

7

8

9Very Much

To what extent did the PSA make you weigh the pros and cons o f using drugs?

Not a t a l l l

4.

3

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9Very Much

To what extent did the PSA make you think about vour opinion o f drug use?

Not a t a l l l

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9Very Much

5. To what extent did the PSA make you compare your beliefs about drug use to
what was said in the PSA?
Not a t a l l l

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9Very Much

6. To what extent did you think of arguments to support or contradict what was
being said in the PSA?
Not a t a l l l

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9Very Much

7. To what extent did the PSA make you think rather than feel?
Not a t a l l l

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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Using the scales below, please circle a number between *1* and ‘9’ which best
reflects your feelings about using drugs.

Using drugs nearly every month for the next 12 months would be:
Extremely 1
Bad

Extremelyl
Harmful

2

2

Extremely 1
Foolish

Extremelyl
Negative

3

3

2

2

4

4

3

3

5

6

5

6

4

4

5

5

7

6

6

7

7

7

8 9

Extremely
Good

8

9

Extremely
Beneficial

8

9

Extremely
Wise

9

Extremely
Positive

8
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Using the scales below, please circle a number between “ 1” and “9” which best
represents your opinion o f the PSA.
Overall, how effective do you think the PSA was?
Not at all
Effective

1

2

3

4

5

9 Very
Effective

6

How convincing do you think the PSA was?
Not at all
Convincing

1

2

3

4

5

9 Very
Convincing

5

9 Very
Believable

How believable do you think the PSA was?
Not at all
Believable

1

2

3

4

How would you rate the strength o f the anti-drug argument presented in the PSA?
Weak
Argument

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Strong
Argument

How persuasive do you think this PSA would be in keeping people from doing drugs?
Not at all
Persuasive

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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In your own words, write down what you think the main argument o f this PSA is:

Had you ever seen this PSA before today?
Yes

[

]

No

[

]

Unsure [

]
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To what extent do you think anything can be done to solve the drug abuse problem in
this country?
Nothing 1
be done

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 A l o t can
be done

To what extent do you think the drug abuse situation in this country is hopeless
Not at all 1
Hopeless

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very
Hopeless

To what extent do you think that societal pressures cause people to use drugs?
Not a t a l l l 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very Much

To what extent do you think that individuals themselves are responsible for their drug
use?
Not at all 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very Much

To what extent do you think uncontrollable, impersonal forces are responsible for the
drug abuse problem in this country?
Not at all 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Very Much

To what extent do you think that individuals themselves are responsible for any drug
abuse problems they may have?
Not at all 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Very Much

To what extent do you think that drug use and its consequences can be controlled or
modified by human action?
Not a t a l l l 2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9 Very Much
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Imagine that you found out that a friend of
youn had been taking drugs, and
o f yours
you were concerned that this penon
person had a serious drug problem. What reasons
would you give to convince your friend to stop abusing drugs?
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Please circle a number between *1* and ‘9’ that best indicates your opinion.
If people do NOT follow the advice suggested in this PSA and start doing drugs,
how likely is it that....
They will suffer serious physical and mental damage as the result o f using drugs
Very unlikely 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

6

7

8

9

Very likely

6

7

8

9

Very likely

6

7

8

9

Very likely

They will get addicted to drugs
Very unlikely 1

2

3

4

5

They will stop enjoying things they used to like to do
Very unlikely 1

2

3

4

5

They will start to use even harder drugs
Very unlikely 1

2

3

4

5

They will have strained relationships with their parents
Very unlikely 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

They will lose friends
Very unlikely 1

2

Their grades will suffer
Very unlikely

1

2
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If people DO follow the advice suggested in this PSA and avoid taking drugs,
how likely is it that....
They will do better in school
Very Unlikely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

They will be more successful in the future
Very Unlikely

1

2

3

4

They will be able to achieve their goals and aspirations
Very Unlikely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

5

6

7

8

9

Very likely

They will be happier about their lives
Very Unlikely

1

2

3

4

They will be well-liked by their peers
Very Unlikely

1

2

3

4

They will get along well with their parents
Very Unlikely

1

2

3

4
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The following statements refer to the feelings and emotions people have and
how they use them. Emotions can be positive and negative. Indicate how
strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by circling
a number between ‘1’ and ‘5’.
I use my feelings to determine what I should do in situations.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
Strongly

My feelings and emotions are very important to me.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
Strongly

My emotions tell me what to do in many cases.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
Strongly

5

Agree
Strongly

5

Agree
Strongly

I try not to let my feelings guide my actions.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

I trust my feelings to guide my behavior.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

I don’t pay much attention to my emotions most o f the time.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
Strongly

I learn a lot about myself on the basis o f my feelings.
Disagree
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
Strongly
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Please place an ‘x’ in the box, o r write in the following information about yourself.
These questions are for classification purposes only.

1. Gender:

Male [

2. Age:

]

Female [

]

__________

3. Year in School:

[

]

Sophomore

[

1

Junior

[

]

Senior

[

]

Caucasian

[

]

African-American

[

]

Asian-American

[

]

Hispanic

[

]

Freshman

Other ____

4. M ajor_____________________

5. Race:

Other _________

6. How relevant is the issue o f drug abuse to your own life?
Not at all 1
Relevant

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Thank you!!!
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Very
Relevant

Appendix E
Main Experiment Schema Coding Book
Negatively framed reasons
You could die
It’s against the law/could go to jail
You could suffer physical damage
Waste o f money
May Hurt/Lose Family
May Hurt/Lose Friends
May Hurt Relationships (general)
May Hinder Future
School work may suffer
W ork may suffer
Attitude/Personality will change
Will get addicted
Will affect others
Will affect mental abilities
Waste o f life
W on’t solve problems
You may turn to harder drugs
You may turn to crime
Your will become unattractive
Positively framed reasons
Think o f the positive benefits o f not being on drugs
Life is too valuable
There are better ways to be happy
There are people who will support you
Esteem: You are beautiful, you have so much to live for, look forward to
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